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ABSTRACT 
 
“LEST THEY PERISH”: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN HUMANITARIAN MEDIA IN THE U.S., 1915-1925 
Jaffa L. Panken 
Kathy Peiss 
Between celebrity spokesmen and late night informercials, international humanitarian aid 
organizations use multiple media strategies to generate public interest in their programs. 
Though this humanitarian media has seemingly proliferated in the past thirty years, these 
publicity campaigns are no recent phenomenon but one that emerged from the World 
War I era.  “Lest They Perish” is a case study of the modernization of international 
humanitarian media in the U.S. during and after the Armenian genocide from 1915 to 
1925.   This study concerns the Near East Relief, an international humanitarian 
organization that raised and contributed over $100,000,000 in aid to the Armenians 
during these years of violence.  As war raged throughout Europe and Western Asia, 
American governmental propagandists kept the public invested in the action 
overseas.  Private philanthropies were using similar techniques aimed at enveloping 
prospective donors in "whirlwind campaigns" to raise funds.  The Near East Relief was 
among the earliest philanthropic organizations to undertake these publicity blitzes.   After 
Armistice, the NER established relief operations that dispensed humanitarian services in 
cities throughout Asia Minor. It is in this latter period that the media appeal for 
humanitarian aid for witnessing publics solidified into a consumer-centered model of 
advertising.  From the NER’s earliest fundraisers, images were crucial tools that bridged 
the distance between the spectators—the prospective donors—and the sufferers. Images 
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of starving children were used to power philanthropic giving.  Rather than focus on the 
reception of these images, the project is concerned with the production of this media and 
vehicles for its message. This perspective reveals considerable overlap between advocacy 
campaigns and the actual relief work. The chapter finally reflects on the emerging role of 
private enterprise in sponsoring humanitarian relief.  By this point, the rise of public 
relations had turned donors into consumers and Armenians into their objects of pity. 
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Introduction  
 
 Blame the wind.  In some places it swoops in without warning, sending houses 
and cows swirling through the air.  At Smyrna on the Aegean Coast there was no such 
caprice.  The wind was as certain as the seasons.  So when the air picked up one early 
Fall afternoon, the arsonists knew the direction it would choose.   It was the thirteenth of 
September 1922, four days after the Turkish Army returned to Smyrna and the day the 
city began to burn.  A block of houses near the Southeastern corner of the Armenian 
Quarter went up in flames.  The wind caught the blazes, spreading Northwest throughout 
the Armenian and Greek Quarters, driving most of the Christian inhabitants down to the 
quay.1  For eleven days, refugees remained trapped between the fiery blaze behind them 
and impassable waters at their toes.  Many suffered from hunger, dehydration, exposure, 
and the violence inflicted by Turkish soldiers.  In the final week of September, Greek 
ships received permission to begin evacuating an estimated 150,000-200,000 Ottoman 
Christians from Smyrna to Greece.2   
 Where the Armenian refugees went, so too would the Near East Relief.  Founded 
in 1915 as an ad hoc committee raising emergency funds for Armenian relief, the Near 
East Relief expanded in concert with the devastation wrought by the Armenian genocide 
and World War I.  Within two years, the philanthropic organization oversaw a network of 
state and local offices from its national headquarters in New York City.  After Armistice, 
the NER established relief operations that dispensed humanitarian services in cities 
throughout Asia Minor.  Working with government officials, churches, and mission 
                                                
1 Under orders to maintain neutrality, Allied fleets stationed just offshore refused to intervene as an 
unknown thousands of Armenians and Greeks amassed at the harbor. 
2 Norman N. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002), 52. 
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stations, the Constantinople-based administration acquired facilities for warehouses, 
schools, hospitals, clinics, and orphanages.  Allied withdrawal and changing battle lines 
during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922 kept the population in constant flux.  After 
months of stalemate outside Ankara and no diplomatic solution in sight, the Greek Army 
began retreating from Anatolia in March of 1922.  Hundreds of thousands of Armenians 
and Greeks fled in their wake.  Many of the refugees settled in and around Smyrna, 
adding substantially to those trapped on the quay.  Providing the Smyrna refugees with 
food, water, and medical attention depleted NER warehouses and nearly bankrupted the 
organization.   
Stakes were unthinkably high when philanthropic and civic leaders convened in 
New York to generate a joint statement responding to the Smyrna disaster.  Under their 
advisement, President Harding formed the Near East Emergency Fund to aid the NER’s 
recovery efforts.  Motion Picture Association of America chief Will H. Hays was 
appointed to head the national committee.  Hays, in turn, worked his connections to 
combine philanthropy with Hollywood magic.  A lot at United Artists’ Studios was 
transformed into a circus rivaling any Ringling Brothers’ production.  An open invitation 
promised the requisite clowns, acrobats, elephants, a bearded lady, daring equestrienne, 
and Jackie Coogan, child star and main attraction.  Admission would cost a “bundle of 
clothing” or “not less than two pint cans of milk” to benefit the NER.3  Though any brand 
of canned milk was accepted, the NER preferred Borden brands because the company 
matched every can of Borden milk donated to the NER with a second can.4  For his many 
fans, the chance to watch Coogan in action was well worth the contribution. Best known 
                                                
3 "Near East Circus to be Larger." Los Angeles Times, Dec 5, 1922, 1.  
4 The Milk Route,” New Near East 6, no. 8 (May 1921): 7. 
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as “The Kid” in Charlie Chaplin’s 1921 box office hit, Coogan enjoyed immense 
popularity managed by a cavalry of press agents.  The ‘real life circus” was an elaborate 
set for Coogan’s portrayal of Toby Tyler, a boy who runs away to join the circus.  While 
other children enjoyed a day of frivolity, ‘His Majesty of Boyhood’ was hard at work 
selling lemonade and peanuts.  Later, the crowds would assemble under the Big Top to 
watch Coogan “ride a horse around the sawdust and . . . do bare-back stunts.”5  Hays 
proclaimed the benefit a huge success, thanking the 7.500 attendees and the Jackie 
Coogan Production Company for underwriting the costs.6 
 Several thousand batches of clothing and milk would not have lasted a day on the 
quay.  The intangible proceeds were expected to yield far more than supplies. In modern 
marketing parlance, Jackie Coogan’s Publicity Circus exhibited cross-promotion, vertical 
integration, product placement, corporate sponsorship, and celebrity branding.  These 
modern commercial methods illustrate the sophistication of NER fundraising techniques.  
At the height of the silent-film era, the culture of cinematic celebrity was firmly 
entrenched. Coogan represented the vanguard of an emerging class of entertainer whose 
influence extended beyond his acting.  If his image could sell peanut butter, paper dolls, 
caps, and biscuits, why couldn’t it sell the NER?  Huge crowds of fans greeting Coogan 
with bundles and cans of Borden milk for Armenians made far better news than his 
aggressive publicists. Just as the NER celebrated Jackie Coogan’s good deeds or 
emphasized Borden milk’s nutritional value, these cooperative campaigns likewise 
promoted the Near East Relief “brand” of humanitarian aid.  
                                                
5 “Benefit Circus ‘Real Thing,’” Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1922, H12.  "Jackie's Circus is Great 
Hit." Los Angeles Times, Dec 10, 1922, 1, 
6 “Jackie Coogan’s Circus,” New Near East 8, no. 5 (April 1923), 8. 
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 This dissertation traces the NER’s development and adaptation of commercial 
techniques to publicize the Armenian plight.  Beyond the press, the NER used 
advertisements, parades, illustrated posters, car cards, billboards, plays, photographs, and 
films in appealing to the American public.  Rather than focusing on popular reception, 
this project considers the production of humanitarian publicity.  Here, ‘production’ 
encompasses both material resources and creative processes.  When placed within a 
chronological framework, NER media reflect the organization’s increasing reliance on 
experienced admen and publicists.  From 1915-1925, NER publicity improved drastically 
in quality and refinement.  Long explanations of Armenian history were excised in favor 
of tales of sorrow, heroism, and redemption.  Until 1917, the NER circulated reports and 
updates on the Armenian situation to the individuals on their mailing lists.  After 
Armistice, the NER offered opportunities for journalists to tour their relief operations and 
write about their experiences.  These articles were published in National Geographic, 
American Review of Reviews, Asia and other reputable periodicals.  Rather than rely on 
illustrators to add visual interest, these accounts were often accompanied by photographs 
taken by NER professional photographers.  Early cinematographers filmed newsreel 
while Hollywood studios released movies sponsored by the NER.  Despite these forays 
into professional media, I contend that NER changed little in its commitment to a 
‘politics of pity.’ 
 The NER embraced a ‘politics of pity’ by emphasizing Armenian suffering and 
promoting its alleviation through humanitarian aid.  In her essay On Revolution, Hannah 
Arendt described a ‘politics of pity’ as a conceptual framework derived from distinctions 
  5 
between sufferers and non-sufferers who observe the former in a spectacle of suffering.7   
Within the politics of pity, spectators of human suffering have a moral obligation to help 
these unfortunates.  French Sociologist Luc Boltanski complicates this model by 
considering the moral and political implications of distant suffering. Just as described in 
this dissertation, Boltanski suggests a case in which the spectator is thousands of miles 
away from the sufferers.8  Therefore, intermediaries are necessary to describe suffering 
using “mode of expression which mixes a depiction of inner life (emotion) and a 
description of the outside world” to inform the spectators while instilling sympathy for 
the unfortunate.9  These choice statements and images must “propose to the spectator a 
definite mode of linguistic and conative emotional commitment” so that he may act 
accordingly.10  NER acted as intermediary and agent between the American public (the 
spectators) and the Armenian refugees (the sufferers) by inspiring spectators to act 
through donations to NER agents.  This dissertation argues that the NER adhered to these 
politics of pity, encouraging spectators to identify and sympathize with the sufferers. 
By examining and analyzing NER handbooks, instruction manuals, internal reports as 
well as publicly circulated articles, advertisements, and visual media, I will show the 
means by which the NER produced a spectacle of the Armenians’ distant suffering.  
 The ‘politics of pity’ help reconcile the NER’s sentimental appeals for funds to 
save the ‘Starving Armenians’ with the complex political, social, and economic turmoil 
behind these conditions.  Boltanski contends that the intermediary or agent must convey 
                                                
7 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), 59-114.   
8 Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics, trans. Graham D. Burchell (Cambridge 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999),  2. 
9 Boltanski, Distant Suffering, 86. 
10 Boltanski, Distant Suffering, 149. 
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the spectacle of suffering with sympathy for the spectator to pity the sufferer.  If the agent 
instead focuses on the perpetrators and their misdeeds, he will promote indignation rather 
than pity.  Indignation diverts attention away from the sufferers to make calls for justice 
or--in this case--intervention.11   While the Armenian Genocide provoked both pity and 
indignation in certain individuals, the NER took pains to appear neutral in public. After 
1919 fundraising material bolstered this claim in emphasizing the sorrowful state of the 
Armenians themselves over the actions that caused their distress. 
 NER pleas for humanitarian aid seem naive in consideration of the harsh realities 
of the Armenian Genocide.  From 1915 to 1923, Turkish nationalists attempted to claim 
‘Turkey for the Turks’ by eliminating Armenian Christians and other non-Turkish 
minorities from their lands.  The Armenian genocide officially began with the April 1915 
arrests of prominent Armenian men.  Within days, Ottoman authorities launched a 
campaign of mass violence against Armenians throughout the Anatolian Peninsula. From 
Constantinople’s Bosphorus strait to Mount Ararat in the East, Turkish gendarmes 
massacred the majority of Armenian men in raids on their communities. The women, 
children, and elderly left behind were deported from their homes and forcibly marched 
through the Turkish Interior and Syrian Desert.  Many succumbed to starvation and 
illness while other endured beatings, theft, and rape.  Attractive young women and girls 
were often taken into Turkish homes as wives or servants.   
 A handful of American diplomats and missionaries witnessed this near decimation 
of a people from posts throughout the former Ottoman Empire.  As Turkish censorship 
closed the borders around them, these firsthand accounts were secretly transmitted and 
                                                
11 Boltanski, Distant Suffering, 77. 
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publicized to the outside world. Operating beneath the watchful eyes of the Turkish 
authorities, this network became instrumental in providing limited humanitarian aid to the 
surviving refugees until their exile in the wake of the U.S. joining the Great War.  At the 
other end of this pipeline was the Near East Relief, an alliance of well-connected 
philanthropists and religious leaders.  Though the violence scaled back around 1917, the 
surviving Armenians still contended with renewed massacres, physical deprivations, and 
limited resources for years afterwards.  They were not alone in their suffering as the war 
had devastated the Ottoman Empire and left its peoples reeling.  Even with humanitarian 
relief programs, many refugees were lost--some to disease, others to Turkification 
programs.  When the dust settled in 1923, an estimated 1.2 million Armenians had 
perished in addition to hundreds of thousands of Greek Christians, Syrians, Kurds, 
Nestorians, Arabs, and Turks.12  
Perpetrated in the shadow of the Great War, the aftermath of the Armenian 
Genocide reverberated beyond Armistice.  Western Europe turned towards recovery but 
the Greco-Turkish War from 1919-1923 prevented similar efforts in the Near East.  
Instead, violence, starvation, or epidemics continued to plague the region.  Relief 
operations were established overseas during the brief respite after the Allied Victory and 
                                                
12 Taner Akçam, The Young Turks' Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic 
Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), Ronald Grigor Suny, 
Fatma Muge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark (eds.), A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the 
End of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), Taner Akçam, A Shameful Act: 
The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (New York: Metropolitan Books, 
2006), Simon Payaslian, United States Policy Toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian Genocide, 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Vahakn N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: 
Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus (Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 
2004), Merrill D. Peterson, ‘Starving Armenians’: America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1930 and 
After (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 2004), Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The 
Armenian Genocide and America's Response (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), Jay Winter, ed. America 
and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Richard G 
Hovannisian (ed.), The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992). 
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continued throughout the conflict. In the U.S., the NER’s in-house Publicity Department 
used professional advertising methods to produce media and fundraising events.  Each 
year, the organization embarked on these whirlwind campaigns until international 
diplomatic intervention helped stabilize the crisis in the mid-1920s.  
The chapters are ordered chronologically with some concessions to thematic unity 
in the latter half.  By necessity, there is considerable overlap during the Great War years 
to avoid switching between different sets of issues and experiences.  Chapter One 
considers the establishment and early years of the Near East Relief in light of its 
relationship to ecumenical Protestant organizations.  The chapter begins by describing 
the founding of the NER, offering insight into the violence that sparked its formation.  
This narrative continues by following the committee’s early attempts at publicizing the 
Armenian Genocide and its evolution into an organized fundraising campaign with help 
from the Laymen’s Missionary Movement.  
 This emphasis on the Laymen’s Movement as an ecumenical Protestant 
organization refutes previous historiography that placed the NER’s origins solely in 19th 
century missions to the Ottoman Empire.  While missionaries for the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions were essential as witnesses of the Armenian 
Genocide and distributors of limited humanitarian aid, it was the business-oriented 
Laymen’s Missionary Movement and its ilk that dominated the NER’s publicity and 
fundraising in the U.S.  This contention is supported by a discussion of the Laymen’s 
Movement’s collaboration with the newly founded organization in spreading its message 
through the reports, bulletins, and pamphlets produced in advance of the 1916 
Campaign.  Analyzing these documents reveals the caution with which the NER guarded 
the disturbing narratives provided by the missionaries, consuls, and victims in this 
period.  This chapter also examines several important individuals who helped define the 
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NER, including members of its early Executive Board and American Ambassador to 
Turkey, Henry Morgenthau.  These men offer insight into the political and social 
connections that supported the NER’s work. 
Chapter Two attempts to understand the influence of Belgian Relief upon the 
Armenian Relief Movement.  Historian Nicoletta Gullace rightly points out that the 
response to German atrocities against Belgian civillians overshadowed the response to 
the Armenian Genocide during the Great War.  Gullace further asks—and this chapter 
begins to answer—why?  The chapter begins by describing the German invasion of 
Belgium as well as its portrayal in the Anglo-American media as the “Rape of Belgium.” 
Analyses of Belgian Relief posters and other publicity materials will reveal its extensive 
reliance on accounts of sexual violence against mothers and adult women.  This 
aggressive propaganda on Belgium’s behalf challenged the public’s threshold for fund 
drives.  As a result, the NER avoided any comparisons by minimizing the considerable 
sexual violence perpetrated against Armenians with euphemisms and focusing on 
orphaned children.   
The second part of the chapter concerns Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Relief 
in Belgium, the Belgian equivalent and immediate predecessor to the Near East Relief.  
Hoover, a private citizen, gained the authority to negotiate with British and German 
officials to grant food aid to the starving Belgians.  At the same time, the situation in 
Belgium was nowhere near as severe as that in the Near East.  This section analyzes the 
political, social, and cultural distinctions that made Belgium a priority and the Armenians 
an afterthought.   
  10 
Chapter Three begins with a general view of American wartime propaganda and 
its role in shaping the NER’s 1919 Campaign for $30,000,000.  In April of 1917, 
President Wilson reversed his prior neutrality and asked Congress to declare war on 
Germany.  Once obliged, the President who “had kept us out of war” steeled himself for 
backlash by a resentful public.  While the American military prepared to ship out, Wilson 
laid the groundwork for a domestic campaign fought with word and images rather than 
guns and subs.   Executive order 2594 established the Committee for Public Information 
to produce propaganda that would inspire the public to support the much-reviled war 
effort.  At the helm stood George Creel, an unexceptional journalist and public relations 
man who exceeded all expectations by building a veritable publicity machine.  The Creel 
Committee’s prodigious output of effective propaganda arguably defined the historical 
legacy of World War I in the United States and heralded the birth of mass media.  Some 
of the Creel Committee’s most talented artists would contribute compelling, evocative 
works of art.  The chapter focuses on three Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP) 
illustrators whose posters appeared in the NER campaign.  W.T. Benda, Douglas Volk, 
and Ethel Franklin Betts represent the breadth of DPP artists with respect to their 
training, previous work, and their rendering of Armenian relief.  
The 1919 Campaign was the last Near East Relief fundraiser that centered around 
poster art.   Once treasured tools in the publicity arsenal, illustrated images were rapidly 
supplanted by photography.  After armistice, representatives from various American 
relief agencies surveyed the desperate conditions throughout the Near East to plan an 
extensive humanitarian operation.  These committees brought back numerous 
photographs, some of which were passed on for publicity purposes.  From then on, visual 
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publicity was dominated by images of Armenian refugees sent by relief workers, 
journalists, and professional publicity photographers.  These resources and the advent of 
mass culture set new rules in a quest for consumer appeal in humanitarian work. 
Chapter Four follows NER operations and the experiences of relief workers in the 
Near East after Armistice.   In February 1919, the Leviathan departed New York with the 
first group of NER personnel aboard.  Among them were ABCFM missionaries, 
physicians, nurses, fresh college graduates, a group of Mennonite Conscientious 
Objectors, and other volunteers. Using internal reports, staff newsletters, personal 
correspondence, journals, and other unpublished sources, this chapter reconstructs the 
human side of humanitarian work. Examining a selection of personal papers reveals 
meaningful differences in backgrounds, experiences, and opinions. In the weeks after 
arriving in Constantinople, the NER took over former Red Cross relief stations as the 
wartime organization withdrew from civilian service.  Though the American Red Cross 
continued providing nurses and other professionals, the NER now directed all 
humanitarian operations in the Near East.  Likewise, the American Women’s Hospitals 
(AWH) supplied female physicians who joined the NER medical relief program. AWH 
staff took orders from the NER, but wore uniforms and received salaries from their 
sponsoring organizations.  As representatives of a small-scale organization, AWH 
physicians had the added responsibilities of generating publicity materials. Dr. Mabel E. 
Elliott also contributed to the AWH coffers through her evocative letters and as the 
ministering angel to a malnourished child in a photograph.  This chapter looks at this 
photograph as an iconic image of Armenian Relief. 
  12 
Chapter Five examines NER fundraising activities after Armistice in the U.S.  As 
relief operations began in Turkey, the Publicity Committee in New York were wrapping 
up the 1919 campaign and gearing up for this new era in the organization. The CPI and 
other wartime publicity departments had spurred the professionalization of advertising 
and publicity. With the end of war, these agencies were dissolved and many of their 
former staff members set up shop as experienced admen.  While this industry catered to 
commercial interests, firms continued to work with philanthropic organizations at 
reduced rates.  Though NER’s Publicity Committee occasionally consulted with outside 
agencies, the in-house staff included its own admen, writers, speakers, and artists.  This 
chapter analyzes publicity methods unique to the post-Armistice period: film, celebrity 
spokesmen, and cooperative marketing with food producers.   
Children were key figures in post-Armistice publicity.  NER photo-plays like 
Ravished Armenia and Alice in Hungerland dramatized the plight of motherless 
Armenian children in the organization’s first forays into film.  Children’s plays, stories, 
and contests were published in The New Near East to provide entertainment for the 
younger generation.  The Boy Scouts of America and other groups for children repeatedly 
organized milk drives and bundle days to collect old clothes for the Armenian orphans.  
Their accomplishments resulted in accolades by the NER as well as local officials.  Child 
star Jackie Coogan was part of this effort to reach children as he was commissioned to 
lead a “Children’s Crusade for the Near East” in 1924.  Coogan traveled across the 
country drawing crowds and collecting donations for a cargo ship he would escort to the 
Near East.  In announcing the tour, Jack Coogan Sr. discussed his edifying intentions in 
exposing his son to the “hardships and suffering other children of his own age have had 
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to endure” so that he might realize “the common duty of all mankind to one another.”13 
As Armenian orphans provided lessons in humanity, NER wards also confirmed 
nutritional value in advertisements for food products.  Food cooperatives such as the 
Dairyman’s League, Inc., and Association of Corn Products as well as certain branded 
food companies are listed as generous contributors to the NER’s Golden Rule Campaign.  
Those brands include Borden’s Condensed Milk, Sun Maid Raisins, Carnation Milk, and 
Tharinger Macaroni.14  In 1923, the NER and President Coolidge asked Americans to 
observe International Golden Rule Sunday on December 2nd by eating at least one meal 
“approximating that which is used every day in the orphanages of the Near East.”15 The 
provided guidelines confirm the commercial collaboration between food manufacturers 
and the NER.  The chapter will thus demonstrate how the NER’s child-centered publicity 
facilitated parental obligations to nourish American children physically and morally.  
Thus, the NER pitiful rendering of “Starving Armenians” paradoxically helped sustain 
the American way-of-life: a triumph of humanitarian salesmanship. 
 After the Republic of Turkey declared independence in 1923, the League of 
Nations relocated the Armenian and Greek populations from Turkey to Greece.  Upon 
welcoming the newcomers, the Greek Government, Allied Nations, and various 
organizations reduced NER responsibilities.  With the Armenians’ survival ensured, the 
organization found other opportunities to dispense humanitarian aid.  Years of collecting 
canned milk and pleas on behalf of malnourished orphans, however, imparted a collective 
concern for the “Starving Armenians.”  Depicted outside the context of genocide, these 
                                                
13 "Jackie Coogan to Aid Tots," Los Angeles Times, Mar 17, 1924.  
14 Charles V. Vickrey, “Advertising and Golden Rule Sunday” (New York: Near East Relief, 1924). 
15 “International Golden Rule Sunday,” New Near East 8 no. 12 (December 1923), 19. 
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children were wholly defined by unending hunger.  This dissertation asks not why, but 
how these images came to be.  In answering these questions, I argue for the historical 
importance of humanitarian media in American cultural life.   
Humanitarian media defined the way Americans saw the tragedies occurring 
outside their own domain.  The images of suffering shaped Americans’ perspectives of 
the world and, in turn, their understanding of the United States in the world.  In 
campaigns by the Near East Relief, Americans perceived the wretchedness of the 
Armenian situation to contrast with their own comforts and privileges.  Armenians 
wandered through the desert or squatted in overcrowded cities under the constant threat 
of continuing or renewed violence.  Meanwhile, Americans remained safely across the 
Atlantic from the perils of warfare in the Near East and Europe.  Geographic isolation, 
however, did not obviate their compassion for their fellow human beings.  If anything, 
U.S. neutrality and, later, distance from the war conferred an added duty to contribute to 
the various wartime relief projects.  Americans were constantly called upon to give of 
their plenty to civilians suffering in Belgium, France, Serbia, and other places ravaged by 
World War I.  Only in the Armenian case did they call for humanitarian relief because of 
violence conducted against a people by their fellow citizens.   
This project, therefore, reflects upon the American cultural experience of 
genocide at the beginning of the deadly 20th century.  Other scholars have discussed the 
political ramifications of the U.S. government’s refusal to intervene in the Armenian 
Genocide.  Political analysis of the American response to the Armenian Genocide often 
fails to note the prominence of the cause among the public.  Through enormous amounts 
of publicity material, church-sponsored programs, and public advocacy, the Armenian 
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Relief Movement ensured that the American public was well aware of the intense 
suffering endured by the Ottoman Armenians.  The fact that Americans were aware of 
Armenian suffering did not mean that they had to take action, there are plenty of 
instances in which knowledge of an even does not lead to humanitarian intervention.  In 
the case of the Armenian Genocide, information about the genocide was accompanied by 
stories and images that influenced the public to contribute to the NER.  From 1915 to 
1930, the Near East Relief raised over $100 million dollars—the equivalent of $1.2 billion 
dollars today.16 
While it would be unwise to attribute that entire sum to the publicity given the 
organization, it would be equally wrong to dismiss the power of humanitarian media in 
persuading so many Americans to give to Armenian relief.  This dissertation considers 
the very fundraising material that helped make such a sum possible.  By doing so, it 
considers questions that plague humanitarian campaigns to this day.  In particular, how 
does an organization provide the graphic details necessary to move the public without 
overwhelming them with desperation?  What is the right amount of sensationalism?  Who 
has the proximity to access effective materials?  How do we project our authority as 
humanitarians?  The Near East Relief addressed all of these concerns and more during 
their publicity campaign on behalf of the Armenian refugees.  In understanding their 
approach to these issues, we perceive the development of these publicity campaigns and 
their influence in shaping perceptions of the “Starving Armenians” as a people totally 
defined by their unmet needs. 
 
                                                
16 “Near East Foundation: Timeline,” http://www.neareast.org/whoweare/timeline (accessed 21 July 2014). 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Early Years of the NER, 1915-1917  
 
 From its establishment in 1915 to the U.S. declaration of war in April 1917, the 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) was closely affiliated 
with the Protestant evangelical networks at home and in the Ottoman Empire.  Historical 
literature on the American response to the Armenian genocide usually begins with the 
relationship between American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) 
stations in the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century and the 20th century ACASR.1  It 
was the ABCFM who sponsored the vast majority of missionaries who witnessed the 
Armenian genocide from their posts throughout the Ottoman Empire. While the ABCFM 
and other denominational mission boards sent missionaries into the field, ecumenical 
Christian organizations recruited candidates and facilitated financial support for foreign 
missions at home.  Non-denominational Protestant groups such as the Laymen’s 
Missionary Committee, Student Volunteer Services, and the Y.M.C.A. rose to 
                                                
1 See Flora A. Keshgegian, “‘Starving Armenians’: The Politics and Ideology of Humanitarian Aid in the 
First Decades of the Twentieth Century” in Humanitarian and Suffering: The Mobilization of Empathy, 
eds. Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 
140-155; Simon Payaslian, United States Policy Toward the Armenian Question and the Armenian 
Genocide (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Merrill D. Petersen, “Starving Armenians”: America 
and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 
2004); Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2003); Jay Winter, ed., America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Eleanor H. Tejirian, “Faith of Our Fathers: Missionaries and NGOs: 
The Transition” in Altruism and Imperialism: Western Cultural and Religious Missions in the Middle East, 
eds. Eleanor H. Tejirian and Reeva Spector Simon (New York: Middle East Institute, Columbia University, 
2002): 295-315; Suzanne Elizabeth Moranian, “The American Missionaries and the Armenian Question, 
1915-1927” (PhD dissertation: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994); Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant 
Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1971); Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-
1960 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1970). 
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prominence during the “Mission Revivalism” of the 1880s.2  Where ordained ministers 
and former missionaries ran the mission boards, faithful laymen with business expertise 
headed the latter organizations.  By the turn-of-the-century, American Protestantism 
embraced a Liberal Christianity that exhorted followers to channel their faith into 
philanthropic endeavors.  American missionary educational and medical institutions 
operated in Armenian communities with support from business-oriented laypeople 
promoting Christian causes in American communities. In the aftermath of massacres in 
1894-6, 1909, and 1915, American missionaries took up humanitarian work while the 
Protestant evangelical movement promoted Armenian relief at home.  This chapter 
investigates these intertwining modes of Protestant evangelism to reassess their role 
within the ACASR.  
 By arguing that the Protestant Ecumenical community—and not the Protestant 
mission boards—was responsible for ACASR publicity, this chapter will demonstrate 
that there is less continuity between 19th century mission work and 20th century 
humanitarian work than originally suggested. In addition, there were businessmen who 
associated with the organization from its founding to become the inner circle of the 
executive board.  These businessmen were often involved in missionary causes as well, 
but they were members of boards based in the U.S.  Their involvement in the NER speaks 
to the initial elitism of the organization, mainly asking donations from society types in 
New York City and its environs. This chapter will continue to discuss the expansion from 
the higher echelons of New York society to church publicity networks in the 
                                                
2 Ian Tyrrell, Reforming the World: the Creation of America’s Moral Empire, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2010).  Tyrrell notes that the Y.M.C.A. preceded the revival, but the organization was 
transformed by the movement. 
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organization’s early years.  Such a transition was reflected in the publicity materials sent 
out to the ACASR’s representatives and supporters.  After demonstrating how ACASR 
appealed to individuals through the churches, we will identify and discuss the nature of 
those campaign materials.  What do they say?  What do they leave out?  Why might the 
ACASR have chosen to emphasize certain items?  This will lead to an evaluation of the 
first publicity campaign of 1916 using booklets, pamphlets, letters, and other materials 
sent out by the organization.  Focusing on these publicity campaigns will help analyze 
how ACASR functioned in its early years, as well as its intentions in making these 
appeals. 
Background 
 The history of ACASR often begins with the Protestant Evangelical movements 
of nineteenth-century America.  In the heyday of itinerant preachers and camp meetings, 
the Congregationalists of New England embraced the religious revival that had taken 
hold of the country.3   Founded on pre-millenialist precepts, the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions would prepare humanity for the Second Coming by 
evangelizing the world.  ABCFM missionaries reached the Ottoman Empire in 1820, to 
commence the mass conversion of Muslims.  Despite their unrelenting optimism and 
dedication, the missionaries made few converts.  Beginning in the 1830s, ABCFM 
missionaries turned their attention towards Armenians, Nestorians, and other Christian 
minorities living under Ottoman Rule.   
Over the course of a century of engagement with the Ottoman Empire, the 
ABCFM representatives developed close ties with the Armenian Christians.  Though 
                                                
3 See Jon Butler, Awash in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990) 
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their conversion rates remained low, their establishment of schools brought Western-style 
education to the Near East.  In the mid-19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in the midst 
of the Tanzimat (or reorganization) to reform the empire through Western modernization.  
The American missionary schools were valuable resources for creating an elite 
population familiar with Western concepts of government and society.  When the 
Tanzimat ended and the new Sultan Abdul Hamid II turned to a Pan-Islamic vision for 
the empire, these schools and their masters were seen as a foreign influence interfering 
with Ottoman sovereignty.  Instead, the Ottoman state sponsored their own Western-style 
schools that infused the curriculum with Islamic subjects and loyalty to the Sultan.4  
Since Muslims generally avoided exposing their children to proselytizing at missionary 
schools, these Ottoman schools increased the level of education in the upper echelons of 
Muslim society.   
In addition to education, the Tanzimat reforms took on the justice system as well 
as the military to imitate a Western bureaucracy.  The Tanzimat ended in 1876 with the 
introduction of a constitution that the Sultan abrogated in 1878. Despite the 
modernization and reforms made during the Tanzimat era, the Ottoman Empire lost the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8. Sultan Abdul Hamid II then re-established control over 
the bureaucrats running the country, turning away from Westernization to embrace Pan-
Islamism.  Under the influence of his Pan-Islamic beliefs, the Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
turned against the Armenian population as a fifth column.  After the loss to Russia, the 
Sultan had grown more suspicious of the Armenian communities that straddled the border 
between Russia and Turkey.  Because Ottoman Armenians were Christians and situated 
                                                
4 William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 120-1. 
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close to an enemy Christian nation, the Sultan made assumptions about their loyalties.  
He sent the Hamidiye Kurdish Militias to deal with his Armenian problem in the 
Hamidian Massacres of 1894-6.  The Hamidiye units of Kurds massacred Armenians for 
other reasons than the Sultan’s orders.  As Janet Klein demonstrates, the Armenians and 
Kurds had been living together for centuries and had centuries-old issues over land 
ownership and taxation.  These conflicts—more so than the Sultan’s words—influenced 
their actions towards Armenians.5  In 1908, the Young Turk Revolution toppled the 
Sultan to reinstate the parliament and the constitution.  Despite a short-lived counter-coup 
in 1909, the Second Constitutional Era continued under the leadership of the Committee 
of Union and Progress (CUP).  The CUP was influenced by Western ideas of nationalism 
and attempted to reform the Ottoman Empire in line with European nations.  From their 
Pan-Turkish platform, the CUP meant to homogenize the Ottoman Empire so that 
minorities such as the Armenians would not be able to rise up in protest.  They 
accomplished this through demographic engineering and genocide.6  These conflicts 
provide important background for studying the challenges facing the Near East Relief’s 
first incarnation as the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR).7  
                                                
5 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire: Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 2011) 
6 Taner Akçam, The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic 
Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
7 Congress incorporated the organization as Near East Relief in August 1919. The ACRNE was the short-
lived successor to the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR).  In the final months 
of World War I, ACASR expanded its activities to the refugees fleeing from Ottoman territories to 
Russian/Soviet Armenia.  In reference to its widened scope, the organization changed its name to the 
ACRNE in 1918. For simplicity, I use the NER moniker for all incarnations of this organization except 
when the distinctions are pertinent to the discussion.  See James L. Barton, The Story of Near East Relief, 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930) and “U.S. Act to Incorporate Near East Relief” 
(http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.228/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html)  
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For many Evangelical Protestants, the Armenians suffered as martyrs within a 
larger conception of Christian redemption.  There was an entire mythology of the 
Armenians as the “oldest Christian nation” that urged Americans to consider themselves 
duty-bound to their co-religionists of the Bible lands.8  Between these beliefs and 
ABCFM investment in the Ottoman Empire, missionaries often reviled the ‘Terrible 
Turks’ even as they sustained hope for their conversion.9  This led to a naturalization of 
the hatred between Christianity and Islam, Christians and Muslims.  In fact, those 
religions had lived together in the Ottoman Empire for centuries with little interreligious 
conflict.10  As a result of their divided interests, however, ABCFM missionaries were 
among the Armenians’ most loyal supporters but rarely called for political intervention 
against the Turks.  
On the twenty-fourth of April, Armenian communities gather to commemorate 
the Armenian genocide.  These ceremonies recall that spring night in 1915 when Ottoman 
authorities arrested around 250 prominent Armenian men in Constantinople under orders 
from Minister of the Interior Talat Pasha.  Among those detained on ‘Red Sunday’ were 
clergymen, physicians, editors, journalists, lawyers, teacher, and politicians.  All were 
men at the core of Armenian intellectual and civic life.  This was specifically done to 
                                                
8 “The Oldest Christian Nation—Shall It Perish?” New York: Near East Relief, 1920.  See also William 
Walker Rockwell, “The Deportation of the Armenians,” New York: American Committee for Armenian 
and Syrian Relief, 1916; “The Cry of Armenia,” New York: American Armenian Relief, 1895. 
9 Justin McCarthy, The Turk in America: The Creation of an Enduring Prejudice (Salt Lake City: The 
University of Utah Press, 2010).  On American missions to the Near East; Hans-Lukas Kieser, Nearest 
East: American Millennialism and Mission to the Middle East (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2010), Ussama Makdisi, Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the 
Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 2009), Thomas S. Kidd, American Christians and 
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Thought and Foreign Missions (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1993).  
10 Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire (London: Arnold Publishers, 2001): 2-3. 
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separate the Armenian population from its leaders so that the consequent deportations 
would proceed as smoothly as possible. Few from this first wave returned from their 
arrests and deportations to the interior: most were tortured then murdered in subsequent 
months.  Similar operations in other cities and provinces targeted the Armenian 
leadership before moving on to the remaining population.  The ensuing massacres, death 
marches to the Syrian desert, and the Islamization of Armenian children make up the 
Armenian genocide of 1915-1917 (some extend this date to 1922 in recognition of 
continuing massacres and adoption of Armenian children into Turkish homes).  Turkish 
gendarmes and the Hamidiye Kurdish Calvary carried out the deadly orders from 
Ottoman authorities, acting under instruction from members of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (CUP).  The CUP was a nationalist political party that favored the 
homogenization of the Turkish homeland and the modernization of Turkish society.  
Under CUP guidance of its “Special Organization” for murdering Armenians, 1 to 1.5 
million Armenians perished in massacres, from starvation, and other violent acts.  In the 
aftermath of World War One, the bulk of the survivors became refugees forced to flee 
from Turkish Nationalist troops during the Turkish War of Independence.  
Ronald Grigor Suny attributes the beginning of scholarship on the Armenian 
genocide to increasingly harsh denials of genocide by Turkish spokesmen and the violent 
actions of Armenian terrorists from 1973 to the early 1980s.  These events raised political 
and academic consciousness on the Armenian genocide and encouraged scholars to begin 
exploring that history.11  Richard Hovannisian released The Armenian Holocaust in 1978 
                                                
11 Ronald Grigor Suny, “Writing Genocide: the Fate of the Ottoman Armenians” in (eds.) Ronald Grigor 
Suny, Fatma Muge Göçek, and Norman M. Naimark, A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the 
End of the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011): 15-41. 
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as a bibliography of sources that pointed towards primary sources as well as the 
“thinness” of academic research on the genocide.  At that point only Yves Ternon, a 
French physician who had studied Nazi medical atrocities, offered a history in his 1977 
Les Arméniens: Histoire d’un Génocide.  A number of Armenian scholars such as 
Richard Hovannisian, Vahakn Dadrian, and Levon Marashlian as well as non-Armenian 
scholars like Robert F. Melson, Leo Kuper, and Ternon, began writing about the 
genocide in the 1980s.12  Their contributions were countered by Heath Lowry, Stanford 
Shaw, and Justin McCarthy who disagreed with their conclusions on the statistical data, 
involvement of the Committee for Union and Progress, and whether the event was the 
unfortunate fallout of war, or was actually genocide.13  Meanwhile, certain Holocaust 
scholars rejected equivalencies between the Armenian cases and the extermination of 
European Jewry.14  
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By the late 1980s, academic scholarship on the Armenian Genocide had 
developed that was shaped by the concerns of the denialists.  Those who supported the 
idea of an Armenian genocide focused their work on proving the denialists wrong rather 
than expanding knowledge of the genocide itself.  Neither did they focus on causation as 
the denialists were uninterested in discovering the reasons for an event that did not 
happen.  Denialists argued that the so-called Armenian genocide was a measured 
response to the actions of a rebellious fifth column that threatened the very survival of the 
state engaged in total war.  In short; the violence was not too bad; the Armenians were 
treacherous and undermined Ottoman defenses; and it all took place as part of a 
devastating war. Those who disagreed with the denialists chose to paint the Armenians as 
innocent victims of irrational violence at the hands of the Young Turks.  Neither side 
would venture beyond the laid tracks as that might concede ground to the opposition.  As 
a result, little progress was made. 
 Not until the late 1990s and 2000s did the historiographic concerns shift away 
from denialism to discuss the origins of Young Turk policy against the Armenians.  
Historians, increasingly non-Armenians and even Turkish scholars like Taner Akçam 
began asking questions about intention, radicalization, the decisions which led to the 
genocide.  When Turkish scholars entered the fray, they brought with them expertise on 
the late Ottoman period, language skills, and access to Turkish sources.  Historians are 
still digging through the Ottoman archives and making inroads between the Turkish and 
Armenian communities on this issue.  Rather than succumb to the politicization of this 
history, historians such as Norman Naimark, Ronald Grigor Suny, and Fatma Muge 
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Gocek are leading the charge to allow historians to explore diverse questions without fear 
of denialism.15 
Founding the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief 
American Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau laid the cornerstone for the 
NER with a failed attempt to rescue the Armenians before the first massacres in 1915.  
Morgenthau negotiated with Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War, to relocate the 
surviving Armenians in the United States. In a September 1915 telegram to Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing, Morgenthau announced his triumph and asked that Lansing recruit 
a few well-known philanthropists and religious leaders “to form committee to raise funds 
and provide means to save some of the Armenians.”16  The State Department relayed 
Morgenthau’s message to Cleveland H. Dodge.17  As a personal friend to President 
Wilson, father of two missionaries in Turkey, and President of Phelps Dodge 
Corporation, Dodge served at the nexus of religion, business, and government.  On 
September 16th, prominent men from all three circles gathered at Dodge’s Fifth Avenue 
office to discuss Armenian relief.  After a briefing on the deteriorating situation in the 
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Near East, the men established an ad-hoc committee to provide the necessary funds.  
Upon Dodge’s insistence that Rev. James L. Barton had the best credentials, the ABCFM 
representative was appointed chairman.  The newly-founded NER elected educator 
Samuel T. Dutton as secretary and industrialist Charles R. Crane for treasurer.  With 
officers in place, the members then voted to set the emergency goal at $100,000.18  
Members contributed half that sum before the meeting adjourned.   
 Just days later Barton convened a second meeting to discuss the troubling lack of 
information on the situation.  The Committee chose Barton and Crane to “ascertain all 
accessible facts” in Washington, D.C.19 Crane was a natural choice to accompany Barton 
as he had acquired useful contacts in D.C while pursuing his youthful interest in foreign 
affairs.  As heir to the Crane Company plumbing firm, the eighteen-year-old Crane 
worked himself to exhaustion.  A salutary tour abroad revived the young man so much so 
that he continued traveling through Asia and Europe for the next seven years.  Crane 
discovered a passion for international affairs that he later asserted through his wealth and 
business clout.  An aborted diplomatic appointment to China under President Taft soured 
Crane on the conservative Republican and impelled him towards the Progressive 
movement.  President Wilson would recognize his hefty contributions in the 1912 
campaign by indulging Crane’s special interests in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.  
                                                
18 Barton, “The Story of Near East Relief,” 8-9. 
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Endowed with Wilson’s favor and his son serving as assistant to Secretary of State 
Lansing, Crane’s presence eased the task at hand.20  
 Barton and Crane were given full access to everything the State Department had 
received from Turkey.  Over two days they “secured copies of the consular reports in 
detail and of all the enclosures [they] asked for.”21  The pair returned to the Committee 
with scores of confidential dispatches detailing the Turks’ alleged efforts to exterminate 
the Armenian population.  Barton selected portions of these documents for inclusion in 
the Report of the Committee on Armenian Atrocities. Identifying details were redacted to 
protect the sources who remained in Turkey from retribution.  On October 4th, the 
galleys were released to the press. Barton revisited the CAA Report in his 1930 memoir 
The Story of Near East Relief: An Interpretation.  The elder Barton claimed to have 
removed “all reports referring to the tragic end meted out to the men” as “the Committee 
could be officially concerned only with the numbers and condition of those still living.”22  
He further recounted censoring the more gruesome details to avoid shocking the public.  
In actuality, the accounts were faithful to the original texts in their graphic depictions of 
genocidal violence against Armenians.   
 The CAA Report publicized Turkish atrocities against Armenians with horrific 
descriptions of torture, rape, and trails of rotting corpses.  While prior articles covered 
these massacres, the media had little knowledge of these events.  Upon its release, The 
CAA Report thrust the Armenian plight into the limelight with a barrage of shocking 
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revelations.  Certain cruelties stood out from the rest, often appearing in multiple 
accounts. Accounts VIII and IX describe methods of torturing Armenian prisoners.  Miss 
Frieda Wolf Hunecke, a German missionary and author of VIII, reported that many 
prisons used the bastinado for interrogations.  She described how gendarmes whipped the 
prisoners’ feet until they swelled and bled profusely.  When a prisoner passed out, the 
tormentors revived him with buckets of cold water until they tired.  Other prisoners 
carried the victim back to bed, where his open injuries stained the linens.  Hunecke 
learned these details after asking about a strange pattern of blood “running in long 
streams” on a sheet from the prison.  Witnesses alerted her to other torture methods for 
inflicting heat and chemical burns.23  An American teacher at Marsovan independently 
confirmed that “the bastinado was used frequently, as well as fire torture” in Account 
IX.24   
 Nearly every account differentiated genocidal acts against Armenian men from 
violence perpetrated against women.  This suggests that the experience of the Armenian 
genocide was gender-specific so that able-bodied men were largely massacred while 
women were deported and often became victims of sexual violence.25  U.S. Consul in 
Aleppo, J.B. Jackson Account XXII clearly states that “the men and boys have been 
deported from their homes in great numbers and disappeared en route” before confirming 
“the killing of the males.”26  Others make reference to “the removal of the breadwinners” 
or note the gender imbalance among surviving refugees.  The CAA offered far more 
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information on the mass killing of men than it does about the sexual violence against 
women.  Rather than specifying rape most accounts mention that women were outraged 
or kidnapped by Turks and other men.  This euphemistic language stands in opposition of 
overt allegations of rape made against the German Army in their treatment of Belgian 
women.  Chapter Two will discuss those cases in greater detail. 
 Victoria Khatchadour Baroutjibashian’s testimony in Account XVIII expounded 
on the victimization of Armenian women.  In June 1915, the wealthy widow, her mother, 
and eight-year-old daughter obeyed deportation orders by leaving Bayburt, a city in 
northeast Turkey.  Two hours into the journey, “bands of villagers and brigands” 
surrounded the exiles and robbed them of everything.  Mujadeers chose the most 
attractive women and girls, including Baroutjibashian’s sister, and “carried them off” to 
the mountains.  Baroutjibashian was most disturbed by the “unimaginable horrors” she 
witnessed “at the banks of the Euphrates and in the Erzingian Plain.”  All those previous 
experiences of death did not prepare her for the “mutilated bodies of women, girls, and 
children [that] made everybody shudder.”  Though familiar with the bandsmen’s cruelty, 
Baroutjibashian makes her only reference to God when describing them “doing all sorts 
of awful deeds to the women and girls that were with us, whose cries went up to 
heaven.”27 Baroutjibashian may render the most thorough depiction, but she and the other 
authors rely on vague phrasing when referring to sexual violence.  Societal standards of 
propriety limited discussions of violations of female bodies and, later, changing publicity 
tactics would render such topics off-limits.  Soon thereafter the NER adopted similarly 
discreet language to temper their portrayal of other Turkish atrocities.  
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Expanding Armenian Relief 
 As the Armenian crisis deepened, publicity strategies increasingly discouraged the 
use of graphic details in fundraising.  Near East Relief’s plan initially assumed—
according to both diplomatic and missionary reports—that this emergent situation would 
be resolved within a few months of relief work.  By the end of 1915, the continuing 
displacement and deterioration of the surviving Armenians indicated that far more funds 
would be necessary. In the beginning of 1916, the Committee set out to raise half-a-
million dollars in three months.28  With increasing obligations and an indefinite timeline, 
the NER had to rethink its approach to fundraising.   The CAA report served its 
immediate purpose to shock and inform the public.  Once Armenian relief efforts 
intensified, the NER warned their representatives to withhold the “more gruesome 
details” in their public interactions.  Barton later explained that “The Committee could be 
officially concerned only with the numbers and condition of those still living.”   It stands 
to reason that donors respond to causes that require contributions to meet pressing needs.  
As opposed to recycling past atrocities, evidence of current Armenian suffering provided 
fresh material for relief funds.    
 Latest News from January 25 1916, the first newsletter in an occasional series, 
demonstrates how the NER kept its representatives on message.29   Latest News primarily 
contained excerpts from recent reports on the Armenian situation similar to those in the 
CAA Report.  The January issue focused on winter’s impact on refugee conditions, 
including instructions for using these accounts.  In their opening message, the Committee 
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announced the aforementioned turn away from detailed accounts of massacres and death.  
Instead, the Committee asked supporters to stress the continuing struggle to meet the 
Armenians’ basic needs, arguing that: 
Horrible as were the massacres, more horrible are the cruelties 
which have been inflicted upon the thousands of men, women, and 
children who escaped these massacres only to live in the power of 
the persecutors.30 
 
In addition to keeping donors up-to-date with the difficulties facing surviving Armenians, 
the newsletter also outlined plans for expanding the organization.  By January 1916, the 
NER had sent nearly $250,000 for relief work and intended to raise half-a-million more.   
These lofty goals required the added support from emerging auxiliary committees.31   
 From the beginning, Secretary Samuel T. Dutton intended to create auxiliary 
committees in every state and as many communities possible.  Correspondence with 
Barton also detailed plans for additional groups for women and Armenians in New York 
City, the Boston Area, Southern California, and other places where they lived.  He 
convened such a meeting with Armenian community leaders in New York City on 
January 31, 1916.32  Dutton, however, had difficulty balancing his expanding vision for 
Armenian relief with his role as Treasurer to Constantinople College for Women.  
Although a $10,000 donation to the College eased his responsibility to raise funds, 
Dutton was exhausted.  Still, he was not ready to cut back his obligations to his outside 
interests. After a long, successful career in education, the Professor retired from 
Teacher’s College, Columbia University in 1915.  Retirement allowed Dutton to dedicate 
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more time to his work with multiple peace societies, relief funds, and various institutional 
boards.  Soon after turning down a position with the Red Cross to assess battlefront 
operations in Europe, Dutton became involved with Armenian relief.  When Dutton’s 
position as Secretary became too onerous for him, Committee hired Walter H. Mallory to 
assist Dutton.  After graduating from Columbia University the prior May, Mallory 
volunteered with The Columbia Relief Expedition to Serbia.  Dutton occasionally helped 
out the Serbian Relief Committee as their offices were both at 70 Fifth Avenue.  Mallory 
may have met Dutton in this context after returning to the U.S. in October 1915.   
 As General Field Secretary, Mallory coordinated a team of field workers who 
traveled nationwide to get auxiliary committees up and running.   Local churches and 
community philanthropies supplied the ACSAR with lists of donors, members, and 
volunteers.  These contacts were invited to attend informational meetings on the 
Armenian crisis.  After assembling groups of interested men, field agents worked with 
the elected officers and membership to begin fundraising.  As liaison between the 
National Committee and these auxiliary groups, Mallory supplied “official data, material 
for news stories, and suggestions for work.”33   In addition, he booked speaking tours for 
returned missionaries from Turkey to give personal accounts of the atrocities against 
Armenians at fundraising events.  In February 1916, there were auxiliary committees in 
14 cities; by April, that number had doubled to 29 city committees spread throughout 15 
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states.34  Each new committee extended these local networks to transform Armenian 
relief into a national movement.   
 While the field agents focused on long-term strategy, Secretary Dutton attended to 
the Committee’s immediate needs. Dutton expedited fundraising by calling upon his most 
influential contacts to solicit large donations.  The Rockefeller Foundation was one of the 
NER’s first and most generous contributors. Despite concerns about “not being able to 
say more definitely how the money is used,” the Rockefeller Foundation allotted $30,000 
for immediate use by Armenian and Syrian relief in October 1915.   The philanthropy’s 
secretary, Jerome Greene attributed their decision to “our confidence in the wisdom of 
the American Ambassador and of the representations of the American Board [of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions].”35  Greene requested “as concrete a statement as 
you can give of the way in which it is possible to spend money effectively.”36  The NER 
response proved persuasive as the Rockefeller Foundation contributed another $40,000 
by the year’s end.  Dutton continued appealing to Greene until the secretaries settled on a 
monthly contribution so that the Rockefeller Foundation donated $490,000 in 1916.37  
 The Rockefeller Foundation Board’s initial reservations were fueled by a survey 
conducted by their War Relief Commission.  Before committing financially, the War 
Relief Commission sent its agents to investigate the needs and feasibility of proposed 
humanitarian aid.  In the summer of 1915, Eliot Wadsworth and Jeremiah Smith Jr. were 
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sent to observe conditions in the Ottoman Empire and the surrounding regions.   War on 
the Eastern Front in conjunction with the many population migrations of Russian 
Muslims and Circassians to the Ottoman Empire created a drastic refugee situation 
throughout the Near East into the Caucasus.  Famine and disease wrought havoc in the 
Caucasus Region.  Turkish atrocities left the surviving Armenians, Nestorians, and 
Syrians particularly prone to continued deprivations. The Russian Empire readily agreed 
to collaborate with the American Red Cross and ACASR in civilian relief.  Their official 
report was optimistic about prospective Rockefeller projects in these regions.  Wadsworth 
and Smith were considerably less sanguine about Turkey.  After confirming reports of 
mass violence against the Armenians, they easily determined that the surviving remnant 
were in dire need of humanitarian aid.  The Turkish authorities galled the investigators 
with their obvious desire for Rockefeller money.  Instead of accepting help from the Red 
Cross or other neutral organizations, they demanded complete government control over 
the relief work and its funding.     
 The Turkish authorities made international humanitarian programs untenable at 
every step, limiting the relief work within its borders.  At the same time, waves of 
deportations and violence prevented the permanent settlement of Armenians, Syrians, and 
other non-Turkish peoples in Anatolia.  Large refugee populations remaining in flux 
rendered a sustained humanitarian operation impractical.  A relief organization might 
invest resources in a ‘safe’ city when thousands of Armenians were suddenly evacuated.  
Since relief stations do not spring up overnight, the displaced Armenians would likely 
find shelter in places without such services.  Neither could the Americans go to the 
Armenians.  Continuing war on the Eastern Front complicated travel throughout the 
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region.  Turkish authorities imposed further travel restrictions on foreigners that generally 
blocked areas proximal to deportation routes. Relief agents could not accompany the 
refugees in flight; nor could they operate roaming soup kitchens or clinics. The 
Rockefeller Foundation took on these territories, but continued their financial support of 
Armenian relief work in Turkey under ACSAR.   The organization proved uniquely 
suited to this difficult field by enlisting American diplomats and missionaries as their 
representatives in Turkey.       
 Despite their official neutrality in this period, the Americans in Turkey struggled 
under the increasing scrutiny of Turkish censorship.  When the massacres began in 1915, 
the Turkish mail service slowed considerably as authorities attempted to curb the flow of 
information.  The entire interior was virtually sealed off when mass murder reached its 
height in the Summer of 1915.  Telegrams were repeatedly intercepted so that the 
Embassy heard practically nothing from Consul Leslie A. Davis at Harput.  Only short, 
coded letters might pass through the postal service censors.  Permission to travel was 
difficult to secure so that missionaries could not leave their posts without intervention 
from higher authorities. Despite these restrictions, Consul J.B. Jackson at Aleppo 
succeeded in eluding censors.  Jackson coded all of his telegrams and dispatches that 
were sent by hand to Morgenthau.38  Missionaries in the Turkish Caucasus region sent 
messages via F. Willoughby Smith of Tiflis (now Tblisi, Georgia) and then forwarded to 
the Embassy in Constantinople.   Eventually messages began trickling through, providing 
information for fundraising. 
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The State Department and the ACASR Constantinople Committee also arranged 
secure modes of sending large amounts of money to distant provinces. When the ACASR 
began their remittances in 1915, the money for Turkey was wired from New York to a 
European bank and cabled to the Committee in Constantinople.39  The diplomats, 
educators, and missionaries on the Constantinople Committee decided how to divide the 
money based on the latest reports from the Embassy.  The Committee would then transfer 
the money to the mission through foreign banks to avoid the Imperial Ottoman Bank.  
Larger amounts and mounting suspicions necessitated greater precautions at both ends.  
At that point, the State Department handled the international transfer through its 
embassies in neutral countries and onto the Embassy in Constantinople.  The Ambassador 
then informed the Consuls to withdraw their allotted amount and confirm their receipt.  In 
1916, the Ambassador directed the Consuls to leave all the relief work to the missionaries 
and discouraged Armenians from visiting the compound.  A social call between an 
American diplomat and missionary would not raise suspicions or give the Turks 
opportunities for interfering.  These measures were taken as the Turkish authorities 
refused to allow foreign relief unless they controlled the funds.  At certain points, 
American relief work was tacitly allowed though the Sublime Porte insisted upon its 
domestic sovereignty.  As the U.S. moved closer to war, the relief work was left to 
Scandinavian and German Missionaries and facilitated by the Swedish Legation.  These 
machinations illustrate not only the immense caution of the time, but also the blurring of 
state and non-state humanitarian intervention. 
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 The extent of State Department involvement in relief work was largely unknown 
at the time, though Ambassador Morgenthau received wide acclaim for avoiding war 
with Turkey.  In February 1916, Morgenthau took a leave of absence to help Wilson’s 
campaign for re-election.  New York City Mayor James Purroy Mitchell appointed a 
committee of 40 prominent citizens to greet Morgenthau at the port with a hero’s 
welcome.  Cleveland H. Dodge chaired the committee that included ACASR Executive 
Officers Dutton and Crane as well as several members of the National Committee.40  
Days before the ambassador’s ship docked in New York, Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing wrote a letter asking that Morgenthau refrain from public events “in recognition 
of the splendid work which you are doing” as unplanned remarks might damage his 
rapport with the Turks.  Lansing further cautioned him with “regard to newspaper 
reporters, who may misrepresent you and whom it is well to avoid as far as possible.”41   
At around 8 AM on February 22nd, the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Manhattan rendezvoused 
with the steamship Frederick VIII in New York Harbor.  “A dozen cameras and two 
moving picture machines” documented the scene as Morgenthau walked the gangplank to 
join his family and the Mayor’s Committee on the Manhattan.  The New York Times 
deemed Lansing’s warning “an unnecessary precaution” as the Ambassador was 
“sufficiently reserved when questioned by reporters” prior to receiving the letter.42   After 
the remaining committee members greeted him at the pier, Morgenthau and his retinue 
continued on to an informal reception at the Office of the Dock Commissioner.  Speaking 
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on behalf of the Mayor’s Committee, Chairman Dodge delivered an emotional tribute 
that ended in tears and a hug.  Citing the poignancy of Dodge’s remarks, Morgenthau 
scrapped his prepared speech to thank the President for his guidance from afar: 
“Whenever I felt weak and sought renewed strength, I would look up at the picture of 
Woodrow Wilson on one side of my desk and at the picture of Abraham Lincoln on the 
other.”  In drawing this parallel between Wilson and his revered predecessor, Morgenthau 
adeptly switched into campaign-mode.  His profuse praise for Wilson focused attention 
on the upcoming election rather than address more sensitive topics. Neither speaker 
discussed the Armenian situation, though Morgenthau suggested that “things have 
quieted down in Turkey now.”43  These assurances failed to impress the print media in 
light of Lansing’s imposed limitations and contrary reports. The Washington Post 
expressed disappointment that “the enthusiasm of home coming was tempered down to 
dry formula by warning from the State Department head.”44  Morgenthau similarly 
chafed beneath Lansing’s gag order, submitting his resignation for approval in March.  
His first act as a private citizen was a speaking tour for the ACASR in April.  
One of Morgenthau’s final dispatches from Constantinople had upped the 
campaign goal to five million dollars. Such a vast increase required the Near East Relief 
to look to larger philanthropic foundations for guidance.  Under advisement from Jerome 
D. Greene, the Near East Relief took measures to increase the scope of its fundraising.  A 
month after Henry Morgenthau returned from Constantinople, Barton proposed a meeting 
at the former ambassador’s home to initiate “a practical plan of aggression” that would 
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garner the money necessary “for repatriating the Armenians.”45  At that meeting the 
Committee voted to raise their goal but not to engage in paid advertising.  Facing the 
unprecedented crisis at hand, however, the April 7th conference resulted in another 
$50,000, a series of speaking engagements for Morgenthau, and a request for public 
relations assistance from the Laymen’s Missionary Movement.46   
The Laymen’s Missionary Movement  
 Barton reached out to William B. Millar, Executive Secretary of the Laymen’s 
Missionary Movement for assistance with publicity and fundraising.  A letter recounting 
their April 13th discussion opens by stressing the extensive need for relief with their 
current knowledge of the situation in Turkey.  Consul Jackson at Aleppo reported that 
nearly 500,000 Armenian refugees had settled between Aleppo, Damascus, and Der-el-
Zor constituting most of modern-day Syria.  ACASR representatives in Aleppo and 
Damascus were able to reach all of the refugees, but many were still dying of disease, 
starvation, and exposure.  Any hope of their survival required exponentially more relief 
funds.47  William Peet in Constantinople estimated that 300,000 or more people in 
Turkey needed relief and had requested a million dollars.48  In addition, the Committee 
predicted an oncoming famine as only 10 to 15% of fields in Turkey were under 
cultivation. A similar situation was reported in Persia and the Caucasus as some of the 
200,000 refugees were returning home without seeds to sow and animals to plow their 
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fields.49  Demands for more relief were streaming in from every corner of the former 
Ottoman Empire and the organization needed to step up their efforts.  Barton singled out 
local auxiliaries for expanding the numbers of potential donors.    
 Though the ACASR had established 38 subcommittees in 16 states by mid-1916, 
these outposts varied widely in their readiness for active fundraising.50  Some groups had 
sought further guidance but the National Committee lacked the human resources 
necessary to meet their needs.  Secretary Dutton and Assistant Secretary Mallory were 
buried in administrative work that stymied any further expansion.  Barton proposed that 
the ACASR commission a few Laymen secretaries to provide executive assistance for 
two or more months.  The borrowed staff would work from the Laymen’s office, but the 
Committee would pay their salaries and any overhead costs.  More hands on deck would 
allow for intensive preparation of existing auxiliaries and the formation of new 
subcommittees so that they might create “a real, aggressive force in all large centers of 
population, ready to act.”  Barton further requested that the Laymen’s organization 
marshall their “splendid machinery and organizing force” to direct attention towards the 
looming crisis and “materialize that interest in substantial gifts.”  Though he recognized 
that Millar did not represent a “money collection agency,” Barton called upon the 
organization to make an exception for these desperate circumstances.51  All of these 
requests were well within the scope of the Laymen’s activities. After meeting with the 
Committee later that week, Millar agreed to collaborate with the ACASR.  The Laymen 
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assigned 12 full-time and 20 part-time men—virtually their entire staff from their 
Executive Office--to work on the ACASR campaign for three months.52   
  The Laymen’s Missionary Movement was a non-denominational Christian 
organization that channeled businessmen’s expertise towards evangelical concerns.  
Founded by evangelical leaders John R. Mott, J. Campbell White, and businessman John 
B. Sleman in 1906, the Laymen structure and ideology were inspired by the Student 
Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM).  The SVM paved the way for the 
Laymen and ecumenical Christian activism by reengineering the missionary endeavor to 
broaden its appeal.  In the late 19th century, American mission boards faced declining 
support for foreign evangelical work, termed a “crisis of missions” in evangelical 
parlance.  In 1886, the college-based groups of the YMCA hosted a month-long retreat 
for 251 promising young men at Northfield, Massachusetts.  After four weeks of 
intensive training, one hundred of these students pledged to become foreign missionaries.  
Within two years, graduates from these retreats had mobilized over 2,200 of their peers to 
form the Student Volunteers Movement for Foreign Missions (SVM).  The numbers of 
SVM members taking pledges soared to around 6,200 by 1892; increasing to 13,789 by 
1904.53  Though as few as one quarter actually became foreign missionaries, the SVM 
remains a crucial innovation in the development of ecumenical religious institutions.  The 
organization trained the next generation of evangelical leaders who would revive and 
reconceptualize the missionary enterprise. While the clergy dominated the American 
Board and other denominational mission boards, the leadership of the SVM, YMCA, 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the United Society of Christian Endeavor, and 
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the Laymen were laymen rather than ordained ministers.  John R. Mott, General 
Secretary of the YMCA, never attended theological seminary yet coordinated the 1910 
Edinburgh Meeting.  Both famed YMCA missionary Sherwood Eddy and Robert E. 
Speer of the Federal Council of Churches attended Princeton Theological Seminary, 
though neither pursued ordination.  Speer later expressed pride in his lay-status, “My 
friends what is the church? I have a place-card here that labels me ‘Reverend.’ I am not 
reverend, I am nothing but an unsanctified layman like the rest of you, and we are the 
church. It is not the priests and the clergy that constitute the church. We are the 
church.”54   
 Ecumenical Christian institutions thus operated beyond the confines of doctrine in 
favor of practicality and inclusiveness.  These organizations embraced a broader 
definition of evangelical work that emphasized education and medicine over theological 
conversion.  Doctors, nurses, teachers, and professors were not ordained, but were 
effective advocates for Christian moral reform.  Non-denominational Christian 
institutions similarly benefitted from lay expertise in business and administrative 
efficiency.  While churches employed the clergy, the lay leadership were often gainfully 
employed in the highest echelons of American industry. Missionary revivalist agencies 
thus imitated the organizational structure and scientific management techniques of early 
20th century private enterprise.   As a result, SVM, YMCA, and similar institutions 
functioned more like corporations than mission boards. These distinctions were 
particularly noticeable in fundraising activities by men like Charles V. Vickrey.      
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 Charles V. Vickrey supervised the temporary staff as office secretary, 
implementing an administrative and organizational structure for the promotional work.  
Prior to working as a Secretary for the Laymen’s Movement, Vickrey coordinated 
mission education programs for denominational youth organizations.  His career in 
Protestant organizations began as a member of the Student Volunteer Movement at 
Nebraska Wesleyan College and Yale University.  While continuing his education at 
Drew Theological Seminary, he took on a leadership role in the Epworth League—the 
Methodist Episcopal Church’s association for young adults.  Vickrey and two other Drew 
students established a separate branch encouraging young Christians to support 
missionary work at home and abroad.  As a former Student Volunteer and recent 
Seminary graduate, Vickrey might have sought ordination or a commission as a 
missionary.  Instead, he chose to promote mission work by designing educational 
materials for the League.  Vickrey rose through the ranks of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church to become a field secretary in 1906.  For the next three years, Vickrey remained 
within the Methodist hierarchy before accepting an offer from the Laymen’s Missionary 
Movement in 1909.   Vickrey’s secretarial position with the Laymen’s Executive 
Committee propelled him from denominational service into the big leagues of ecumenical 
Protestant organizations.    
 Despite Millar’s opposition to turning into a “money collection agency,” the 
Laymen’s Missionary Movement was the driving force behind fundraising campaigns 
well before their involvement with Armenian Relief.  The Laymen’s built up ‘markets’ to 
support fellow religious institutions by galvanizing churches on their behalf.  Though the 
Laymen did not collect funds or sponsor missionaries, the movement trained men to 
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facilitate these nationwide campaigns in their locales.  These local Laymen were 
encouraged to gather personal and financial information about fellow church members 
for files kept by National Laymen headquarters in New York City.  These files were an 
invaluable resource of inside knowledge for outside canvassing teams.  Historian 
Valentin H. Rabe describes how the organization used this information in practicing a 
form of psychology called “applied personality.”  Laymen were trained to maximize 
donations “send[ing] canvassers first to those least able to contribute, in order to have 
their sacrificial example to set before wealthier prospects,” also “insist[ing] that all 
solicitations be made by teams” as part of “a pattern of exploiting weaknesses.”55  Having 
a group of people all expecting a pledge made it more difficult for the targeted man to 
give only a small amount or refuse to give at all.  Other strategies meant to heighten 
embarrassment for “those who had been lax in church attendance” by issuing a personal 
invitation to a prayer meeting.  Canvassers used the background data “to deal with 
excuses or to stir vanity or shame through subtle comparisons.”  Rabe offers the example 
of a prospective donor who belonged to an expensive private club.  Such a man “might be 
asked how he squared this with a token contribution to missions.”56  The Laymen’s 
influence solidified this use of “applied personality” into NER strategy during the 1916 
Campaign. 
Planning the 1916 Fundraising Campaign 
   When the loan period elapsed, Vickrey and a number of his staff would stay on 
with the Committee.  By then Dutton had ceded his responsibilities to Vickrey while 
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remaining active as Chair of the Board of Trustees. Under Vickrey, ACASR extended its 
pool of donors from the privileged recipients of Barton’s press releases to the Laymen’s 
local networks of churches.57 As a result of this connection, biblical imagery and 
religious themes were more prominent in Armenian relief publicity prior to 1917 than in 
later years.  Though religious groups proved a fruitful market, ACASR also attempted to 
interest a broader audience.   
 In February 1916, the Senate passed a resolution urging President Wilson to 
“designate a day on which the citizens of this country may give expression to their 
sympathy by contributing to the funds now being raised for the relief of the Armenians in 
the belligerent countries.” About a month prior, the Senate had passed a nearly identical 
resolution on behalf of Jews in the war zone that President Wilson then acted upon.  As 
opposed to the Jewish Relief Resolution, its Armenian counterpart was submitted as a 
concurrent resolution that required both houses’ approval before becoming official.  At 
hearings held by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Armenian-American Counsel 
Miran Sevasky testified that its submission as a concurrent resolution was an error rather 
than an attempt to gain more privilege than other causes.  Even without precedent, 
Sevasky maintained that the worthiness of the Armenian cause and immediate need for 
humanitarian relief justified its approval.58  He explained that Barton, Dutton, and others 
had assured them that: 
the passage of this resolution will have a great moral effect on the 
people and that it will really disseminate throughout the country 
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the importance, the necessity, and the urgency to contribute.  It 
will, as it were, be ratified by the State and by the President, and 
that will give it moral importance which it would not otherwise 
have.59  
 
Pushing for a concurrent resolution informed Congressmen about Armenian relief before 
gaining the official status the ACASR Board sought.  Though the Senate had approved 
the resolution without discussion, the House listened to witness testimony, collected 
information, and discussed the resolution.  During the floor debate Chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs Rep. Henry Flood (D-Va.) corrected his colleagues’ many 
misapprehensions.  When another representative lumped the genocide together with prior 
massacres, Chairman Flood retorted that “there has never been a time before when seven 
or eight hundred thousand Armenians were driven into the desert and were there starving, 
or living on grass and roots as they are today.”60  U.S. Senate Historian Donald A. Ritchie 
considers the House legislative process on the resolution to be especially significant in 
familiarizing those Congressmen and their staff with Armenian relief efforts and 
generating the reports, testimonies, and debate transcripts on record in official U.S. 
Government Publications.61  The Concurrent Resolution on the Relief of Armenians 
made a more immediate impact in buffing ACASR’s credibility by publicly encouraging 
their private support for Armenian Relief.    
 By the time the House passed the resolution in July, the National Committee was 
already deep in planning the 1916 Campaign.  When the White House delayed issuing the 
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promised statement, Vickrey sent Barton and Dutton to deliver a prepared statement for 
Wilson.  President Wilson signed that proclamation designating October 21st and 22nd as 
days for Americans to express their sympathy for Armenian and Syrian refugees with 
contributions to ACASR.  With the dates announced, the National Publicity Committee 
was able to establish firm dates and set goals for local fundraising.   Vickrey and his team 
had continued Mallory’s earlier work with added support from their fellow Laymen and 
that organization’s files of possible donors. 
 In the lead-up to the 1916 fundraising campaign, ACASR issued memos and 
pamphlets that offer insights into the National Committee’s expectations for local 
affiliates.   “A National Test of Brotherhood” is worth an extended analysis as it renders 
the ACASR’s publicity plan and targeted audience in complete detail.  Copy on the front 
cover indicates that the handbook was designed to inform “those who deliver addresses 
or sermons or who make personal appeals to persons with financial ability.”62  Like most 
ACASR publications of that time, the bulk of the booklet reprinted excerpts from 
eyewitness accounts and summaries of the organization’s accomplishments.  However, 
these familiar materials were adapted for use by ACASR publicity officers as opposed to 
pamphlets and news releases for public circulation.  A section entitled ‘Sources of Facts’ 
customarily precedes these reports to account for the excision of identifying details as a 
precautionary measure. “A National Test of Brotherhood” adheres to these conventions 
before expressing distaste for the “many sickening details that follow.”  Similar 
statements were discussed earlier in this chapter with regard to the change in strategy 
following the Committee on Armenian Atrocities Report of 1915.  Rather than discount 
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the appeal of graphic imagery, the committee uses these facts  “to deepen the conviction” 
of its local representatives “in connection with the campaign to secure relief funds and 
not for public recital.”63   None of this information was new to most ACASR supporters 
as it was identical to those dispatches and reports found in Latest News.   
 What was substantially different about this pamphlet was its attempt to reach a 
general audience through the step-by-step instructions for “How to Make the Most of 
Relief Days.”  While the first section was directed at pastors and speakers from religious 
communities, the remainder catered to a general audience of volunteers. The pamphlet 
placed particular emphasis on gaining the cooperation of local newspapers by putting 
their case before editors of such publications. Other methods for gaining access to local 
media included letter-writing campaigns and asking businesses to sponsor advertising 
space.  Assuming the editor was willing to cooperate, the New York Office had prepared 
articles ready to be placed in the papers.  The local newspaper would also serve as a 
collecting point for donations along with “churches, hotels, banks, restaurants and public 
places.” Included here was a list of publicity materials available for purchase from the 
New York Office.  A housewife may have encountered the “two-color poster, size 
approximately 11x14” hanging below the list of daily specials in her grocer’s window.  A 
“large cardboard collection box (6x4x4), price 5¢” could be perched next to the till at a 
diner.  Ushers at the local theater solicited audiences with “a neat celluloid dime coin 
box, pocket size, capacity of $5.00 in dimes.”  From the church to the arcade, any place 
where people gathered was a possible site for fundraising.64   
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Advice on making direct appeals was straight from the Laymen’s playbook on 
singling out wealthy men and placing social pressure upon prospective donors. Rich men 
were ACASR’s area of expertise, if only because its founding members were among the 
wealthiest men in the country. “A National Test of Brotherhood” offered suggestions for 
bringing in generous donations as “too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the 
importance of securing large gifts.” The booklet advised representatives to make a list of 
the “prosperous, well-to-do individuals” in town as well as a target donation 
“commensurate with their wealth and resources.” target them personally for “one 
thousand, five thousand or ten thousand dollars out of their abundance to relieve 
Armenian and Syrian distress.”  A second list would contain names of “smaller 
contributors” to whom the local committee would send a personalized letter and leaflet to 
reflect the secondary importance of smaller gifts. 
In addition to the facts, personal solicitations would include anecdotes of 
admirable individuals—often those in unfortunate situations—giving to Armenian relief. 
In one vignette, a bereaved father duplicated his invalid daughter’s last remittance to 
honor her memory.  Another anecdote featured the sales pitch given a “well dressed but 
unassuming man” who responded by increasing his donation from $5,000 to $18,000.  
His impressive contribution was inspired by tales of an old penniless woman who 
surrendered a family heirloom to the cause and a four year-old girl who had earned 2 
pennies by sweeping the sidewalk to give “one cent to the Belgian babies and the other to 
the starving Armenians.”  In the end, the wealthy man compared himself to these poor 
people willing to sacrifice what little they had and wrote out a check for more than three 
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times his original donation.65  This was exactly the sort of calculation such stories were 
designed to induce: a prospective donor was meant to compare himself to his neighbors 
and these paragons of charity and find himself lacking.  To remedy the unease evoked by 
these campaign morality tales he would then increase his own contributions.  Thus, the 
pamphlet advocated that ACASR representatives use the Laymen’s psychological 
approach to maximize contributions. 
 Local committees followed these guidelines closely as Armenian and Syrian Relief 
Days approached.  Vickrey assembled a memo with details of preparations in different 
cities.  In Mitchell, South Dakota, all daily papers would include a copy of the ACASR 
pamphlet “Cry of Millions.”  Brooklyn, New York had 3200 streetcar placards printed 
and placed in the local streetcars.  A call went forth from the pulpits in Washington, D.C. 
recruiting “several hundred of the most attractive girls in the Capital” as volunteers 
collecting donations on Saturday October 21st.66 These girls were to be supervised by the 
Women’s Auxiliary Committee in D.C. to “cover all principal traffic centres, department 
stores, theatres, government buildings, banks and hotels.”67 The D.C. ‘female phalanx’ 
demonstrates an early use of the traditional advertising technique of using pretty faces to 
sell humanitarian relief.   
 Despite this emphasis on the visual, the 1916 Campaign was the only appeal to 
focus on facts rather than imagery and emotion.  The few posters were neither colorful 
nor interesting; most provided maps to help the public locate distant Armenia.  Prior to 
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WWI, appeals such as these were marketed to businessmen who, experts agreed, 
responded to reason over emotion.68  This trend reversed once governmental propaganda 
campaigns by Wellington House in Britain and the Committee on Public Information in 
the States found success by employing professional illustrators and issuing heartrending 
pleas.  At this point, however, Vickrey and his Laymen believed that straightforward and 
honest campaigns were the most appealing.  
 Charles V. Vickrey is a crucial character in the transition from reliance on mission 
boards to non-denominational Protestant Evangelism.  Like many of his peers, he was not 
an ordained minister but was heavily involved in religious organizations.  He came to 
ACASR after learning the ropes of fundraising in Methodist youth groups, the Student 
Volunteer Movement, and Laymen’s Missionary Movement.  As executive secretary for 
ACASR, he personally instituted many of the publicity techniques used during their 1916 
Campaign.  Though ACASR had begun to establish local auxiliary group, it was Vickrey 
and the Laymen that kept them abreast of organizational strategies and developments.  
While Chairman Barton may have been the public face of the NER, Vickrey was its 
engine.  He was always generating new media materials to solicit donations, especially in 
the lead-up to the 1916 Armenian and Syrian Relief Days.  Studying materials from this 
1916 Campaign reveals publicity tactics Vickrey imported to ACASR.  At first, the 
ACASR shared information received from the American missionaries via the State 
Department.  When the well of facts from State Department dispatches ran dry, ACASR 
publicity recycled some reports and generated new material based on a psychological 
approach to fundraising.  Without Vickrey, the ACASR would not have attracted so 
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many donors and likely would not have made it past its first year.     
 This chapter has addressed the early years of Armenian relief efforts by the Near 
East Relief.  The early 20th century was a time of massive change within the Protestant 
Evangelical Movement that saw the decline of such 19th century mission boards in favor 
of non-denominational Protestant organizations run by laymen who were attuned to 
business.  From 1915-1917, American missionaries may have been the eyes and ears of 
the organization overseas, but the domestic fundraising activities were dominated by the 
representatives of this younger generation of Protestant Evangelists.  Among the latter 
group, the Laymen’s Missionary Movement produced many of the leaders of the 
publicity campaigns.  Since the Turks made relief work difficult for Americans to 
conduct, the chief objective of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian 
Relief—predecessor of the NER—was raising money for the Armenians.  It is therefore 
integral to this study of pre-war ACASR activities to understand the Laymen’s 
Missionary Movement, their difference from 19th century mission boards, and their 
publicity strategies as done in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Commission for Relief in Belgium 
 
When the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief announced the 
establishment of their organization, the New York Times called it “the greatest American 
Relief Campaign to be undertaken since organization of the Belgian Relief 
Commission.”1  The two organizations had much in common.  Both were dedicated to the 
relief of non-combatants in war zones.  Both were appealing to the American people for 
donations.  Both had connections to the U.S. government, but were non-governmental 
agencies.  Beyond these commonalities, Belgian relief could have served as a model for 
Armenian relief to follow.  Instead, the Armenian relief agency learned what they could 
from its Belgian analogue, the Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB), and then 
mostly went in a different direction.  This was especially true in their use of publicity 
media, where the CRB was resistant to publishing its own sentimentalist portrait of the 
suffering Belgians.  Instead, the CRB relied on a slew of other organizations, including 
government propaganda agencies, promoting their own vision of “poor little Belgium.”  
Armenian relief had only the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief 
(ACASR) to introduce a largely foreign population to the American public.   
The differences between the Belgian and Armenian situations, therefore, provide 
glimpses into the roots of the distinctions between Belgian and Armenia relief.  Beyond 
the commonalities and differences, the fact remains that Belgian relief had a higher 
profile than Armenian relief, despite the magnitude of the latter.  Historians have begun 
to ask why.  British historian Nicolletta Gullace puts the question to future historians,  
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Future research on war propaganda will need to acknowledge 
the reality of that suffering and to begin to ask new questions 
about how particular events make, or fail to make, history.  
Why did Belgium become such a powerful symbol during 
World War I, while the eastern theater, where civilians were 
treated with even greater brutality, failed to make an equivalent 
emotional impact on neutral audiences?  To what degree did 
the prominence accorded Belgium eclipse the massacre of 
Armenians?2 
This chapter begins to explore these questions with a comparison between Belgian and 
Armenian relief. Analysis of Belgian Relief posters and other publicity materials will 
reveal an extensive reliance on accounts of sexual violence against mothers and adult 
women.  As a result, the ACASR, and later the Near East Relief, avoided any 
comparisons by minimizing the considerable aftermath of sexual violence perpetrated 
against Armenians with euphemistic language and outright avoidance.  Belgian relief 
work was conducted through the CRB, a humanitarian aid organization headed by 
Herbert Hoover.3  This chapter will tell the story of the CRB to better understand its 
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origins in a shaky political climate as well as its humanitarian activities.  It will proceed 
to examine the modes by which this organization functioned; its appeals, shipping 
practices, and projects overseas.  This chapter will further consider political, economic, 
and cultural differences between the Belgian and Armenian situations in the interest of 
drawing conclusions about the relationship between the CRB and ACASR.   
The Invasion and Occupation of Belgium 
On the fourth of August 1914, the Imperial German Army crossed the border into 
Belgium on their way to France.  Their military strategy called for a swift strike against 
the French before turning eastward to deal with the Russian Empire and avoid a 
protracted, two-front war. German troops would then sweep the countryside, claiming 
victory while the unprepared French struggled to mobilize their defenses.  However, 
things did not go as planned.  After an unopposed invasion of Luxembourg, the German 
Army faced their Belgian counterparts in the twelve fortresses surrounding the industrial 
city of Liège.  While the battle raged, German soldiers killed more than 640 civilians 
living along the invasion route.4  Germans blamed these incidents upon armed civilians 
whose resistance justified the perpetrators’ violent retribution. After enduring ten days of 
bombardments and heavy artillery fire, the fortresses crumbled. Following the fall of 
Liège, the Belgium Army withdrew to Antwerp as the German Army continued their 
advance.  On their way to the French frontier, attacks on civilians increased in size and 
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scope.  This period of German war crimes and their later excesses as occupiers is well-
known as “The Rape of Belgium.” 
 Until recently, German atrocities in Belgium were considered spurious 
propaganda manufactured by the British government.  Beginning in the 1990s, historians 
started revisiting these supposedly fabricated war crimes only to find reams of reliable 
evidence to the contrary.  John Horne and Alan Kramer, historians of Modern Europe at 
Trinity College, collaborated on a book described as “the definitive work on Belgian 
atrocities” in a review by a fellow Great War historian.5  German Atrocities: 1914 
provides a compendium of war crimes derived from witness depositions and reports by 
contemporary commissions of inquiry established by the Belgian government as well as 
sources from various archives and published accounts. From these materials Horne and 
Kramer estimate that Germans murdered almost 6000 civilians during their 1914 
invasion.  Entire cities were destroyed and fertile land laid to waste.6    
The German’s violation of Belgian neutrality and their war crimes—both real and 
exaggerated—earned them the epithet ‘Huns’.  The name derives from a speech given by 
Kaiser Wilhelm II in response to the murder of the German minister to Peking and 
several German missionaries during Boxer Rebellion.  In the speech the Kaiser declared 
“No quarter will be give, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at 
your mercy.  Just as the Huns a thousand years ago . . . so may the name of Germany 
become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again even dare to 
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look askance at a German.”7  This statement circulated widely in European newspapers 
so that the Kaiser’s comparison to the Asiatic Huns who invaded Europe in the 5th 
Century would come to haunt the Germans during the Great War.  ‘Hun’ became a 
popular derogatory term to describe the Germans.   
Nicoletta Gullace writes, “While the term could be used either facetiously or 
ominously, it became iconographic shorthand, evoking themes of ‘racial otherness’and 
primitive atavism that recast a modern European adversary as something far more 
menacing.”8  Above all, World War I was a modern war in its weaponry, mass culture, 
and the dawn of nation-states.  The Huns were depicted as the very opposite of 
modernity, their barbarism contrary to the mores of Western Civilization. Gullace uses 
cartoons and posters to show “the complex juxtaposition of the primitive and the modern 
in wartime iconography.”9  An advertisement for the Fourth Liberty Loan placed in Boys 
Life Magazine depicts the Huns as “Worse than the Turks.” In the text of the ad an 
Armenian peddler relates the destruction of his home, his parents’ deaths, his brother’s 
murder, and how his sisters were sold into sexual slavery.   At the end of his tale, the 
peddler remarks that the Turks are almost as bad as the Germans.  The ad then addresses 
the audience, “Remember, you boys who read this, that the cruelty of the Hun stops at 
nothing.  His track is red with blood.  Your country needs your help.”10  In effect the ad 
uses the Turkish atrocities against the Armenians to indict the Germans.  This creates 
purposeful confusion that equates the Turks, already seen as barbaric, with the European 
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and formerly civilized Germans.11  Associating these two cultures undermines their 
differences and lumps them together as unrepentant murderers.  
 
Figure 1: "Worse Than the Turks," (1917).  Courtesy of Boys' Life Magazine. 
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Posters such as H.R. Hopps “Destroy This Mad Brute” depict the Germans as 
barely human, capable of despicable acts of violence against women and children.  
Hopps’ poster features a simian beast wearing an Imperial German helmet and carrying a 
cudgel labeled “Kultur,” an ironic use of the term for German culture and civilization.  
His other arm clutches a partially-clothed European woman in the grips of terror and 
distress.  The word “America” lies under his feet meaning that the beast has traversed the 
Atlantic Ocean to reach U.S. shores.   
 
Figure 2: "Destroy This Mad Brute," H.R. Hopps (1917).  Courtesy of Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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This is an enlistment poster meant to scare Americans into joining the war effort to 
“Fight this Mad Brute” and protect their women and their homeland.  More than that, this 
poster offers a highly sexualized perspective on German militarism where a helpless, 
comely girl thrashes in the arms of a sexual aggressor.  It is meant as a warning that the 
Allies fight not just for Belgian women but for all women’s safety from the ape-like 
Huns. 
Rape played a large role in the construction of German atrocities by Allied 
propaganda. Wartime rape in Belgium was over-reported by the media and underreported 
in the findings of Allied war crimes commissions.  Horne and Kramer note that the Allied 
commissions believed that rape occurred with an “unheard-of frequency” but were unsure 
how to classify the act: “They felt it had less connection than other types of ‘atrocity’ to 
what they saw as the German policy of systematic terror and they placed it at the 
individualist end of the spectrum of war crimes.”12  Rape was part of a pattern of 
destruction and abuse, terrorizing multiple persons by the rape of an individual.  Family 
members watching the sexual victimization of a loved one would also be traumatized.  
Male family members were often forced to watch as Germans violated their female 
relatives to demonstrate their inability to protect ‘their women’.13   
At the same time, women were reluctant to come forward to report rape as such 
violation was considered shameful.  One woman who reported her rape to the police in 
Nancy said “that she had never complained to the German authorities ‘due to fear and 
shame’, and the same motives might well have kept her silent had she not been 
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pregnant.”14  After looking at the instances of rape mentioned in witness testimonies 
versus other types of violence, Horne and Kramer nonetheless conclude that “it would be 
improper to assume that rapes were a dominant feature of German behavior.”15 
In contrast to the Belgian situation, sexual violence against women was part and parcel of 
the Armenian Genocide.  Katherine Derderian argues that violence against Armenians 
was gendered so that men were deported and killed while the women were raped, 
kidnapped, and held in forced marriages.  As a result, sexual violence was a central 
element of the Armenian Genocide.  Where the media was vociferous in its 
condemnation of the raping in Belgium, euphemistic language alluded to the “outrages” 
perpetrated against Armenian women.  Derderian writes: “Contemporary observers often 
cited their discomfort openly discussing sexual violence, and some accounts explicitly 
expunge passages recounting it, or else summarize it only superficially.”16  Rape 
appeared often in primary documentations of the Armenian genocide, so much so that 
Derderian points to sexual violence and rape as central concerns in the experience of the 
genocide.  However, those publicists writing about the Armenian relief went out of their 
way to avoid using the term ‘rape,’ despite the common use of the term in relation to the 
German atrocities against the Belgians.  Since their stories were fed to the print media, 
neither did “rape” appear often in newspapers and periodicals.  As discussed in Chapter 
One, the NER likewise resorted to euphemism when discussing the sexual violence 
against Armenian women.  The relative absence of straightforward reporting on rape in 
the Armenian situation suggests that this was a conscious choice, perhaps influenced by 
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the overemphasis on the “Rape of Belgium.” 
Sensationalized and mythologized by Allied propaganda, the “Rape of Belgium” 
became a call-to-arms against the barbarous Huns.17  British propaganda repeatedly 
referred to this event as a means of increasing popular disdain for Germany. Accounts of 
rape, mass executions, and wanton destruction disseminated through mass media outlets 
influenced public opinion throughout the Anglo-American world.18 Horne and Kramer 
suggest that this aggressive propaganda campaign soured the public against these reports 
of German abuses.  Over the following years, that disgust turned into denial as public 
memory reclassified the “Rape of Belgium” as mythology.19 
The Commission for Relief in Belgium 
With the outbreak of war in Europe, Americans traveling throughout the continent 
soon found themselves trapped in a war zone.  Unfortunately, generally well-off tourists 
and businessmen were short on cash as Europe soon placed a moratorium on letters of 
credit, drafts, and checks.  Since few travelers carried large amounts of cash, thousands 
were left stranded without funds to pay for food, shelter, or transportation.20 Walter Hines 
Page, the American Ambassador in London turned to Herbert Hoover, a mining engineer 
based there to “take charge of getting 100,000 stranded American tourists out of Europe.”  
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Hoover used his own money to fund an organization to help his fellow countrymen return 
home.21   
Hoover’s next project, The Commission for the Relief of Belgium (CRB), began 
in association with the Belgian Comité Central de Secours d’Alimentation (Central 
Committee of Assistance and Provisioning).  The Comité was the combined effort of 
Belgian and American businessmen under the aegis of the neutral Spanish and American 
ministers in Belgium.  At its first meeting on September 1, 1914, a sub-committee was 
formed “to have direct charge of obtaining and distributing the food supplies” in the city 
of Brussels and its environs.22  Despite the industrialized nation’s impressive array of 
canals, trains, light rails, the German occupation had shut down much of Belgium’s 
transportation system.  As a result no trains were available to bring flour from the mills 
an hour away at Louvain back to the hungry crowds in Brussels.  During this first crisis, 
one of the American businessmen was able to requisition trucks from the fire department 
to bring the flour from Louvain to the connecting tramline from Tervueren to Brussels.  
Louvain soon ran out of flour leading the Comité to search the surrounding province for 
additional supplies.  German requisitioning coupled with the demands of the citizenry 
forced the Comité to look outside the country for a more permanent solution.23    
Brussels was hardly alone in its need for foodstuffs as other Belgian cities were 
also suffering.  Belgium was an industrialized nation that only produced a quarter of the 
grain necessary to feed its population.  As a result, Belgians were reliant upon imports to 
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feed themselves.24 The Americans on the subcommittee decided to take up the issue with 
the German military officials in hopes of restarting the importation of necessary items to 
the occupied country.25  Though the subcommittee members worked out an arrangement 
to import food through the Netherlands, the Dutch Government needed all the food it 
could produce for its own people.  However, the Dutch agreed to facilitate the transfer of 
food from England to Belgium through the port at Rotterdam.  Millard Shaler, a 
representative of the Comité and American engineer, accompanied by the Secretary of the 
American Legation at Brussels, Hugh Gibson, went to London in hopes of purchasing 
2,500 tons of wheat, rice, beans, and peas for exportation to Belgium.26  While in 
London, Shaler became acquainted with Herbert Hoover, who took on the Belgian cause 
as his own.   
Already well known for his interventions on behalf of American travelers, Hoover 
worked with Ambassador Page to establish a neutral humanitarian agency to provide 
sustenance for the besieged civilians in occupied Belgium.27 The Commission for Relief 
in Belgium (CRB) would finance, purchase, then transport and distribute much needed 
supplies to the Belgians.  Hoover quickly adapted his corporate experience to the 
diplomatic negotiations necessary to facilitate aid across battle lines. Those negotiations 
over transporting and distributing food proved complicated as the English needed to 
protect its naval blockade and Germany suffered from its own food shortages.  After 
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much debate, Hoover managed to win concessions from both sides to transport large 
amounts of food to Rotterdam and on to Belgium.28    
Propaganda 
British propaganda on behalf of Belgian relief reduced the need for the CRB to 
tear at American heartstrings to get the supplies they needed.  In an effort to bring the 
U.S. into war against Germany, the British government’s propaganda wing, Wellington 
House, produced materials that provoked sympathy for Belgium.  In fact, Wellington 
House worked so closely with the Belgian Legation in Britain that historian Gary S. 
Messinger contends that the British office “functioned as virtually the entire ministry of 
propaganda for Belgium in the early months of war.”29  Later on, the Belgian Legation 
contributed its own propaganda for American consumption.   
Propaganda on behalf of the Belgians aimed to demonize the Germans and 
encourage Americans to pity the Belgians.  Nicolette Gullace points out that early 
propaganda focused on Germany’s abrogation of international law with its invasion of 
Belgium.  The fuss over that “scrap of paper” known as the 1839 Belgian Neutrality Act 
died down quickly once propagandists realized its limited potential.  Nicoletta Gullace 
writes, “In an attempt to popularize the meaning of the war, the highly legalistic 
discussion of the "scrap of paper" gave way to a discourse that expressed the travesty 
against international law in ever more human terms.”30  Those “human terms” included 
legitimizing the accusations against Germany by referring to the violation of the family 
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and the female body, in particular.  Rape played a large role in the construction of 
German atrocities by Allied propaganda.  Sexual violence against Belgian women was 
reported in the press and featured in many war posters and cartoons.  For example, 
Ellsworth Young’s poster depicted a silhouette of a German soldier dragging a woman 
behind him against the fiery background of a burning village.  With the implication of 
widespread rape, the poster urged Americans to ‘Remember Belgium’ by buying Liberty 
Bonds.   
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Figure 3: “Remember Belgium” by Ellsworth Young (1918).  Courtesy of Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C. 
The Dutch cartoonist Louis Raemaekers also drew disturbing images of German 
actions against Belgian civilians that made their way to the U.S.  A book featuring 
Raemaeker’s cartoons “with accompanying notes from well-known English writers” was 
published by Doubleday, Page & Company in the U.S.  Given the commentary from 
British writers and an “appreciation” by British prime minister H.H. Asquith, it is likely 
that British propagandists compiled the book to share Raemaekers’ cartoons with the 
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American public. Asquith alludes to the book’s purpose in reinforcing the Allied mission, 
“Mr. Raemaekers' powerful work gives form and colour to the menace which the Allies 
are averting from the liberty, the civilization, and the humanity of the future. He shows us 
our enemies as they appear to the unbiassed[sic] eyes of a neutral, and wherever his 
pictures are seen determination will be strengthened to tolerate no end of the war save the 
final overthrow of the Prussian military power.”31  The included cartoons serve as 
indictments of German barbarity, featuring Belgian women and children facing all sorts 
of horrors. 
   
Figure 4: "Seduction" by Louis Raemaekers.  From Raemaekers’ Cartoons: With Accompanying Notes from 
Well-Known English Writers (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1916): 79. 
 Figure 4 depicts a German soldier saying to his young, female hostage, “Ain’t I a 
lovable fellow?”  The woman is on her knees in an upright posture that suggests her pride 
and disgust for her captor.  Her right breast is exposed and she is bound and gagged with 
a gun pointed at her head.  English writer G.K. Chesterson called the illustration “one of 
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the most pointed and vital of all pictorial, or indeed other, criticisms on the war. It is very 
important to note that German savagery has not interfered at all with German 
sentimentalism. The blood of the victim and the tears of the victor flow together in an 
unpleasing stream.”32 Raemaekers had drawn an illustration of deviance where the captor 
desires affection from his captive.  This dynamic indicates the perversion of the German 
mentality in which one could abuse another and expect adoration in return.  The 
implication of her torn dress and the title “Seduction” alludes to the sexual nature of the 
German Rape of Belgium.  It was a reflection of the Belgian situation in which they were 
expected to welcome their violators into their country, homes, and bodies.  Unfortunately 
for the German, he cannot win over her heart, just as the occupying Germans could not 
conquer the Belgian spirit.   
 Propaganda regarding the rape of Belgium was just one aspect of the media 
campaign supporting Belgian independence.  The more pertinent issue for the C.R.B. was 
the feeding of Belgian children.  Appeals for such donations were replete with pictures of 
gaunt Belgian children and crying mothers.  These posters, more so than those with rape 
imagery, are reminiscent of similar photos and posters of Armenian mothers and children.  
As Michaël Amara sees it, Belgium earned a reputation for such misery through 
propaganda which tapped into American sympathies.  Amara writes, “Undoubtedly, the 
C.R.B. allowed Belgium to remain at the front of the media scene by systematically using 
wells of emotion and sentimentality, distributing photos of malnourished Belgian 
children or girls crying for their families, the organization contributed a stereotyped 
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image to the American mind that Belgium will never rid itself of.”33  There were many 
posters with “malnourished Belgian children or girls crying for their families,” but they 
were not created by the CRB.  Instead, organizations such as the U.S. Food 
Administration and various Belgian relief funds produced posters that recalled Belgian 
starvation. 
 
Figure 5: “Hunger” by Henry Raleigh (1918).  Courtesy of Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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This poster from the U.S. Food Administration depicts a desperate mother and her 
children drawn in black-and-white.  Underneath the illustration, the copy reads: “Hunger.  
For three years America has fought starvation in Belgium.  Will you eat less—wheat 
meat—fats and sugar that we may still send food in shiploads?”  The poster implies that 
cutting back Americans’ food consumption will allow the U.S. to continue helping the 
starving Belgians.  This appeals to Americans’ proven sympathies for Belgians—
especially mothers and children—so that the U.S. Food Administration should fulfill their 
goals of conserving food.  It is the image of the mother and children that provides the 
impetus to change behaviors, and the creators of the poster believed that such an image 
would have the power to motivate its observers.   
 
Figure 6: “Forget Me Not” by Josef Pierre Nuyttens (1917).  Courtesy of Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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Another poster from the publicity department of the Belgian Military Mission in 
Washington, D.C. shows a Belgian child sitting among ruins, holding a bouquet of 
forget-me-nots.  Like the name of the flower, this poster aims for the observer to 
remember the Belgian babies by giving to Belgian relief.  It is significant that the Military 
Mission chose an illustration of a child to promote itself, rather than a Belgian soldier or 
some other more representative image.  This demonstrates the use of children in appeals 
for donations and other support.  It is no coincidence that childhood and motherhood 
represent universal aspects of human life.  Both were considered innately good: 
childhood in its connection to innocence and motherhood as the giving of life.  The 
images depicting these virtues were anything but ideal as they stressed the desperation 
inherent to the deprivation in Belgium.  Children and mothers were a staple of Belgian 
relief publicity materials, just as they were for Armenian relief.   
Notice, however, that none of these posters were created by the CRB.  Though the 
CRB profited from publicity about the ‘Rape of Belgium’ and Belgian families, the 
organization did not rely upon sympathy to win the public.  Instead, the CRB placed 
press releases and cooperated with newspapers to ensure that its needs were met.  The 
“Hand Book Issued by the Commission for Relief in Belgium” recalled the beginning of 
CRB public relations: “The representatives of the great American papers and news 
agencies were called together, and their help and direction asked in placing the plight of 
the people in Belgium before the public of the world.  All sense of rivalry or personal 
prestige has been buried by these men, with the same sense of devotion to a great cause 
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which has actuated every other member.”34  The CRB was able to pull together many 
journalists because they had a former Associated Press reporter doing the publicity.  Ben 
Allen, formerly of the AP in London, was managing the CRB advertising along with 
Hoover confidante and journalist Will Irwin, who had control of the Press Department.35  
Together, Irwin and Allen were able to keep the press on the CRB’s side and influence 
American public opinion through the news.   
One of the first press releases that were distributed dealt with combining multiple 
Belgian relief committees into the single Commission for Relief in Belgium.36  Prior to 
Hoover’s intervention, there had been some effort to raise relief funds for Belgium.  
These were local relief committees with no affiliation between them and quite a bit of 
rivalry: 
“M. Havenith, the Belgian Minister in Washington, had similarly assisted 
in the organisation of committees throughout the United States to raise 
funds to relieve the sufferings of his countrymen. In New York some of 
the recognised leaders in charitable work had organised a New York 
Belgian Relief Committee, which collected more than $250,000 in two 
months. Similar committees had been organised in other cities. All these 
efforts, however, had been scattered and uncentralised. The various 
activities often overlapped. There was no common object to which the 
various committees were devoted. There even existed invidious jealousy 
and competition between the various committees.”37 
 
Once the CRB was established, the organization made an effort to absorb all of these 
local campaigns.  Soon they were all centralized through the CRB and were working as a 
unit to raise funds for Belgium.  Even if they had wanted to remain independent, they still 
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would have had to send all their contributions through the CRB as the organization was 
the only authorized relief agency outside of Belgium’s Comité.   Though there were still 
miscommunications and mistakes between the local and national committees, Kittredge 
notes that the process of combining these different levels went fairly smoothly. 
The CRB was more interested in the big picture of getting large amounts of food 
to Europe and less so in the collection of food in the U.S.  Rather than establishing local 
committees to run campaigns within communities, they pursued appeals at the state level 
through governors.  Neither were they interested in affiliating with such philanthropic 
organizations as the American Red Cross or Y.M.C.A. that had highly organized 
branches at the local, state, and regional levels.  Despite their exclusion from the CRB, 
the ARC had their own project working with Belgian soldiers after the U.S. entered the 
war.38  Though the CRB would accept donations from existing charitable agencies, 
Hoover had no intention of establishing a network of its own.  The organization was not 
soliciting money, but rather foodstuffs.  The CRB created a network of warehouses and 
shipping depots where individuals and organizations could send food and clothing to be 
sent to Europe.  Shipping was handled at the state level so that each state had a place to 
send its donations. They did not involve themselves in any grassroots organizing, but 
kept their engagement limited to the transportation of necessities to Belgium.  
The CRB’s “General Instructions” gave information about the process of 
packaging and handling parcels for shipment as well as guidelines on what kinds of food 
to buy and what to avoid.  For instance, starches such as flour, cornmeal, barley, and oats 
were listed under “foods containing maximum amount of calories and proteins at least 
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cost” and were to be given in the largest quantities possible.39  Under the “do not buy” 
lists were canned fruits, vegetables, and soups because they contained too much water to 
be worth the shipping costs.  Also, purchasers were instructed to buy “pork fat backs, 
bacon, and oleomargarine” as they were considered “food containing maximum amount 
of fats at least cost.”  Purchasers were to avoid other meats as “calories purchased as 
meat cost two to eight times as much as the same quantity of nutriment bought as 
grain.”40  This food guide was intended to maximize the amount of calories in the 
smallest amount of space.  Meats and dairy products were less valuable to the CRB than 
starches because their goal was to feed people as many calories as possible, not 
necessarily a balanced diet.  As Nick Cullaher writes in “The Foreign Policy of the 
Calorie:” “When a group of engineers organized a massive food drive for occupied 
Belgium, they turned to the new ‘science of dietetics’ . . . The commission calculated 
purchases and rations on the basis of calories, which it considered ‘almost the only thing 
to be considered’ in managing famine relief.”41  The food guide illustrates the extent to 
which the CRB counted and calculated its food supplies as a method of scientific 
management.   
 The “General Instructions” do not just indicate what kinds of food to send, but 
also dictate how to send quantities of food.  Donors were not expected to pay 
transportation costs for their donation, but rather to submit to the process designated by 
the CRB.  There were forwarding agents, or “State Assembling Depots” located in most 
cities and, in the most populous states, multiple forwarding agents in different locales.  
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For example, there were three forwarding agents in Massachusetts: the New England 
Belgian Relief Fund in Boston, Taunton Teaming Company in Taunton, and Bay State 
Storage & Warehouse Company in Springfield. Most of these facilities were warehouses 
that would collect all inland donations and load them into carload lots for transportation 
to the seaboard.42   After these donations were packaged in carloads at the “State 
Assembling Depots,” the forwarding agent or State Executive Committee was to 
telegraph the CRB headquarters in New York “to obtain route, cheapest rate and desired 
port.”43 There were separate instructions for billing the storing charges, classifying the 
shipments, returning the stamps to the donors, and sending the detached tags to 
headquarters.44  All of these instructions demonstrated the immense amount of paperwork 
and bureaucracy that went in to readying a shipment for transfer from the donor to the 
American seaport to Rotterdam, and finally to Belgium.  This represented the majority of 
the CRB’s work as the Comité handled most of the distribution within Belgium. 
There were American representatives of the CRB who facilitated the distribution 
of the shipments from the U.S.  Thomas Westerman writes about the approximately 150 
Americans who worked for the CRB in Belgium as “neutral arbiters of relief aid” who he 
identifies as “neither combatants, nor victims; neither occupied or occupiers.”45  These 
men lived in this liminal space ‘between’ civilian and belligerent where they observed 
much of war, but experienced little of its dangers.  But who were these men? And what 
did they do? According to Westerman, “most were a ‘good type’ of early twentieth-
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century Anglo-American, upper-class man—the first volunteers were mostly American 
Rhodes Scholars on holiday from classes in the winter of 1914-1915.  Later participants 
included men who, while older, more mature, and seasoned in life and business, still fit 
into that particular masculine cultural idea promoted by Cecil Rhodes, the Boy Scouts, 
and even Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders.”46  The men would work behind the trench 
lines that demarcated German territory, in major cities, small towns, and villages 
throughout Belgian.  They were charged with supervising the Comité in their distribution 
of the food supplies from the U.S. and overseas.  This entailed “detailed bookkeeping at 
offices” throughout Belgium and “inspection tours of CRB warehouse and Belgian-run 
distribution centres.”  Ultimately, they reported to the CRB authorities in Brussels, who 
reported to the CRB authorities in London.47   
While Hoover ensured that the food operations remained in the hands of 
trustworthy men, he allowed women to participate in aspects of the work relating to 
children and mothers.  Historian Katherine Storr writes: 
Hoover saw the work being naturally divided by gender.  Financing, 
organising shipments, giving assurances that the Germans were not getting 
the food, were ‘a man’s job’.  Women’s work was providing canteens, 
undertaking mothers’, babies’ and children’s relief, counseling and 
undertaking ‘actual executive labour from early morning till late at night 
with cheerfulness, sympathy, and tenderness’.48 
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Charlotte Kellogg, wife of Hoover confidante Vernon Kellogg, was the only woman 
officially associated with the CRB in Belgium.49 As a result, much of the work funded by 
Americans was conducted by volunteers with the Comité and other agencies. 
American women supported the relief through the ‘Women’s Section of the CRB’ 
which Storr states “was probably the biggest women’s organization in America 
concerned with foreign relief” as women came together from conflicting political 
organizations in support of Belgian Relief.  The organization’s executive committee 
ranged from the heads of the National American Woman Suffrage Association to the 
National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage.  Together with the Literary Digest 
the Women’s Section established a Belgian Flour Fund that raised enough money to 
purchase 20,000 barrels of flour.  The Women’s Section also “sent five cargoes of 
supplies, established sewing camps for Belgian women refugees in Holland and 
undertook relief work in Poland and Northern France.”50 
The “sewing camps” to which Storr refers were a core part of Belgian Relief, run 
solely by women.  In her book Women of Belgium Turn Tragedy to Triumph (1917), 
Charlotte Kellogg described different sewing workshops in which Belgian women 
produced various garments, quilts, and lace.  These workshops provided work to the 
unemployed and a means of repaying their debt for the food.  Former public buildings 
such as the Brussels Hippodrome, the Liège skating rink, and the Antwerp Music Hall 
functioned as warehouses for the clothing supplies as well as giant workrooms.  Belgium 
was well known for its lace industry but the war threatened to put the lace-makers out of 
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business.  Lace, after all, is an adornment and not a necessity.  Instead, the CRB made a 
special agreement with England to supply thread in return for selling the lace in England, 
France, and the U.S.51   
The CRB also relied upon sympathetic nations for loans and donations of food, 
clothing, and other supplies. Vernon Kellogg, one of Hoover’s close associates in the 
CRB, wrote a series of articles on the organization for The World’s Work.  In his article, 
“How Belgium was Fed,” from September 1917 Kellogg described how the CRB raised 
“more than 300 million dollars’ worth of food, and the transportation and handling of the 
more than two and a half million tons of foodstuffs that were bought with this great sum” 
up until June 1917. Much of those funds were contributed by the British and French 
governments in the form of loans to the Belgian government.  Nearly 30 million of the 
total 300 million dollars was given as charity from private sources: $17,000,000 from the 
British Empire and $11,500,000 from the United States.52 
In the funding of the CRB we see a significant distinction from those funds raised 
by the NER.  While the Belgian government was largely intact, there was no such official 
Armenian government as most Armenians were citizens of the Ottoman Empire.  As a 
result, there was no central authority that could be relied upon to repay loans on behalf of 
the Armenians.  Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire was a belligerent nation so that even a 
neutral nation such as the U.S. before April 1917 could not take sides by contributing 
funds.  The NER, therefore, had to rely entirely on private donations.  This fact, more 
than any other, determined the manner in which the organization portrayed itself to the 
U.S. and the world.  Armenians had to appeal to the public to such an extent that their 
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entire existence depended upon it.  Belgians, meanwhile, had a government to act on their 
behalf. 
The Belgian government not only backed the subventions given them by Britain 
and France, but also aided the CRB in distributing the food and clothing in a fair manner.  
After the formation of the CRB, the Comité Central de Secours d’Alimentation re-formed 
itself as the Comité National de Secours d’Alimentation.53  This second iteration of the 
Comité joined the CRB in apportioning the imported food according to a rationing system 
based on “scientific dietetic principles.”54  While the Comité had “forty or fifty thousand 
official members, and the eagerly proferred[sic] services of nearly all the seven and a half 
million other unofficial Belgians,” the CRB never had more than 40 volunteers in 
Belgium at any one time.55  Despite its small numbers, the CRB accomplished a lot by 
cooperating with the Belgian Comité.   
Historian and Hoover biographer George H. Nash characterized the agency’s 
work as “an undertaking unprecedented in world history: an organized rescue of an entire 
nation from starvation.”56 Armenian Relief might then be construed as a successor 
movement to Belgian Relief.  Both dealt with starving populations that required outside 
help to feed civilians.  That outside help required diplomatic finesse to find long-haul 
cargo ships to transport much needed supplies.  Belgian Relief found aid in the Dutch 
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fleet and navigated the treacherous waters of the English Channel and North Sea; while 
the Near East Relief relied most often on American ships with permissions from Allied 
Naval forces to reach occupied Constantinople and Beirut.57  Both organizations ran soup 
kitchens, provided food rations, and took a special interest in child welfare. 
While both Belgian and Armenian Relief performed the requisite humanitarian 
tasks, there were considerable differences in the level of the intervention.  Prior to the 
German invasion, Belgium was a profitable, industrialized nation.  Its reliance on 
imported food was a weakness exploited by war so that the population was brought to the 
brink of starvation within weeks.  All industry was halted due to the occupation so that 
unemployment became a problem.  When the CRB succeeded in getting food and 
supplies to reach the country, the transportation infrastructure had remained intact enough 
for distribution to the entire country.  The Belgians were fortunate enough to have a 
government to advocate on their behalf as well as the Comité National to deal specifically 
with the apportionment of the food supplies.  Numerous funds were established in 
Britain, the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, and other nations to provide further support to 
the Belgians.  Though the German Occupation was harsh, there was a system in place to 
ensure survival. 
Despite the Near East Relief’s best efforts, the organization was unable to 
establish humanitarian operations as effective and efficient as Belgian Relief.  The large 
expanse of the Ottoman Empire was nowhere near as industrialized or modernized as tiny 
Belgium.  Perhaps the greatest complication was the overall level of destruction wrought 
by the military battles. The large refugee population posed multiple challenges.  After the 
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Ottoman surrender in October 1918, Armenian refugees descended upon the cities in 
hopes of finding family, friends, and food.  The American Red Cross and the NER were 
unable to provide proper shelter for most of these refugees.  As a result most settled in 
abandoned warehouses, churches, and homes.  There was no guarantee of a clean water 
supply so that refugees without parasites were few and far between. In those cramped 
quarters, diseases spread like wildfire so that epidemics of typhus and cholera were 
common and deadly.  Other common ailments included scabies, trachoma, and Aleppo 
button, also known as cutaneous leishmaniasis—a parasitic skin disease transmitted by 
sandfly bites.58  While there were outbreaks of tuberculosis among the Belgians, the 
gravity of that situation was nowhere near as serious as the Armenians’ plight.   
Another arena in which Belgians had the advantage was international law. 
Existing international law contained provisions for a neutral agency to administer 
humanitarian and medical aid within the war zone.  Founded on the front lines, the 
International Red Cross (IRC) and its national affiliates marshaled tremendous resources 
from government, philanthropies, and individuals.  Though reputed to serve all humanity, 
IRC operations mainly served the active, injured, and captive combatants of belligerent 
nations.  As neutral international humanitarian organizations, the Commission for the 
Relief of Belgium and International Red Cross held similar ideologies but differed in 
their obligations.  The IRC often provided aid to civilians but combatants remained their 
first priority.  Without such military ties the CRB concerned itself with the increasingly 
desperate refugees amassing in Northern Europe.   
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As a result of international law (or lack thereof), the CRB was the only agency 
taking responsibility for the Belgian civilians.  The 1907 Hague Convention on the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land afforded consideration to civilian populations living on 
occupied land in guidelines “On Military Authority Over Hostile Territory.” Section III, 
Article 46 states “Family honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well 
as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected.”59  Other clauses protected the 
occupied territory’s necessary resources from requisition, prohibited pillaging, and 
treated institutions of arts and sciences as off limits but there was no regulatory force to 
protect these rights, leaving the civilians of occupied territory without formal recourse. 
Since the neutral Belgians faced outside belligerents, the German occupiers presumably 
held responsibility for their national well-being over a neutral agency.  Belgium was 
intended as a satellite German state so the German government took some interest in 
preventing starvation.  Unfortunately, their own food shortages undermined any internal 
efforts to sustain the Belgians. 
Occupied Belgium was at least given consideration in international law, unlike the 
Turkish Armenians.  There were no provisions for citizens facing attack from their own 
government. As victims of their own belligerent government, the Armenians’ plight had 
no legal precedent to foster an international response. Armenians had to rely on the Turks 
to allow the Near East Relief to distribute humanitarian aid during the war. Though this 
was complicated enough while the U.S. remained neutral, it became impossible once they 
declared war on Germany.  To solicit aid from the U.S. government, the Armenian relief 
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activists would have had to convince the U.S. government to look beyond their status as 
Turkish citizens and grant them succor.  Given the financial demands on the U.S. 
government from their allies, giving handouts to their “enemies” was out of the question. 
Despite the severity of the situation in the Near East, the Belgian cause 
overshadowed Armenian relief efforts.  In order for people to care about distant suffering 
they had to identify with the sufferers. Geographical, cultural, and religious differences 
fostered psychological distance between Americans and Armenians, impeding the 
Americans’ empathic responses to Armenian suffering.  The 19th century missions to the 
Armenian Christians helped prime Americans to help the Armenians by facilitating a 
long-term relationship with them, but the fact that American missionaries had referred to 
Armenians as “nominal Christians” extended the perception of religious difference 
among the Protestant majority in the U.S. Most documents on Armenian relief included a 
map so that Americans could locate the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire.  It 
was this sort of basic knowledge about Armenians that Americans lacked.  Thus, the 
psychological distance between Americans and Armenians prevented the former from 
feeling morally responsible for the latter’s suffering.  It was the ACASR’s job to 
convince Americans otherwise. 
Another advantage Belgium relief had over Armenian relief was the simple fact 
that the invasion of Belgium occurred before the Armenian genocide began.  While the 
German Army entered Belgium in August 1914, Henry Morgenthau didn’t begin calling 
for Armenian relief until the spring of 1915 when the first Armenian victims were 
deported from their homes.  Even then, the details of the Turkish campaign were not fully 
known.  In the lag between the two events, Belgian Relief programs were established and 
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resources allocated for their use.  Large public appeals were issued for donations of food 
and clothing for the Belgians beginning in 1915.  Meanwhile, Armenian Relief was a 
project of a few wealthy men and Protestant churches until the 1919 Campaign 
introduced the facts to the entire American public.  By that point, concern for the 
Belgians was well entrenched throughout the U.S. 
Protest meetings on behalf of Belgium illustrate the preferential treatment shown 
the Belgian cause.  Like the Armenians, Belgians were subject to “deportations” to 
German territories for work in labor camps.  For Armenians, however, “deportations” 
meant death marches through the Syrian desert to unknown locations.  Belgian men were 
taken specifically for their ability to contribute to German industrial and other military 
needs.  From August 1914 on, at least 10,000 French and 13,000 Belgians accused as 
franc-tireurs were taken to labor camps in Germany.60  Horne and Kramer write that “we 
do not know whether deportations were intended as a measure of security, punishment, or 
deterrence.” Since the deportees included women, children, and the infirm, Horne and 
Kramer conclude that “the motivation cannot have been purely security, but must also 
have been collective punishment.61  According to Imperial Germany historian Isabel 
Hull, “deportation for forced labor did not cross the German administrative mind until 
early 1916.  Indeed, until June 1915 security concerns had outweighed need, and 
thereafter first efforts concentrated on enticing volunteers.”62  Germans were unable to 
                                                
60 Horne and Kramer, 166. 
61 Ibid, 166. 
62 Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014), 128. 
  86 
attract many volunteers for reasons of patriotism and “C.R.B. food allotment, however 
meager, lessened the impetus to work.”63 
When large numbers of Belgian volunteers failed to materialize, a deputy war 
minister called for the deportation of 400,000 Belgian civilians to Germany.  Those 
forced laborers would allow German munitions workers to head to the front lines. Thus 
began deportations of Belgian civilian for forced labor in Germany as well as the world’s 
outcry against what one British pamphlet deemed “acts of wholesale slavery.”64 Cardinal 
Desire Mercier of Belgium also equated deportations with slavery in his address to 
neutral countries, “thus are another thousand Belgians reduced to slavery, without 
previous trial, condemned to the penalty which comes next in cruelty to the death 
penalty—deportation.”65  The pope even made a “direct reference to the deportations of 
the Belgians by the Germans as a war measure without precedent in the history of 
civilized nations.”66  The American people were outraged by what they saw as the 
enslavement of an innocent people for the betterment of their enemies.  The Washington 
Herald compared the deportations to “the blood curdling atrocities of the days of 
Babylon.”67   
Many events were organized in protest of these deportations.  The New York 
Tribune reported that “Carnegie Hall will be thrown open to those who desire to join in a 
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mass meeting condemning the leading away of a nation into captivity.”68 Three thousand 
people attended the meeting where “the hall was packed to capacity.  There was not a 
seat left on the stage, in pit or in boxes or galleries.”69  Former Secretary of State, former 
U.S. Senator, and current leader of the preparedness movement, Elihu Root spoke of the 
German actions against Belgium, “If the civilized world of the twentieth century is 
willing to stand silent and see these things done, in cumulative progression, in violation 
of the laws of humanity and of nations, then the civilization of the twentieth century is 
worse than the savagery of the Romans.”70  Speakers were keen to connect the Belgian 
deportations to lesser levels of civilization to emphasize their horror and barbarism. 
A program from a mass meeting in Philadelphia demonstrates the manner in 
which these meetings were organized.  The meeting began with the Belgian National 
Anthem and continued with high profile speakers including an invocation by Bishop 
Philip Rhinelander of the Episcopal Diocese of Pennsylvania and addresses from the 
prominent Philadelphia attorney Walter George Smith, essayist Agnes Repplier, former 
Assistant Attorney General Hon. James M. Beck.  These speakers were all Philadelphia 
natives as opposed to those luminaries on a speaking circuit.  Since this event was based 
in Philadelphia, there were many allusions to the city as the birthplace of liberty, “this 
great historic city is also an appropriate locality for this meeting, for had not the people of 
Philadelphia met in common with their brethren of other American cities to protest 
against infamy, the ‘very stones of the street’ would have cried out against them.”71  
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Speaker Agnes Repplier made the requisite comparison to prior barbarous acts, 
comparing the protest Belgian deportations to the abolition movement, “The slave-raids 
in Belgium bear the most amazing likeness to the slave-raids which Europe deemed it her 
duty to suppress in Africa.  Hon. James M. Beck went further back in history: “In the 
thirty years’ war . . . there happened the siege of Magdeburg, and before that the sack of 
Rome by the mercenaries of Charles the Fifth, two of the wickedest atrocities up to that 
time which history has recorded; but mankind now witnesses not the pillage of a city like 
Rome nor Magdeburg, but the deliberate, cold-blooded and selfish spoliation of a whole 
nation.”72  Again, the audience was reminded of the barbaric nature of the crimes against 
Belgium through uncivilized past events. 
Beck considered Belgium “but one chapter of the blackest volume of human 
history.”  He reminded the crowd of other tragedies during the war including the 
Lusitania, deportations from Poland, and the Armenian genocide.  As he states, “If 6,000 
Belgian non-combatants have already been slaughtered, why 600,000 Armenians have 
fallen in the last two years under the same ruthless frightfulness. . . Why, then, do we 
make such an especial feature of the damnable wrongs done to Belgium?”73 Beck 
answered himself, “I think the answer is obvious.  In the first place, there is a greater 
certitude to the facts . . . But, ah! There is a greater reason than that why Belgium has 
such a peculiar appeal to our pity and sympathy.  It is because the striking down of that 
nation is possibly and probably the most malignant act in modern history.  (Applause)”74 
According to Beck the international laws that Germany violated in their treatment of 
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Belgium made it “the most malignant act in modern history”.  The Armenian genocide 
could not compete with Beck’s level of outrage regarding the Belgian situation because 
the exact facts and statistics of the Armenian situation were unknown and the Ottoman 
Empire did not violate international law as it existed at the time.  It was this disregard for 
the law that this trained lawyer and his followers found as detestable as the actions 
perpetrated by the Germans. 
While there were some mass meetings on behalf of the Armenians, none 
specifically protested the deportations or received a similarly high profile in news reports.  
Belgian relief was a more active and well-known cause, helped by familiarity between 
Americans and Europeans. It would become the ACASR’s, and later the Near East 
Relief’s responsibility to similarly familiarize the American public with the Armenians.  
One of the key components of this approach was to introduce connections between 
Americans and Armenians through their love of children or the shared importance of 
motherhood.  Belgian relief committees used these same motifs, along with allegations of 
rape against the Germans, to induce sympathy towards the “poor little Belgians.”  The 
CRB, however, did not approve of such sentimental advertising, but instead ensured that 
the American public knew the ‘facts and figures’ of their organization.  At the same time, 
the CRB benefitted from this sentimentalist propaganda so that Americans felt pity 
towards the Belgians and donated to the CRB.  The ACASR did not have such proxy 
organizations creating propaganda about the Armenians.  As a result, the ACASR had to 
moderate their message by toning down any explicit discussion of rape and using 
children and mothers as the face of their organization.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Posters, Photography, and the 1919 Campaign 
 
 On December 11th 1918 the American Committee for Relief in the Near East 
announced its 1919 Campaign for $30,000,000.  The announcement included a statement 
from President Wilson asking Americans “to help re-establish these ancient and sorely 
oppressed people in their former homes on a self-supporting basis” by making “even 
more generous contributions than they have made heretofore.” Wilson’s appeal placed 
the numbers in need of “outside help to sustain them through the winter” at 4,000,000 
Armenians, Syrians, Greeks, and other war sufferers, “including 400,000 orphans.”1  The 
campaign was originally planned for November 1918, but postponed to January 1919 so 
as not to conflict with the United War Work Campaign2 that aimed to raise over 
$170,000,000 on behalf of the Salvation Army, YMCA, YWCA, the Knights of 
Columbus, American Library Association, the War Camp Community Service, and the 
Jewish Welfare Board.  The ACRNE did not join the communal fundraiser since its 
overall needs would far exceed the rest of the organizations’ needs combined.   
Although small in comparison with fundraisers by the Red Cross and the United 
War Work Campaign, the ACRNE’s appeal for $30,000,000 represented a vast sum in 
consideration of their past campaigns.  Their efforts had begun in October through 
December 1915, when a small contingent of philanthropists had contributed $176,929 in 
emergency funds.  With help from the Laymen’s Missionary Movement and the 38 local 
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committees, the first public appeals in 1916 brought in $2,404,000. The 1917 drive 
collected nearly five million dollars for disbursal by agents of neutral countries.  In 1918, 
the campaign had garnered $7,022,000, most of which was raised in the second half of 
the year as the agency prepared to enter the field.3  In light of these prior results, the 1919 
Campaign’s tremendous expectations seem untenable, even foolish. After all, this was 
“the greatest charity fund ever asked in America for other than our own people.”4 The 
committee estimated that they would need to provide at least 6 months of food, shelter, 
medicine, and “clothing for at least 2,900,000 needy,” transportation and “houses for 
1,770,000 returning refugees,” complete care for 400,000 orphans, facilities, and 
materials for reestablishing agriculture and industry in the affected regions of 
Transcaucasia, Persia, Anatolia, and the former Ottoman territories in Syria, Lebanon, 
Mesopotamia, and Palestine.5  Dealing with this magnitude of disaster in Western Asia 
required the ACRNE to pursue such large amounts of money, a feat that necessitated a 
comprehensive strategy of outreach designed to arouse the American public’s 
compassion and commitment. 
Planned during the latter half of 1918, the 1919 NER Campaign  
drew upon resources cultivated by the federal government for propaganda purposes.6 
NER’s collaboration with the Committee for Public Information’s Division of Pictorial 
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Publicity would extend the organization’s contacts to commercial artists and non-
Evangelical publicists.  As a result of outreach through mainstream publicists, the 1919 
Campaign looked and sounded different than prior campaigns that had been wholly 
overseen by Charles Vickrey and other Laymen’s Missionary Movement veterans. This 
chapter explores that transformation, then interrogates the subsequent transformation in 
visual publicity from illustration to photography.  
Like their peers in the relief business, the Near East Relief commissioned and 
produced posters to raise funds for Armenian relief efforts.6  Analyzing publicity posters 
by Near East Relief offers direct insight into the changing political expediencies of 
Armenian relief efforts.  This chapter primarily explores the organization’s portrayal of 
suffering Armenians from 1918 through 1919.  It will further explicate the themes chosen 
for the 1919 Campaign, as illustrated in publicity posters.  Illustrators Douglas Volk, 
W.T. Benda, Ethel Franklin Betts, and W.B. King drew some of the most memorable 
images of the Armenian relief movement in the United States.  All 1919 posters conform 
to the general theme of preventing the Armenian from ‘perishing,’ but these posters 
individually highlight more specific issues dealing with the convergence of advertising 
with humanitarian aid, American duty towards other nations, children in peril, and 
motherhood.  These illustrations echo similar themes in posters for the American Red 
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Cross (ARC).  During the period from 1918 to 1919, the ARC and NER cooperated in 
caring for refugees in Palestine, Syria, and portions of the Near East under Allied control.  
In general, the ARC provided the medical staff and other workers, while the NER 
contributed a portion of the supplies and sponsored former missionaries to address the 
logistical challenges.  Just as they shared responsibility for these relief efforts, so too did 
their publicity reflect these mutual concerns through thematic unity. 
 Within months of the U.S. declaration of war, there was no escape from the 
estimated 40 million war-related posters plastered on bulletin boards, store windows, 
trains, and even buildings.   While articles and speeches provided far more information, 
even the most influential writers and charismatic speakers could not reach as many 
people as a well-placed, well-designed poster.  Art director and writer, C. Matlack Price, 
described the inextricable link between posters and politics: 
War, destroyer of many things, has brought the poster into its own, has 
made the poster fulfill its greatest destiny . . . as a more forceful aid to 
nationwide publicity than any other means employed by the Government 
or by any war activity to reach all the people, every day, everywhere. 7 
War posters created a sensation among fields affiliated with public relations.  Trade 
journals for advertisers, publishers, and the art world kept abreast of the uninterrupted 
flow of posters, offering critiques and devoting entire articles to the creation of the most 
popular posters. This interest partially explains why so many posters of this era were 
preserved when similar ephemera often lasts until garbage day.  As a medium considered 
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accessible and provocative to the general public, posters were the dominant form of 
visual media used for publicity purposes by a wide range of philanthropic organizations.8   
Posters were designed to galvanize support for war through their visual appeal 
and inspirational messages.  The popular understanding of the Armenian plight was 
largely shaped through visual materials manufactured by professional advertisers. 
Depictions of Armenians emphasize their vulnerability to trigger sympathy and 
donations.  Such a simplistic approach downplayed the complexity of the Near East 
crisis, meeting fundraising goals without political repercussions.  As a result, much of the 
American public came to pity the “Starving Armenians,” basing much of their knowledge 
on the publicity posters. 
The 1919 Campaign was the last Near East Relief fundraiser that centered around 
poster art.   Once treasured tools in the publicity arsenal, illustrated images were rapidly 
supplanted by photography.  After armistice, representatives from various American 
relief agencies surveyed the desperate conditions throughout the Near East to plan an 
extensive humanitarian operation.  These committees brought back numerous 
photographs, some of which were passed on for publicity purposes.  From then on, visual 
publicity was dominated by photographic images of Armenian refugees sent by relief 
                                                
8 For more on World War I war posters see Pearl James (ed.), Picture This: World War I Posters and 
Visual Culture (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Anne Classen Knutson, “The Enemy 
Imagined: Visual Configuarations of Race and Ethinicity in World War I Propaganda Posters,” in Race and 
the Construction of Modern American Nationalism, ed. Reynolds J. Scott-Childress (Boston: Garland 
Press, 1997): 195-220; Peter Paret et al, eds., Persuasive Images: Posters of War and Revolution from the 
Hoover Institution Archives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Walton Rawls, Wake Up, 
America! World War I and the American Poster (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988); Maurice Rickards, 
Posters of the First World War (New York: Walker and Company, 1968); Matlock Price and Horace 
Brown, “How to Put in Patriotic Posters the Stuff That Makes People Stop—Look—Act!”  Washington 
D.C.: National Committee of Patriotic Societies, undated (ca. 1917-8). 
  95 
workers, journalists, and professional publicity photographers.  These new resources set 
new rules in a quest for consumer appeal in humanitarian work.   
Background 
 This section emphasizes the effect of war upon the situation in the Near East, 
deepening the crisis that humanitarian agencies would take on in peacetime.  It is 
important to understand that the Armenian genocide took place in a war zone so that 
much of the Ottoman Empire was in distress.  War began in the Near Eastern Theater 
from October 1914 and lasted until the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918.  The major 
military confrontations included campaigns in the Sinai and Palestine, Mesopotamia, the 
Caucasus, Persia, and Gallipoli.  With General Allenby’s forces capture of Jerusalem 
(December 1917) and Jericho (February 1918), humanitarian relief activities in the Near 
East extended from Port Said, Egypt, outside of Cairo, to Western Palestine. By 1918, the 
British had secured much of modern Iraq and concentrated their troops to advance on 
modern Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. From there they continued fighting battles from the 
Mediterranean Coast inward, penetrating into the Judean Hills and Jordan River Valley in 
the Fall 1918.  Armenian, Arab, Russian, and Turkish refugees crossed over the battle 
lines in the Jordan Rift Valley to seek food and medical services in Jerusalem.   
As of June 1918, the NER was helping around “twenty thousand individuals” in 
Jerusalem alone. Still, refugees were streaming in from the “Northern villages” of the 
Galilee as well as 6,000 more from Es-Salt, a Palestinian city from which British troops 
had recently retreated.  Among them were 1,700 Armenians from the Armenian towns of 
Marash, Adana, Aintab, Kessab, etc. who one ACASR worker in Jerusalem deemed “the 
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most pitiful sight I ever saw.”9  Fifteen hundred of the Armenian refugees were 
transported from Jerusalem to Port Said, Egypt to relieve some of the crowding.   The 
Relief Committee in Jerusalem asked for 80,000 dollars to aid the indigent refugees 
remaining in the area.10  
  In the final days of battle, the British captured Damascus and Aleppo where the 
Armenians deported to the Syrian deserts had gathered en-masse.11 The American Red 
Cross and ACASR expanded their relief network based in the region to care for this large 
number of refugees now under Allied control.  Fifteen relief units reported to 
Constantinople, not including those in Persia and the Caucasus where over a million 
people suffered from famines caused by the military campaigns and political upheaval.12 
In view of these large numbers of Persian, Kurds, Arabs, and Turks they intended to 
serve, the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief changed their name to 
the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) in Fall 1917.  This name 
would last until August 1919, when the organization would officially take on the name 
Near East Relief.  By that point, the American Red Cross had left the region entirely to 
NER recovery efforts. 
In the reports from Palestine, the ACRNE envisioned the challenges yet to come 
and began strategizing for their post Armistice operations.  Such a project would require 
far more funds that would—in turn—require more publicity.  Facing the rising 
expectations for 1919, Barton emphasized “that the publicity given this great enterprise 
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will largely determine its ultimate success.”13 William B. Millar, general secretary of the 
Laymen’s Missionary Movement and organizer of the Army and Navy Y.M.C.A. 
campaigns, returned to join forces with his former colleague, Charles Vickrey, as the 
directors of this “special nation-wide campaign.”14   Since its first official campaign in 
early 1916, the organization had developed an impressive publicity department.  The 
“latest news reports” that had earlier circulated among a select few became the News 
Bulletin, a newsletter edited by Nora Waln of the National Publicity Bureau. For 10 cents 
a year, subscribers stayed informed about Armenian relief efforts through the Bulletin’s 
articles, stories, and pictures.  The News Bulletin kept subscribers abreast of 
developments in the Campaign, particularly regarding the money raised.   
Each state and major city had a quota for donations that varied by population, 
number of participating committees, and past giving.  Though few states actually met or 
exceeded their quota, establishing quotas allowed local groups to work for a concrete 
goal rather than solicit donations generally.  This made an organized publicity campaign 
important to fostering an environment conducive to large-scale giving to the NER.  
Holding each state responsible for “their share” of the necessary funds also turned the 
campaign into more of a national project than when it had a lesser presence in most 
states.  
The National Publicity Bureau also issued a portfolio “contain[ing] a complete 
newspaper advertising campaign, some cartoons and photographs, a page of editorials 
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and a complete outline of a publicity organization,” further offering instructions for their 
use by the over two thousand local committees. As opposed to “A National Test of 
Brotherhood” in 1916, this collection of publicity materials was far more sophisticated 
and contained material for use in newspapers and periodicals rather than providing 
information only for inspiring the representatives.15  Analyzing this portfolio reveals the 
extent to which the ACRNE had stepped away from the Laymen’s appeals of those early 
years to enter a new age of advertising.  The 1919 Campaign Portfolio was designed and 
distributed by the National Publicity Committee to help the hundreds of local committees 
conduct a professional campaign.  The overall tone of the Portfolio is captured in the title 
to one advertisement: “In the Name of Pity—Give!”16  Most articles depict the distant 
sufferers in desperate circumstances, picking food out of garbage pits, scavenging for 
“orange peels from the mud”, and “scratching in the dust beneath the feed bags of the 
army mules” for errant “kernels of oats and barley.”17   
The Portfolio also included a weeks’ worth of editorials by NER’s head of 
newspaper publicity, David Hinshaw, advertising executive Bruce Barton, Supreme 
Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes, and former President William Howard Taft.  Most 
of the editorials made the case for donating by appealing to Americans’ sympathy for the 
Armenians children: “Shall the fathers and mothers of America fail to hear the call to 
help these orphans?  If they do so, they shall fail to be parents of children who are world 
                                                
15 See Chapter 1 for “A National Test of Brotherhood,” New York, N.Y.: American Committee for 
Armenian and Syrian Relief, 1916. 
16 “Advertisement A8” in “1919 Campaign Portfolio,” File 12HA-F16: Publications of the American 
Committee for Relief in the Near East, 12/1918 - 01/1919, U.S.F.A. Educational Division Records. 
17 “Five Thousand Persons Fed On Rise—Salt and Water Soup,” News Clip Sheet No. 1 in “1919 
Campaign Portfolio,” File 12HA-F16: Publications of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, 
12/1918 - 01/1919, U.S.F.A. Educational Division Records. 
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brothers and sisters of their own American children.”18  In addition to promoting 
paternalistic concern, the editorials played upon ideas of American exceptionalism to 
depict donations as a matter of national moral integrity: “Tolerant, Helpful, Kindly 
Generous America would never permit relief workers to sign death warrants for 
thousands of people, did it but realize the situation.”19  Hinshaw further argued that the 
devastation stemmed from the Great War, thereby obligating Americans to finish what 
they started so “that autocracy might be forever crushed from the earth.”20  In appealing 
to Americans as parents and citizens, these editorials provided crucial models for 
emphasizing a “special” relationship between Americans and Armenians. 
In addition to office staff like Hinshaw and Millar and big name endorsements 
from William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes, the Board “spared no pains in 
securing the most experienced help available.”21  For illustrating the campaign posters, 
this meant recruiting artists from the Committee of Public Information (CPI), the 
government’s own public relations agency.  The CPI led philanthropic agencies to step up 
their game by professionalizing public giving.  The government agency’s employees 
went on to define the field of public relations in the postwar era by working as experts in 
that field.  The Laymen’s Missionary Movement, meanwhile, would cede some control 
over the NER to this emerging crop of publicity men. 
Committee of Public Information 
                                                
18 David Hinshaw, “Armies of Starvation Not Yet Demobilized,” in “1919 Campaign Portfolio,” File 
12HA-F16: Publications of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, 12/1918 - 01/1919, 
U.S.F.A. Educational Division Records: A18. 
19 David Hinshaw, “Stay These Executions,” in “1919 Campaign Portfolio,” File 12HA-F16: Publications 
of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, 12/1918 - 01/1919, U.S.F.A. Educational Division 
Records: A16. 
20 ibid. 
21 News Bulletin, March 1919, pg. 4. 
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 In April of 1917, President Wilson reversed his prior neutrality and asked 
Congress to declare war on Germany.  Once obliged, the President who “had kept us out 
of war” steeled himself for backlash by a resentful public.  While the American military 
prepared to ship out, Wilson laid the groundwork for a domestic campaign fought with 
words and images.   Executive order 2594 established the Committee for Public 
Information to produce propaganda that would inspire the public to support the much-
reviled war effort.  At the helm stood George Creel, an unexceptional journalist and 
public relations man who had impressed Wilson with his vision of “voluntary censorship” 
through cooperation with media outlets.   
 Heartened by Creel’s faith in the press, Wilson chose not to proceed with 
censorship legislation intended to curtail press coverage of the war.  In turn, Creel 
exceeded all expectations by building a veritable publicity machine so attuned to its 
chairman’s specifications that the agency took on his name.  Creel and his mission were 
often the only things that connected the various overlapping sub-committees that 
comprised the agency.22  This haphazard organization, however, did not hinder the Creel 
Committee’s prodigious output of effective propaganda that arguably defined the 
historical legacy of World War I in the United States.23  Of all these departments and 
                                                
22 Rachel Conescu, “A Portrait of the Division of Pictorial Publicity,” Archives of the Society of 
Illustrators, New York, New York: 10-11.  
23 The Committee’s work was cut back after July 1, 1918. Its domestic activities ended after the armistice 
was signed on November 11, 1918, but its foreign operations continued until June 10, 1919. The 
fundamental studies of the Committee are James R. Mock and Cedric Larson, Words that Won the War: 
The Story of the Committee on Public Information 1917–1919 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1939); and Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on 
Public Information (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980). Creel’s talent for self-
promotion calls for a cautious approach to sources that rely upon his version of events, in particular Creel’s 
oft-cited How We Advertised America.  It is important to emphasize that How We Advertised America is 
both a memoir and a response to the postwar criticism of wartime propaganda.  Look no further than the 
unsubtle subtitle—The First Telling of the Amazing Story of the Committee on Public Information that 
Carried the Gospel of Americanism to Every Corner of the Globe—to justify some measure of concern.  
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projects conducted by the agency, none contributed more to this reputation than the 
posters designed by the Division of Pictorial Publicity.  Creel claimed that the division 
“was inspirational rather than planned,” though Eric Van Schaack, a scholar of art and art 
history, found some discrepancy between Creel’s published recollections and the 
“surviving records.”24  Those records revealed the extensive negotiations between Creel 
and the DPP illustrators over control of their product.  Creel envisioned the DPP as a pool 
of artists available for publicity needs. He tapped Charles Dana Gibson, President of the 
Society of Illustrators, as chairman of the department. Founded in 1901, the Society 
sought professional advancement for professional illustrators whose work in advertising 
and periodicals was often deprecated for its commercial conventions.  Wartime 
effectively elevated the status of illustrators by calling them to “wake up America” with 
their war posters.  Many of the Society’s members, including Gibson and other top 
illustrators, were also members of the Vigilantes, an association of writers, painters, poets 
and other artists involved in the Preparedness movement.  Their participation in the war 
effort began before the U.S. declaration of war—and certainly before Creel created his 
propaganda machine. 
  The DPP attracted many members of these groups as a vehicle for advancing 
their artistic credentials while serving their country.  Under the guidance of one of their 
own, the DPP attracted both known and unknown artists to work together to design 
                                                                                                                                            
How We Advertised America is best used for objective facts and insight on Creel’s own perception of his 
work.  See George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York and London: Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1920). 
24  Eric Van Schaack, “The Division of Pictorial Publicity in World War I,” Design Issues 22 no. 1(Winter 
2008): 33.  It is estimated that 75% of the Committee’s records were destroyed by the Army’s Bureau of 
Useless Papers or lost.   Executive Correspondence; Executive Division, Committee on Public Information; 
Records of the Committee on Public Information, Record Group 63; National Archives in College Park, 
College Park, MD. 
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appealing posters and other materials. The Division of Pictorial Publicity issued seven 
hundred of these posters, with multiple printing runs totaling in the millions for the most 
popular examples. All in all the 318 artists issued a total of 1,438 posters, cards, 
newspaper ads, cartoons, seals, and buttons for 58 governmental departments and 
organizations.25  
 Early on, Creel struggled to maintain control over the structure of the Division but 
conceded to Gibson and his board’s insistent adaptation of the Society’s organization to 
the task at hand. 26  A New York Times article promoted “C.D. Gibson’s Committee for 
Patriotic Posters” as an efficient, noble organization with only passing mention of the 
Creel Committee.  This suggests that the Division of Pictorial Publicity had a measure of 
autonomy in the public’s eye.  As the official liaison between the government and his 
fellow artists, Vice-Chairman Fred De Sales Casey, the Art Editor for Collier’s Weekly, 
held an important post: 
                                                
25 Committee on Public Information and George Creel, Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee 
on Public Information (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920). The numbers break down to 
700 posters, 122 cards, 310 newspaper ads, 287 cartoons, and 19 buttons. Historians have debated the 
DPP’s total number of printed posters to gage its share of American war propaganda.  Most historiography 
cites Walton Rawls’ estimates that showed that the United States printed more war-related posters than all 
the other combatant nations combined with approximately 20 million copies of 2500 designs.  According to 
these figures, the DPP designed almost 30 percent of American war posters (Rawls, 12).  This is the origin 
of the oft-cited one-third estimate. While the DPP kept track of the number of different designs in 
circulation, it did not record exact production runs.  Based upon the sizable, but roughly equivalent 
numbers of individual DPP and Naval posters preserved, Knutson suggests that the DPP production runs 
were likely comparable to that of the Navy’s 11 million copies of 30 posters.  Extrapolating from these 
numbers would suggest that the DPP’s total number of copies definitely exceeds Rawl’s supposition of 20 
million posters total.  Since Rawls only did not even consider unpublished numbers, Knutson makes 
relatively conservative estimates to place the number of war-related posters at 40 million, double Rawls’ 
already incredible total.  Knutson and more recent scholars have relied upon the Hoover Institution Library 
and Archives for their thorough sampling of over five thousand American WWI posters.  Anne Classen 
Knutson, Breasts, Brawn and Selling a War: American World War I Propaganda Posters (Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1997): 2-5.   
26Van Schaack, 33-35.  Van Schaack quotes extensively from Creel’s correspondence with Gibson to 
illustrate this argument.  For original correspondence and related material see Executive Correspondence; 
Executive Division, Committee on Public Information; Records of the Committee on Public Information, 
Record Group 63; National Archives in College Park, College Park, MD 
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At each meeting Mr. Casey reported the requests for posters, cartoons or 
illustrations received from the Government, or from patriotic 
organizations throughout the country. Each request was put in charge of 
a "Captain," whose duty it was to see that idea-sketches were received, 
on time, from such of the artists as were judged best fitted to carry out 
the work. These idea-sketches were then passed through the committee 
headquarters to Washington, and, when approved, were promptly 
executed in finished paintings.27 
 
 So as not to stifle creativity, any member could submit their design for consideration.  In 
addition, requests often came with specific instructions or predetermined campaign 
slogans. Such requirements often resulted in considerable thematic overlap between 
sketches from different artists of varying abilities. Though the Captains had some control 
over the sketches, they could not ensure that the commissioning agency would choose 
their preferred submissions. Nor could the chosen artist retain influence over the 
production of the original design as the sponsoring agency took complete control for 
turning the proposal into a finished poster.  This resulted in complaints by artists and art 
critics alike over the deficiencies of war posters.    
The Treasury Department’s Liberty Loan campaigns sparked artists’ feelings of 
frustration on account of its choice of winning posters and the amendments made to the 
submitted designs.  For the first competition, the uncultured bureaucrats chose a poster by 
political cartoonist C.R. Macauley that featured a disapproving Lady Liberty in peril.  
Critics of the poster apparently cringed privately so as to ‘get behind the government.’  
That posture lasted nearly two months before The Nation broke its silence.  In an article 
decrying the mediocre quality of both visual and textual publicity, Lady Liberty stood 
directly in the line of fire.  On behalf of himself and others, the author admitted to “a vast 
sense of irritation aroused by the wild-eyed female who shouted from the store 
                                                
27 Price, “Poster Design,” 278. 
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windows.”  He went on to compare her to an angry shrew, her “minatory finger darting 
out at the poor man who dared cross her path.”28  Indeed, Lady Liberty bears a confusing 
message between her tense jaw, widened eyes, and accusatory pose.  Her projecting 
finger and intense gaze clearly mimic Uncle Sam’s stance in J.M. Flagg’s “I Want You” 
recruitment poster.29  When performed by a woman, however, the gesture read as 
hysterical to artists and art editors alike.30  
                                                
28 “Posters and Slogans,” The Nation 104 no. 2712 (21 June 1917): pg. 728. 
29 Macauley would have been familiar with this wildly popular image as a fellow commercial artist.   
30 “Posters and Slogans,” 728. 
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Figure 7: "Lest I Perish," C.R. Macauley (1917).  Courtesy of National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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 Though Macauley’s imperiled heroine failed to impress, the Treasury officials 
stumbled upon a winner with the Fourth Liberty Loan in Fall 1918.  Joseph Pennell, 
Associate Chairman of the DPP, submitted an apocalyptic vision of the Statue of Liberty 
and New York harbor aflame.  In preparing the poster for production, the printers made 
some adjustments that also got Pennell fired up.  Displeased with this interference, 
Pennell wrote a short book on poster design in which he aired his grievances. After 
providing a brief lesson in poster design and production, Pennell told of his travails at the 
hands of clueless government officials and “wholly artless” lithographers.  Rather than 
present a simple drawing like the majority of submissions, the well-connected artist 
rendered his original illustration on lithographic plates to submit a print.  The printers and 
lithographers reviewing the approved contributions failed to distinguish Pennell’s 
lithograph from the hand-drawn designs.  This oversight struck Pennell as “the most 
awful joke and giveaway on some members of the American lithographic trade.”31  Once 
chosen by the Treasury Department Jury, these so-called professionals took control of 
editing and production the posters.  Set below the image of New York burning, Pennell’s 
original text warned ‘Buy Liberty Bonds or You Will See This.’  The Committee 
scrapped that title in favor of ‘That Liberty Shall Not Perish From the Earth—Buy 
Bonds.’  While acceding that “the spirit of it is inspiring like its author,” Pennell 
contended that “in relation to my design [the text is] meaningless.”32   The brilliance of 
Pennell’s work shone through these perceived flaws, so that the poster was one of the 
most circulated and popular World War One posters.      
                                                
31 Joseph Pennell's Liberty Loan Poster, A Textbook for artists and amateurs, governments and teachers 
and printers, with notes, an introduction and essay on the poster by the artist, Associate Chairman of the 
CPI, DPP (1918), 7.41. 
32 Pennell, 44. 
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Figure 8: “That Liberty Shall Not Perish From the Earth,” Joseph Pennell (1918).  Illustration courtesy of 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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1919 Campaign Posters   
As the Fourth Liberty Loan ran its course, Near East Relief was gearing up for 
their record-breaking 1919 Campaign for $30,000,000.  They commissioned the Creel 
Committee’s Division of Pictorial Publicity to supply the necessary posters for the 
campaign.  Upon receiving the Near East Relief order, the Division of Pictorial Publicity 
designated J. Thomson Willing as Captain. At that time, Willing held positions as Art 
Manager for the American Lithographic Company, Art Editor of the Associated Sunday 
Magazines, and Treasurer of the American Institute of Graphic Arts.  Willing’s previous 
work with the Y.M.C.A. and Salvation Army earned him a sterling reputation among 
ecumenical Christian organizations.33 He was currently engaged with the 1918 United 
War Work Campaign, a much larger project that included several philanthropic 
organizations, so it is surprising that the Near East Relief secured his services.  Willing’s 
vast experience and solid connections would serve the Near East Relief well.  Some of 
the Division’s most talented artists would contribute compelling, evocative works of art 
that put their previous publicity posters to shame.  
 As in the past campaigns, each poster bore a slogan in accordance with Vickrey’s 
chosen campaign theme.  Slogans were a crucial element of war posters as words could 
contain the concise messages to which illustrations gestured. The prior year’s emphasis 
on hunger was marked with incessant cries:  “You Can’t Let Us Starve,” “You Won’t Let 
Me Starve, Will You?” “5 Dollars a Month Saves A Life.”  Posters from the 1919 crop 
stress the need for American aid to prevent the Armenian people from “perishing.”  
Expressed through fragmented ultimatums, the slogans do not command action: “Lest We 
                                                
33 “War Artists As Seen By William Oberhardt,” The International Studio 69 no. 273(November 1919), pg. 
xlviii.  
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Perish,” “Lest They Perish,” “They Shall Not Perish.”  Each slogan alludes to the last line 
of the Gettysburg Address in which Lincoln reaffirms "that government of the people, by 
the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth." Lincoln apparently borrowed 
the phrasing of his final clause (in italics) from the Bible. The conditional formulation of 
“perishing” appears in John 3:16: "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only 
begotten Son, that whosoever believes in him should not perish, but have everlasting 
life."  Perish also appears in the context of famine, which resonates with the prevailing 
food shortages in the Near East.  
The best way to ascertain the general characteristics of these posters is first to 
account for the artists’ personal style. After identifying these individual qualities, the 
communal message will emerge.  Considering their work separately and together will 
elucidate the particular elements of the NER’s 1919 Poster Campaign.  For our purposes, 
three posters by different artists serve to represent the contrasting styles used by DPP 
artists.  Douglas Volk, W.T. Benda, and Ethel Franklin Betts created the three most 
memorable posters based on the given theme of “perishing.” A fourth poster by W.B. 
King will lead into a discussion of the transition from illustration to photography. 
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W.T. Benda was the most commercially successful illustrator of the three under 
consideration and represents the commercialization of American philanthropy.   
 
 
Figure 9: “Give Or We Perish,” W.T. Benda (1918).  Illustration courtesy of 
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 
  111 
Soon after his emigration from Poland to New York City, W.T. Benda made a name for  
himself drawing attractive women for advertisements and magazines.  During the war 
years, Benda was a prolific and highly-paid magazine illustrator.   His drawings appeared 
in Harper’s Weekly, Collier’s Magazine, and other popular weekly periodicals.34  Benda 
earned more money working for advertisers of such products as Crisco (1918) and S.S. 
White Toothpaste (1919, 1920). In the grand tradition of Charles Dana Gibson and 
Howard Chandler Christy, Benda’s illustrations idealized feminine beauty for 
commercial purposes.   Where the ‘Gibson Girls’ and ‘Christy Girl’ were apple-pie 
American, ‘Benda Girls’ worked a different angle.   As described in a 1921 article:  
The very contour of her face was radically different from that of the 
regular pictured magazine girl. She had rather high cheekbones. She did 
not smile as much as did the other girls. There was something sweetly 
grave about her expression, a spirituality which the others lacked.35 
 
Inspired by the romanticism of 19th Century Polish art, Benda drew Slavic beauties or 
Oriental women with deep-set almond eyes and dark swirling hair. In another life, the 
Armenian heroine might too have been a ‘Benda Girl.’ These illustrations appealed to the 
public’s growing fascination with the exoticism of foreign lands and women.  With 
commissions for his work piling up, Benda ascended into the top echelon of American 
illustrators.   
Benda—like many illustrators in the “Golden Age of Illustration” from 1880 to 
1930—was able to straddle the two worlds of magazine and commercial art. Of course, 
art critics often dismissed the value of such illustrations as technical drawing rather than 
                                                
34 On the role of periodicals in the creation of American national culture see: Richard Ohmann, Selling 
Culture, Magazines, Markets and Class at the Turn of the Century (New York: Verso, 1996); Matthew 
Schneirov, The Dream of a New Social Order: Popular Magazines in America 1893-1914 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994). 
35 Carol Bird, “New Faces For Old Onces” in Theatre Magazine 33, no. 239 (February 1921): 91. 138 
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art.  The rise of poster art during the war, however, cemented Benda’s reputation as an 
artist.  He also contributed posters to the Red Cross, Y.W.C.A., and United War Work 
Campaign.  None of these posters featured a beautiful, exotic young girl who resembled a 
Benda girl.   
 
Figure 10: “You Can Help,” W.T. Benda (1918).  Illustration courtesy of Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
Despite Benda’s own prominence, his poster was not featured as prominently as 
Volk’s “They Shall Not Perish” or Betts’ “Lest We Perish.” His design was intended for 
window display rather than large billboards; printed by photogravure rather multicolor 
lithography.  By developing an illustration on a single plate, photogravure reproduced 
larger quantities of one-color prints more cheaply than colored lithographs.  Relative to 
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the many Volk and Betts prints preserved in public and private collections, Benda’s 
“Give or We Perish” posters are scarce. Indeed, the 1919 Campaign Portfolio warns that 
the Benda posters should be “used with discretion.” One can only speculate on the reason 
why this poster was classified differently than the colored posters. Benda’s work is 
admittedly more grim in style and content. Perhaps the poster was deemed suggestive in 
its presentation of a vulnerable, beautiful young woman, or else there was a logistical 
explanation for their caution. Without further information, however, only conjecture is 
possible. 
  114 
  
Figure 11: “They Shall Not Perish,” Douglas Volk (1918).  Illustration courtesy of Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 
Douglas Volk’s “They Shall Not Perish” depicts Columbia poised for battle in 
anticipation of onslaught from beyond.  An allegorical female representation of 
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‘American Ideals,’ Columbia “descend[s] not only from classical antiquity but also from 
the French Revolution.”36   Her accessories further gesture towards connections with 
other images of Columbia and, specifically, Delacroix’s La Liberté guidant le peuple. 
Stretching out her ‘sword of justice’ and clad in Phyrgian cap, Columbia symbolizes her 
willingness to resort to violence in pursuit of liberty.37  She fights not for her personal 
liberty, but intercedes on behalf of others.  Volk plays upon Columbia’s traditional 
embodiment of “masculine” ideals with an uncharacteristic demonstration of sympathy.   
Columbia’s fierce pose is softened by her tenderness towards the dark, frightened child 
clinging to soft folds of her white gown.  She shelters the child with her shawl, an 
American flag.  
Volk’s poster likewise asks Americans to protect the Armenians by donating to 
ACRNE.  The illustration promotes the idea of humanitarian aid as an American duty.  
Historian Julia Irwin writes about similar attitudes within American Red Cross 
fundraising campaigns: “In the Great War years, [the ARC] undertook a concerted 
publicity campaign, flooding the American cultural landscape with two distinct yet 
intertwined messages.  First they advanced the idea that all loyal U.S. citizens had a civic 
duty to support their nation’s civilian relief efforts.  To be a good American citizen now 
demanded more than showing concern for one’s compatriots; it required coming to the 
aid of fellow democratic citizens wherever in the world they happened to reside.”38  Much 
of this perceived duty also derived from American neutrality throughout the war so that 
                                                
36 Jakub Kazechi and Jason Lieblang, “Regression Versus Progression” in Picture This: World War I 
Posters and Visual Culture, ed. Pearl James (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 127-8; 
James, 278. 
37 Kazechi and Lieblang, 128. 
38 Julia Irwin, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening 
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Americans recognized that their country remained in a position to give to war-ravaged 
countries.   The same reasoning behind U.S. Food Administration posters against wasting 
food applies here as Americans were constantly asked to compare their own good fortune 
at living far outside the war zone.  Volk’s poster presents a similar message showing 
Armenian children reaching out to a feminized, symbolic America. Together with the 
slogan, the poster suggests that Armenians lives lie in American hands and it is the 
public’s obligation to prevent further disaster.  
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Figure 12: “Lest We Perish,” Ethel Franklin Betts (1918). Illustration courtesy of Library of Congress, 
Washington D.C. 
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 Ethel Franklin Betts’ “Lest We Perish” romanticizes childhood in her depiction of 
an Armenian girl staring out, palms open and reaching beyond the frame.  Betts trained at 
the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts as well as with renowned illustrator Howard Pyle 
at the Drexel Institute and the Howard Pyle School.  Pyle was best known for illustrating 
Robert Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island, 
defining the modern image of pirate dress 
and swagger.  Ethel Betts and her sister, 
Anne Whelan Betts, were both trained by 
Pyle at a time when the field of illustration 
was attempting to professionalize by weeding 
out dilettante women.39 While her gender 
could have ended her career before it began, 
Betts managed to prove herself a serious 
student so that Pyle took her on.  Pyle’s 
female students were among the only 
women artists who were included in the 
Division of Pictorial Publicity.  Her work 
was more defined by her course of study than her gender.  Like her mentor, Betts drew 
vivid illustrations of fairy tales and other children’s literature.  Her illustrations for 
Frances Hodgson Burnett’s The Little Princess bear particular resemblance to her poster 
subject in color and composition.  Both of Betts’ illustrations depict lone children, Sara 
Crewe, supposedly orphaned when her widowed father contracted jungle fever, and the 
                                                
39 Michelle Bogart, Advertising, Artists, and the Borders of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995), 30. 
Figure 13: Illustration by Ethel Franklin Betts for 
Frances Hodgson Burnett, A Little Princess (New 
York, 1916), 113. 
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Armenian girl by genocide.  As such, Betts turns our attention toward masses of orphaned 
children who needed help from the NER.  
 Though difficult to pin down statistics on the number of children cared for by the 
NER, the organization initially estimated that 400,000 were in need of aid.  Figures from 
NER relief stations in 1920 indicate that their orphanages and child feeding programs 
were only reaching one fourth of the original estimates.40  One reason for this discrepancy 
was the huge numbers of Armenian refugees fleeing from Turkish troops during the 
Turkish War of Independence.  Certain stations in Anatolia were unable to produce 
accurate figures at all.  More disconcerting was the fact that the organization lacked the 
resources to reach all the children who needed help.  Many within proximity to NER 
relief stations were going hungry simply because there was not enough room, nor enough 
food to go around.  Given the innocence and helplessness attributed to children, this 
aspect of relief work figured heavily in publicity campaigns.  In the 1919 Campaign 
Portfolio, for example, most of the proffered photographs and newspaper stories feature 
children still in need of aid.   
Many of these children were not strictly orphaned, but born of widows and single 
women.  This is the version of maternal imagery displayed in W. B. King’s “Lest They 
Perish,” revealed only with the photography upon which the poster was based.  On the 
surface, “Lest They Perish” depicts the devastation of Armenian neighborhoods and 
villages that turned survivors into refugees.  This background, ironically, is the most 
imaginative aspect of the design. Though the previous posters bear the Division of 
Pictorial Publicity’s seal, King’s print displays no such seal.  Even without that mark, the 
                                                
40 “Near East Relief Handbook,” 17. 
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poster unquestionably belongs to this series.  Both the slogan, “Lest They Perish,” and 
the text—right down to the lettering of “CAMPAIGN for $30,000,000”—conform to the 
other posters.  The Division of Pictorial Publicity likely dissolved before King’s poster 
could be approved.  The Creel Committee suspended its domestic activities, including the 
Division of Pictorial Publicity, shortly after Armistice was declared on the November 11, 
1918.  While all the other posters appear in the December 1918 issue of the News 
Bulletin, “Lest They Perish” is conspicuously absent.41   
 Figure 14: “Lest They Perish,” W.B. King (1919).  Illustration courtesy of Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C.  Figure 15: Photograph courtesy of Maurice Missak Kelechian. 
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 The News Bulletin does include a photograph featuring a woman and child who 
look nearly identical to King’s subjects.  Both women wear light headdresses secured 
with a darker swatch to keep their hair covered. Each woman lowers her gaze to the 
ground with her hands clasped together. The babies strapped to their backs peer forth 
from beneath blankets to reveal their tiny faces.  These appreciable similarities suggest 
that the Armenian mother and child depicted in the photograph served as models for W. 
B. King’s subjects in “Lest They Perish.” In King’s version, smoldering ruins stream 
towards the bright sky.  Behind the other pair, however, a crowd of curious men and 
children gather in a narrow alleyway.   By replacing the crowd gathering in the 
background with a pile of rubble, King adjusted the context to portray sympathetic 
refugees in dire circumstances.  As a result, the poster reiterated the call for American aid 
articulated by Benda, Betts, and Volk’s posters for Near East Relief.   
There remains one crucial distinction between “Lest We Perish” and its 
counterparts: King’s subjects were illustrations of actual Armenian refugees.  Moreover, 
other Near East Relief publicity identified the pair as beneficiaries of American relief.  
According to Barton, the photograph depicts: 
An Armenian mother, whose child was born during the exile in the 
wilderness east of the Jordan.  She has come to the Relief Fund 
headquarters for the tin of condensed milk which is given twice a week.42 
Assuming this caption is correct, the Armenian woman was likely one of the fifteen 
hundred Armenians whom the Turks exiled to this area until their recovery around March 
or April 1918.  British trucks brought the refugees to camps in and around Jerusalem, 
                                                
42 Barton, “Advertising the Campaign,” unnumbered. 
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where relief agencies were up and running.43   Most of the incoming Armenians stayed 
only a few weeks to rule out illness before moving on to the district refugee center for 
Armenians in Port Said, Egypt.44  In September 1918, all the remaining Armenian 
refugees were sent away from encroaching battle lines to Port Said. These movements 
suggest that the original photo was taken in Jerusalem or Port Said between April and 
September 1918.  Long after the moment passed, however, the captured image lived on in 
NER publicity work.   
An illustration of the photograph also appeared in an advertisement for the 1919 
Campaign.  The advertisement was directed towards “Mothers of America” and asked 
them to consider whether they would give up their baby to the Near East Relief or allow 
the baby to starve.  By asking this question, the ad placed American women in the shoes 
of their counterparts in Western Asia.  The Armenian woman’s baby becomes everyone’s 
baby as the ad interrogates its audience: “Would YOU have let that baby starve?  Would 
you let any baby starve if you had the means to save it?” This is a rhetorical question that 
aimed to bridge the distance between American spectators and suffering Armenians.  In 
doing so, the ad puts forth a moral quandary for which the only answer is to save the 
baby by donating to the Near East Relief.  The ad further shifts the hypothetical to the 
actual situation facing “poor, terror stricken Armenian, Syrian, and Jewish mother[s] in 
Bible lands.”  Some of the terrors facing these mothers include those wrought by the Turk 
over “hundreds of years.”  At this point the ad turns into an anti-Muslim tract, noting that 
                                                
43 Henry P. Davidson, American Red Cross in the Great War (New York: Macmillan, 1919), 261-7.  The 
American Red Cross received notice of this recovery from NER in April 1918.  The Capture of Jericho on 
20 February 1918 became the British Occupation of the Jordan Rift Valley, but the Allies did not control 
territory east of the Jordan River until final Battle of Megiddo in September 1918. 
44 American National Red Cross Nursing Service et al, History of American Red Cross Nursing, 897-9. 
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“the Turk has fed these unfortunates on cruelty and oppression.  He has crushed them by 
evil misrule.  He has polluted them with devilish Muslim practices.”  This anti-Muslim 
rhetoric was common in NER propaganda from this period, though the claims were 
usually sensationalized rather than realistic interpretations of the political situation.  Here, 
these dramatic claims were mere background to the more insistent call for aid based upon 
the needs of mothers and children as the “devilish Muslim practices” simply increase the 
direness of the cause.  Illustrating this advertisement with yet another iteration of this 
image of mother-and-child demonstrates just how important maternal sympathy was to 
the 1919 Campaign.45 
                                                
45 “Advertisement A5” in “1919 Campaign Portfolio,” File 12HA-F16 Publications of the American 
Committee for Relief in the Near East, 12/1918 - 01/1919, U.S.F.A. Educational Division Records.  After 
appearing in print and poster, the photograph circulated as a lantern-slide on the organization’s speaking 
circuit.  An Armenian-American engineer named Missak Kelechian found a batch of NER lantern-slides in 
the archives of the Armenian Orthodox Church in Antelias, Lebanon.  The slides came from the collection 
of Maria Jacobsen, a Danish Missionary/Nurse stationed in Harpoot, Turkey.  Jacobsen arrived as a young 
woman in 1907 who dedicated her life to the Armenian orphans under her care.  After witnessing the 
genocide, she spent seven months on the Near East Relief publicity circuit in 1920 before returning to her 
work.  Long fascinated by the American relief work, Kelechian added images of the slides to his large 
collection.  It was not until he encountered the “Lest They Perish” poster at the University of Minnesota 
Library that he recognized the uncanny resemblance between King’s illustration and an image in his 
collection.  When he returned home, Kelechian identified the photograph made from Jacobsen’s lantern-
slide and went public with his finding in August 2006.  Author’s correspondence with Maurice Kelechian.  
See also Maria Jacobsen, Ara Sarafian(ed.), Kristen Vind(trans.), Diaries of a Danish Missionary: Harpoot, 
1907-1919 (London, UK: Gomidas Institute, 2006). 
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Figure 16: “Mothers of American,” (1918).  Illustration courtesy of National Archives, Kansas City, Missouri.  
 Sympathy directed at mothers and motherhood expresses universal ideas about the 
importance of the family.  Mothers are the cultural caretakers of children and their 
suffering leads directly to children suffering.  When a mother is the lone adult in charge 
of her children, her ability to feed and clothe her children is imperative.  Children are 
often seen as helpless to preserve themselves without adult intervention.  In one way, 
maternal sympathy is an extension of sympathy for children.  On the other hand, there is 
an element of sympathy all its own whereby the observer identifies with the mother’s 
inability to provide for her own children.  That responsibility is one universal to parents 
in that every parent wants to protect and nurture her child.  When the NER appeals to 
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parents, the organization is therefore appealing to adults as parents, themselves, and as an 
extension of the universal sympathy for children as innocents.   
Photography 
The photographic image of mother and child was one of the first to emerge from 
Allied-controlled regions of the Near East.  Initially, Red Cross representatives like 
Major Stephen Trowbridge or future New York Times editor John H. Finley in Palestine 
sent back photographs of children and young mothers in the final months of 1918.  Glen 
Russell Carrier, a photographer and future cinematographer, was hired to take some of 
these early photographs.  A press release from his employers, International Film Service 
Co. Inc., indicated that Carrier would be taking both still and motion pictures on an 
expedition of the Near East during the first half of 1919.  The International Film Service 
advertised that “the result of his photography will be available to this company 
exclusively for showing to the public.”   In addition, “motion pictures of the conditions, 
as they actually exist, will be shipped back by Mr. Carrier for use in the Hearst News, 
The Universal Current Events and the Screen Telegram,” all newsreels which were 
shown regularly in movie theaters across the country.46  As the first hired photographer in 
the region, most of the 1919 and 1920 publicity photographs were also developed from 
Carrier’s negatives.  Relief workers, journalists, and others would send hundreds more 
back to the Committee’s New York headquarters where they were turned into publicity 
material.   
Transitioning from illustration to photography added to the “realness” of the 
Armenians’ suffering and, therefore, the need for donations. Artists and drawings can 
                                                
46 Press release courtesy of Vicken Babkenian. 
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depict people in situations that never existed or add emotion with just shading or color. In 
fact, one art enthusiast dismissed photography entirely as “the camera cannot feel.”  
Robert Cortes Holliday, an editorial staff member at The Bookman, argued that the artist 
has “the power to seize upon those things before him the interest of which is universal 
and eternal, and to let drop away those things which are ephemeral and accidental.”47  For 
Holliday, strict realism was an undesirable quality that rendered photography unfit for 
inclusion as an art form.  Of course, Holliday’s analysis assumed that the camera was an 
objective source of truth and the photographer was a mere button-pusher.  Photographers 
influence the image far more than Holiday allows through framing, posing, perspective, 
lighting, and the like. 
In Susan Sontag’s essay “On Photography,” she writes that “photographs alter and 
enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at and what we have a right to look at.”48 
When a photograph shows a group of street children dressed in rags or women escaped 
from Turkish homes, the distant observer enters a world not his own.  Though the 
photographer may have been given entry, the subjects have no control over their own 
image.  While this is ethically problematic, many would dismiss these concerns as the 
NER photographs theoretically benefitted the unfortunate women and children as a 
group.  Ariella Azoulay has more recently postulated that a photograph constitutes a civil 
contract where the subject signs over their image for a specific use.  Azoulay’s work 
tracks the relationship between rights and photography where a subject whose rights are 
being violated is unlikely to exert control over their image.49  This is certainly the case as 
                                                
47 Robert Cortes Holliday, “Posing the War for the Painter,” The Bookman 47 (July 1918): 512-516. 
48 Susan Sontag, “On Photography,” 3. 
49 Ariella Azoulay, The Civil Contract of Photography (New York: Zone Books, 2008). 
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far as NER publicity photographs are concerned.  They targeted the pathetic and helpless, 
using those images to solicit donations without directly involving the original subjects.  
Chapter Four will deal with the process of producing these photographs in greater depth.  
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CHAPTER 4  
Creating Humanitarian Media in the Field, 1919-1923 
 
 
Figure 17: Dr. Mabel E. Elliott with patient.  Courtesy of Drexel University, College of Medicine, Archives and 
Special Collections. 
This chapter focuses on the creation of publicity media in the midst of 
humanitarian aid operations in the Near East from 1919-1923.  Up until this point, the 
advocacy efforts remained largely separate from the actual work of giving humanitarian 
aid. With the establishment of field operations the publicity media transformed from 
posters into photographs; stilted diplomatic dispatches turned into descriptive personal 
accounts from NER personnel working with the refugees. Together, photography and 
literary reportage altered the personae of Armenians into starving, diseased orphans.  
These horrific images were made palatable by portraying Americans as saviors whose 
contributions brought redemption.  
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This dynamic is clearly displayed in this photograph of an American physician 
and one such starveling.  In Figure 1, Dr. Mabel Elliott is examining a patient suffering 
from malnutrition and contracted tendons for a publicity still.  The doctor’s 
correspondence offers insight into the pressure placed upon Elliott to contribute to 
publicity efforts.  All NER staff were asked repeatedly to participate in the ‘selling’ of 
Armenian relief to the folks back home. Our protagonist may be the most historically 
visible due to her published memoirs—Beginning Again At Ararat (1924)—and the 
papers preserved at Drexel University’s Special Collection of Women in Medicine in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  When coupled with these sources, the interpretation of the 
photograph moves from sheer pathos to a deeper perspective on humanitarian aid, 
philanthropy, and media. 
This photograph became an iconic image for Armenian relief efforts in the U.S. 
First published in the November 1922 issue of New Near East, this photograph went on 
to appear in some of the fundamental works on American relief efforts in the Near East. 
Dr. Elliott included the picture in Beginning Again At Ararat, perhaps the most well-
known personal account of Armenian relief.  The same photograph reappears in Esther 
Pohl Lovejoy’s 1927 account of the American Woman’s Hospitals, Certain Samaritans, 
an important text in the history of women in medicine and the Great War.1   However, the 
image truly gained immortality in The Story of Near East Relief by NER Chairman Rev. 
James L. Barton. Scholars have since appropriated the photograph to document subjects 
                                                
1 Esther Pohl Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), 127-8. 
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such as the Armenian Genocide, American International Humanitarianism, and 
contemporary women’s literature on Armenian orphanages.2  
This visual image depicts a cooperative effort between the American Women’s 
Hospitals and the Near East Relief as well as their shared mission.  At the same time, its 
creation and subsequent use betrays the underlying inequities between the two 
organizations.  As detailed in earlier chapters, publicity experts were an integral part of 
the Armenian relief movement due to the many philanthropic demands on the American 
public.  Successful fundraising required concerted efforts and appealing material to gain 
public support and solicit donations.  Without a publicity department to orchestrate the 
annual fundraising campaigns, such organizations as Near East Relief, the American Red 
Cross, and other large-scale humanitarian agencies would have been unable to send 
much-needed aid to Armenian refugees.  Therefore, the proffered photograph points to 
the impact of NER’s professionalized publicity on affiliated organizations without such 
resources.  
 Smaller, more specialized humanitarian relief groups struggled to find their place 
in a philanthropic scene dominated by veritable publicity factories.  The American 
Woman’s Hospitals (AWH), an organization of female physicians that coordinated 
medical care for the Near East Relief, exemplifies such agencies.  This organization had a 
peculiar relationship with the NER in that it was both an independent agency and one 
working under the auspices of the NER.  It both was and was not part of the NER.  While 
                                                
2 Rebecca Saunders and Shushan Avagyan, “(Un)Disciplining Traumatic Memory: Mission Orphanages 
and the Afterlife of Genocide in Micheline Aharonian Marcom’s ‘The Daydreaming Boy’,” Contemporary 
Women's Writing 4 no. 3 (November 2010): 197-219; Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris, 232-3. Balakian 
misidentifies Elliott as “A Near East Relief Nurse,” thereby understating the significance of AWH 
physicians working in cooperation with the larger relief operation. 
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the organization enjoyed many opportunities as part of NER work, the AWH received 
limited financial support from NER and had to do its own fundraising.  As one David 
among a phalanx of Goliaths, AWH successfully raised funds to support their medical 
relief missions in the Near East.  While professional “publicity men” trolled the region to 
find material for stylized accounts of suffering, the AWH chairwoman gathered tidbits 
from correspondence with physicians and nurses in the field. Rather than maintaining an 
entire department of artists, writers, photographers, and public relations experts, the 
AWH employed a few professional consultants and interested medical women.  This 
allows for a reconstruction of the process of making publicity in the field.  Despite these 
enormous differences in publicity operations, the AWH held its own in the competitive 
philanthropic scene and continued their humanitarian work long after the Near Eastern 
crisis ended.  
After years of massacres, rape, and deportation into the desert, the surviving 
Armenians from Turkey desperately needed medical care, food, and shelter.  When 
Armistice with Turkey came into effect in October 1918, the Near East Relief stepped in 
to provide humanitarian aid.  By 1919 the organization was financially secure enough to 
provide for relief and recovery overseas.  Furthermore, the organization’s federal charter 
noted that only the NER had the contacts and knowledge necessary to conduct such work 
in the region.   In effect, NER had a virtual monopoly over Armenian relief efforts that 
provided both credibility in the field and among American donors.  Prior humanitarian 
organizations lasted only as long as the disaster remained relevant to the American 
public.  Near East Relief, however, continued dispensing humanitarian aid long after the 
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fallout from its precipitating crisis—including the Genocide, World War I, and the 
Greco-Turkish Wars from 1919-1923—ran its course.   
Background 
At the ‘eleventh hour on the eleventh day of the eleventh month’ of 1918, Allied 
and German troops laid down their weapons to end over four years of fighting.  Crowds 
gathered across Europe, the United States, and the British Empire gathered to celebrate 
the Armistice signed in a railway car deep in the forest of Compiègne.  Some 2,240 km 
Southeast of Compiègne, French troops prepared to descend upon Constantinople based 
upon their interpretation of the Armistice of Mudros.  British troops joined them in the 
conquered capital the following day on November 13th.  By early December, the Allied 
High Commission to Constantinople administered the military occupation, using their 
authority to install a new government.  With the Young Turks’ Pan-Turkish regime in 
retreat, the Commission reinstituted a nominal Sultanate, appointed a Grand Vizier, and 
organized Parliamentary elections. One of the Parliament’s first acts was to repeal the 
deportation laws as Article IV of the Mudros Armistice stipulated that “Armenian 
interned persons and prisoners . . . be collected at Constantinople and handed over 
unconditionally to the Allies.” The agreement contained other clauses signaling Allied 
intentions to protect Armenians.  Article XI ordered Turkish troops to withdraw from 
Northwest Persia and parts of Trans-caucasia; Article XXIV reserved the Allies’ rights to 
occupy the six Armenian vilayets “in case of disorder.”  Deportations had so ‘Turkified’ 
Eastern Anatolia that any “disorder” was contingent upon Armenians returning home en 
masse.   
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For these refugees and their international supporters, redemption seemed close at 
hand.  However, though relief operations and food aid were initially successful, the 
resurgence of Turkish nationalism threatened Armenian rehabilitation.  From January to 
June 1919, the Allied victors negotiated terms for the formal end of war at the Paris 
Peace Conference. Partitioning the former Ottoman Empire led the Allied Powers to 
squabble over territorial control. While the French consolidated their holdings in Syria 
and the British in Palestine and Mesopotamia, a growing independence movement 
opposed Allied authority.  The Turkish National Movement established its base in 
Ankara, a remote city in central Anatolia. In Ankara, the National Movement rebuilt the 
Turkish Army, equipping them with munitions smuggled in from Constantinople. Far 
from disarming the Turkish forces as charged, Mustapha Kemal Pasha used his position 
to raise awareness of Allied territorial ambitions and make contacts with sympathetic 
officials.  
Kemal’s National Movement undermined the legitimacy of the Grand Vizier and 
Ottoman Parliament as an Allied puppet government.  In late-January 1920, the National 
Movement persuaded the Parliament to ratify a “National Pact” that asserted Turkish 
sovereignty.  The British responded by attempting to discourage nationalist sentiment and 
forcibly imposing the Treaty of Sevres to legalize Allied control over the region.  By 
Spring 1920, the Turkish Nationalist established the Grand National Assembly as the 
Parliament for a provisional government in Ankara.  Thus officially began the Turkish 
War of Independence, a conflict that also included the Turkish-Armenian, Franco-
Turkish, and Greco-Turkish Wars.  Each of these wars held grave consequences for 
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Armenian refugees and complicated the work of Near East Relief with changing battle 
lines and renewed massacres. 
Armenian Relief in the Near East 
In November 1918, the American Committee for Relief in the Near East 
(ACRNE) assembled a group of missionaries and businessmen “to make a complete 
study of the problem of rehabilitation of the Armenians, Syrians, and other destitute 
people of the Ottoman Empire.”  The Barton Commission (named for its chairman James 
L. Barton) invited investigators from the Rockefeller Foundation to join the survey.3  In 
January 1919, the Commission departed for London where they spent 10 days meeting 
with various British officials who offered the ACRNE “the free use of the warehouses, 
docks, wharves and railways under British control in the Near East.”4 British officers and 
men on the ground would also cooperate with the relief organization.  The Commission 
then proceeded to Paris where they received similar assurances regarding the French 
military as well as access to French ships. This errand coincided with the opening weeks 
of the Paris Peace Conference where industrialist Arthur Curtiss James remained to act as 
a conduit between American officials and ACASR.  After a stop in Rome to receive 
approval from the Italian government, the Commission proceeded to Constantinople.  
Upon arrival, the Commission met with the American Allied High Commissioner Rear 
Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol and the organization’s local relief committee.  From there, 
the Commission split up to cover the Caucasus, the Turkish Interior, Syria, Palestine, and 
Persia.  Upon returning to the U.S., the Commission translated their personal 
                                                
3 Payaslian,  143-4. 
4 Barton, The Story of Near East Relief, 111. 
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observations into a series of “recommended methods and policies of operation” that 
would guide the relief work.5 
The organization had more than logistics to consider.  ACRNE was one of many 
wartime organizations concentrating on fundraising rather than providing humanitarian 
services. From the initial massacres of Armenians in 1915 to their 1918 surrender, 
Turkish authorities stymied attempts to coordinate effective means of aiding constant 
streams of refugees.  American Board missionaries and their colleagues distributed 
supplies but remained frustrated by their small-scale efforts. These limitations lifted with 
the Allied victory so that the American Red Cross or another existing international 
humanitarian agency could have worked on the ground. When the war drew to a close, 
hundreds of thousands of Armenians were scattered throughout the deserts of Syrian and 
Mesopotamia.  Dying of starvation and disease, refugees gathered in Aleppo, Damascus, 
Beirut, Jerusalem, Baghdad, and other cities where the American Red Cross was 
dispensing aid.  Though the ACRNE was prepared to launch a cooperative agency in 
June 1918, the ARC declined to participate in such an effort based on advice from their 
Committee on Coordination.  The ARC bowed out in favor of concentrating on returning 
soldiers and domestic public health as obligated in their federal charter to receive 
government funding. Furthermore, the ARC recommended that the ACRNE “continue its 
existing organization; because its field of activity was distinctive; because of the 
existence in Turkey of the Red Crescent Society; and because relief was already being 
                                                
5 ibid, 117. 
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effectively administered.”6  Despite their wartime development into the premiere 
international humanitarian agency, the ARC was unable to address the tremendous needs 
in the Near East. As they testified before the House Committee on the Judiciary during 
the hearings for the ACRNE’s federal charter, providing aid to all of the refugees “would 
practically exhaust the entire fund of the American Red Cross.”  That money was 
furthermore “contributed largely for the relief and comfort of our own soldiers and sailors 
and those of our allies.”7 Besides, “the two organizations are thoroughly one in their 
purpose and ideals, different only in the territory served and the form of its 
organization.”8 
In recent years, the American public had grown accustomed to the competing 
calls for donations to aid the suffering Belgians, French, Dutch, Serbians, Poles, and so 
forth.  Those countries also benefitted from the millions of dollars in aid or loans that the 
U.S. government had appropriated for their respective governments to care for its 
civilians.  As the Armenians, Syrians, and Greeks had no such representative 
governments eligible for U.S. loans, their suffering had advanced to levels far beyond 
those nations.  The ACRNE went on to establish its own corps of volunteers “to restore 
these once prosperous but now impoverished refugees to their former homes.” With “the 
period of rehabilitation at hand,” the additional personnel, facilities, equipment, 
                                                
6 House Committee on the Judiciary, American Committee for Relief in the Near East, report prepared by 
Warren Gard, 65th Cong., 3d sess., 22 February 1919, H.rp. 1125, Serial 7455, 4. 
7 ibid, 4. 
8 ibid, 4. 
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medicine, food, clothing, and other supplies necessitated “vastly larger sums . . . than 
were required for merely to sustain life in their desert exile.”9  
The organization’s external transformation from a philanthropic fund to an 
international humanitarian aid agency led its trustees to seek formal recognition from the 
federal government.  The ACRNE argued that since only private philanthropy was 
available to them, the U.S. government should officially throw its weight behind the 
organization by granting the organization a federal charter of incorporation.  A 
Congressional Charter would “[give] to the charity the prestige and unity essential for the 
efficient administration and distribution of the funds among the people for whom the 
relief is intended.”  The Near East Relief, formerly the American Committee for Relief in 
the Near East (ACRNE), received its federal charter from Congress in August 1919. 
In February of 1919, The U.S.S. Leviathan had departed for Brest, France with a 
party of 240 volunteers.  This group included doctors, nurses, missionaries, agricultural 
and industrial experts, Mennonite conscientious objectors, and recent college graduates.  
Over the next four years, nearly a thousand men and women would join them in service 
with the NER.10  Some members of these corps would run hospitals, clinics, rescue 
homes, and orphanages. Others worked in occupational training programs and 
agricultural initiatives to prevent dependence on American aid.  Many held logistical 
positions as drivers, administrative, and other support staff.  NER personnel were 
predominantly female, under thirty, and college-educated. Of course, there was a large 
contingent of former missionaries to Turkey who were older and more experienced in 
                                                
9 ibid, 5. 
10 Stanley Elphinstone Kerr, The Lions of Marash, xvi. 
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relief work than the average worker.  Apart from the missionaries, many came from 
wealthy homes as most volunteered without wages.  The organization would rely upon its 
field personnel to help retool its identity as a philanthropic fund to support its postwar 
endeavors overseas. 
Most strikingly, these volunteers were neither universally sympathetic to 
Armenians nor hostile to the Turks.  Proximity to American diplomatic circles in 
Constantinople often fostered skepticism as to the extent of Armenian suffering.  Elsie 
Kimball, for example, served as stenographer to Allied Relief Commissioner William N. 
Haskell in Tiflis, Georgia.11  Basking in the Bosphorus sun, playing tennis, and eating 
plentiful meals at various diplomatic events, Kimball found herself turning brown and 
packing on pounds.  In a country with so many on the brink of starvation, her increasing 
bulk testified to her distance from the field.  Kimball’s position working as a 
stenographer was rare in an organization where most volunteers worked among the 
refugees. Haskell was a racist who detested both Turks and Armenians, but found the 
latter more objectionable.  As he wrote in his memoirs, “I give it as my measured opinion 
that as a race the Armenians in Armenia are a grasping, avaricious and cruel people, 
entirely lacking in veracity, and as a rule oblivious to the sufferings of even their own 
people.”12  Kimball absorbed this message from her superior and wrote home with little 
regard for the “wild, loathsome creatures” she encountered while touring a hospital.13 
Kimball’s and Haskell’s hostility towards Armenians and their privileged status among 
                                                
11 Now Tblisi, Georgia. 
12 “Draft 1,” Box 1, Folder 1, William N. Haskell Memoir, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford 
University, Palo Alto, California: 47-8. 
13 Elsie Kimball to Family, 30 August 1919, Box 1 Folder 1, Elsie Kimball Papers, 1887-1972, Archives 
and Special Collections, Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, MA. 
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the diplomatic corps marked them as outliers in an organization concerned with 
Armenian relief.   
On the other hand, staff assigned to work in close contact with refugees generally 
developed more sympathetic views towards their charges. Once Kimball went into the 
field, her view of Armenians softened.  When reflecting upon the filthiness surrounding 
Armenian homes from her new station in the Caucasus, Kimball declined to pass final 
judgment upon the refugees: “I suppose they can’t be blamed for the wretchedness of 
their homes.  All ambition they may possess is killed in them by the constant fear of 
massacre. . . they beg and steal and lie, but really, they are forced to it.  They can’t live 
like decent people because they aren’t treated decently.  They are given little more 
consideration than animals.”14  Kimball’s mix of disapproval and pity for the Armenians 
was common among her peers who worked with refugees at their worst.  True affection 
for Armenians was rare, even among those who might be expected to sympathize with 
the persecuted Christians.  Stanley Kerr, a Protestant minister’s son from Central 
Pennsylvania, had connections to the missionary workers through his father.  He 
nonetheless expressed suspicions of the Armenian population, quoting a co-worker with 
gusto “the Bible should have said—All men are liars, especially Armenians.”15 He 
indicated that many among the NER ranks were skeptical of the necessity for extended 
relief work, “Lots of the A.C.R.N.E. here think that the Armenians should soon take care 
of themselves.”16  He further noted after a presentation on the relief work in the Caucasus 
                                                
14 Elsie Kimball to Mother and Rose, 15 November 1919, Box 1 Folder 2, Elsie Kimball Papers. 
15 Stanley Kerr to Father, 6 July 1919, Stanley Kerr Archives 92, Stanley E. Kerr Archives Project, Zoryan 
Institute for Contemporary Armenian Documentation and Research, Arlington, Massachusetts.  
16 Stanley Kerr to Father, 18 July 1919, Stanley Kerr Archives 94a, Stanley E. Kerr Archives Projects. 
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that “some of the Americans had the idea that we were not needed here.”17  Kerr, 
however, was convinced that NER was a vital organization and began showing off the 
relief work to traveling publicity men and journalists.  
As a tour guide, Kerr interacted with journalists and used his skills as an amateur 
photographer to provide them with illustrations for their articles.  Kerr showed around 
Jackson Fleming, a writer for Harper’s Weekly, and Christian journalist William T. Ellis 
of the New York Herald.  After taking some of his charges out to rescue Armenian girls 
and women from Arab homes, conducting them around the refugee barracks, and taking 
pictures for them, Kerr grew impatient with the never-ending parade of “inspectors”: 
There have been so many “publicity men coming thru here lately that we 
are sick of them now.  It seems as if more men are coming around to 
inspect things than there are workers.  Some people have a continual 
joyride around the country “inspecting” and criticizing.  I get my share of 
the bother and have to supply the publicity men with photos of the work.   
I like to take pictures but hate to develop them for other people.18 
 
Despite his earlier enthusiasm for playing photographer, Kerr had met so many writers in 
need of photographs that he tired of the routine.  Still, Kerr fulfilled his role in helping 
bring good press to the NER work.  
American Women’s Hospitals and Publicity 
At the behest of the Publicity Committee in New York, the overseas personnel 
produced media material that helped bridge the psychological distance between the 
American public and the suffering Armenians.  Calls for submissions in The Acorne, the 
staff newsletter published in Constantinople, were also opportunities for aspiring writers 
or amateur photographers such as Kerr to display their talents.  Without access to 
                                                
17 Kerr to Father, 31 July 1919, Stanley Kerr Archives 94b, Stanley E. Kerr Archives Projects. 
18 Kerr to Father, 7 September 1919, Stanley Kerr Archives 98, Stanley E. Kerr Archives Projects. 
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journalists and publicity men, more modest relief agencies had only their own personnel 
to carve a niche for themselves in this increasingly professionalized world of 
philanthropy.  Unlike many similar organizations, the American Women’s Hospitals 
managed to adapt to the new business of relief work and parlayed their work in the Near 
East into international medical projects that continue to the present day.  Though many 
physicians, nurses, and philanthropists played integral parts, it was the partnership of Dr. 
Esther Pohl Lovejoy and Dr. Mabel E. Elliott that ensured its success.  With little more 
than their own talents, Lovejoy and Elliott finessed the new publicity techniques to raise 
their organization’s profile.  In doing so, they brought AWH from the margins of 
Armenian relief efforts to its very center.   
 Founded in 1917 by the Medical Women’s National Association, the early work 
of the AWH focused on providing care to civilians in war-torn Europe and promotion of 
women in medicine.19  At first, the AWH Board demonstrated their distaste for publicity 
by rejecting a suggestion to publish a newspaper story.  Dr. Rosalie Slaughter Morton, 
the chairwoman, feared that advertising would compromise their integrity as a “doctors’ 
organization.”20  Only months after the ARC’s successful First War Fund Drive, Morton 
                                                
19 The Medical Women’s National Association (MWNA) was, itself, created to protest the exclusion of 
women physicians from the American Medical Association.  With the onset of hostilities in World War I, 
the MWNA formed a War Services Committee in 1915 and appointed Dr. Rosalie Slaughter Morton as its 
chair.  Dr. Morton initially offered the services of medical women to the U.S. Department of War, but was 
rebuffed.  In response, Dr. Morton conceived of the American Women’s Hospitals as a means of 
contributing to the war effort while raising the professional stature of women physicians.  For more on the 
American Women’s Hospitals see Esther Pohl Lovejoy, Certain Samaritans, Ellen S. More, Restoring the 
Balance: Women Physicians and the Profession of Medicine (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001): 134-147; Kimberly Jensen, Mobilizing Minerva: American Women in the First World War 
(Champaign, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 2008): 80-87. 
20 “General Meeting, 13 September 1917,” pg. 5, Box 30 Folder 293, American Women’s Hospitals 
Records, Drexel University Library Special Collection on Women in Medicine, Drexel University, 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Hereafter, AWH Papers. 
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could not deny that publicity was an effective means of fundraising and additional funds 
were necessary. The AWH hired a publicist and planned its own fundraising campaign 
for the spring of 1918. Meanwhile, the increasing need for physicians at the front left the 
NER scrambling for more medical professionals. Though the campaign fell short of its 
lofty goals, the AWH raised enough to begin their work overseas and continue raising 
funds.21  
 The AWH work in Europe received enough public acclaim to attract the attention 
of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE). With the Armistice 
between the Turks and the Allies signed in October 1918, the ACRNE began planning for 
their return to the Near East.22  According to AWH histories, the ACRNE recruited the 
organization of female physicians specifically to meet the higher standards for female 
modesty among observant Muslims.23  This “feminist Orientalism” was a familiar trope 
throughout the history of women in medicine. In the 19th century, Westerners visiting the 
Middle East, India, and the Far East condemned the treatment of women in these rigidly 
sex-segregated societies.  Beyond female illiteracy and exclusion from the public sphere, 
cultural and religious practices such as footbinding, suttee, and purdah were deemed 
barbaric.  To raise the lowly status of women as emblematic of Oriental ‘backwardness,’ 
                                                
21 More, 649-51. 
22 Barton 1930, 107-119. 
23 Dr. Mary Merrit Crawford, Chairman, “Report of the War Service Committee of the Medical Women’s 
National Association for the Year 1918-1919,” 10 June 1919, Box 1 Folder 5, AWH Papers.  This is a 
familiar trope in the history of women physicians as a justification of female medical education and Euro-
centric criticism of “Oriental backwardness.” See Antoinette Burton, “Contesting the Zenana: The Mission 
to Make ‘Lady Doctors’ for India,” Journal of British Studies 35 no. 3 (July 1996): 368-397.  Barton’s 
1930 history of the NER does not address this particular concern in his discussion of medical relief.  In 
practice, AWH physicians rarely treated such Muslim women as their hospitals and clinics mainly served 
Christian refugee populations.  Barton, The Story of Near East Relief, 188-203.   Nonetheless, the 
predominantly female refugees—often survivors of sexual violence—benefitted from the care of women 
physicians.   
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Western missionary group and other social movements worked to bring their Eastern 
sisters into the light.  “Women’s work for women” was an expression of feminist 
Orientalism that remained a popular cause among the progressive women who sought 
medical training.24  It is no wonder, then, that the AWH Executive Board construed their 
Near East work in such terms.  In practice, however, Armenians and other minority 
Christians received the vast majority of AWH medical care. Women physicians, 
nonetheless, would fill an important role in treating a refugee population nearly bereft of 
adult men.  
 Arriving in March 1919, the Leviathan passengers were the first large contingent 
of relief workers to step foot on the land since Americans were expelled from Turkey in 
1917.   The NER coordinated all the relief organizations—including the ARC—in the 
region using long-standing missionary connections to establish humanitarian operations. 
With armistice, the U.S. began sending soldiers home so that the American Red Cross 
had fewer obligations in Europe.  The Near East, however, remained an unresolved site 
of political conflict and humanitarian need.  As a result, the Near East Relief earned a 
higher profile in the American philanthropic scene.  The roles had reversed between the 
NER and the American Red Cross, so that the NER controlled the relief work in the Near 
East and gained prestige as a result of their authority in the region. 
 The AWH became an important beneficiary of the NER’s ascension.  Dr. Esther 
Pohl Lovejoy, the recently appointed head of the AWH, was ready for this shift. Though 
her position was initially temporary, Lovejoy quickly earned a permanent post.  Thanks 
                                                
24 Lisa Joy Pruitt, A Looking-Glass for Ladies: American Protestant Women and the Orient in the 
Nineteenth Century (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2005). 
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to the experience she had gained working for the suffragists during the victorious 1912 
Oregon suffrage campaign, Lovejoy knew how to run an organization.  In both the 
movement for Oregon suffrage and the AWH fundraising, Lovejoy inherited a stalled 
campaign from accomplished women activists whose reputations had outlasted their 
energy and publicity techniques.  For instance, the legendary Oregonian suffragist 
Abigail Smith Dunwiddy abided by her “still hunt” strategy of quietly courting influential 
men while eschewing the public demonstrations led by her younger colleagues.25  
Dunwiddy and her AWH counterpart, Dr. Morton, were overruled by a younger 
contingent who demanded more active campaigns.  Both women ended their public 
careers before the campaigns were over.26   
 From her earliest roles as small cog in the suffragist machine, Lovejoy exhibited 
legendary reserves of stamina.  The internationally renowned activist, Alice Stone 
Blackwell, admired her as a “tower of strength.”27   Under the tutelage of other feminist 
luminaries such as Anna Shaw Howard, Lovejoy honed her innate abilities as an advocate 
for women’s suffrage.  Though she remained politically active throughout her life, the 
Great War led her away from advocacy for a time.  In 1918, her newfound appreciation 
for the politics of philanthropic organizations along with prior experience on the 
campaign trail made Lovejoy a natural choice to head the AWH.  Lovejoy’s polished 
presentation complemented her keen sense of public relations and aggressive tactics 
that—when given the right conditions—raised philanthropic leadership to an art. 
                                                
25 Kimberly Jensen, “‘Neither Head nor Tail to the Campaign:’ Esther Pohl Lovejoy and the Oregon 
Woman Suffrage Victory of 1912,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 107:3 (Fall 2007): 350-383. 
26 Dunwiddy took ill, while Dr. Morton simply faded from public view.   
27 Jensen, “Neither Head Nor Tail,” 56. 
  145 
 Such an opportunity for public relations would arise once the AWH personnel 
reached the field.  Gladys L. Carr of Brookline, Massachusetts, Caroline Rosenberg of 
San Francisco, Elsie R. Mitchell and Clara Williams of Berkeley, California, Ruth A. 
Parmelee of Harpoot, Turkey, and Mabel E. Elliott of Benton Harbor, Michigan made up 
the pioneering troop of women physicians to the Near East.  Over the voyage from New 
York to Constantinople, the AWH women had grown close to one another as the few 
established professionals among the largely young and inexperienced NER volunteers.  
Upon reaching the Sublime Porte in March, tons of medical and relief supplies were 
unloaded haphazardly from the cargo hold to the NER warehouses at the nearby wharf in 
Derinje.  In their frenzy, the dockworkers had made a mess of the carefully-packed 
equipment.  As a result, the new arrivals spent their first weeks sorting out the materials 
for each post.   
 Meanwhile, the NER medical committee revisited the personnel assignments.  As 
a long-serving medical missionary to Turkey, Dr. George H. Washburn was appointed 
Medical Director shortly after Armistice.  His original plans called for 15 medical units 
operated out of former missionary hospitals in posts throughout Allied-controlled 
territory.  Most of these posts were still viable, but others were still considered dangerous 
or medical relief was well-in-hand.28  Drs. Carr and Rosenberg left first in roaming units, 
the former setting up X-ray equipment and the latter assessing public health conditions.  
Drs. Mitchell and Williams were then sent to the Caucasus region where famine 
conditions were wiping out the large numbers of refugees in the small Armenian 
                                                
28 Dr. George L. Richards, “The Medical Work of the Near East Relief: 1919-20” Journal of American 
Medical Association 1923, 5. 
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Republic.  At last, only two remained: Dr. Elliott, who was no longer needed in Beirut, 
and Dr. Parmelee, who waited for Allied permission to return to her birthplace in the 
Anatolian Interior.29 
 Neither woman, however, could stand to be idle long.  Instead, Elliott and 
Parmelee lent their expertise to the Armenian Red Cross Orphanage in Scutari, Turkey to 
examine the 50 young women enrolled. Billed as Armenia’s best and brightest, these 
women were specifically chosen for schooling because they hailed from wealthy and 
highly educated families.  Elliott and Parmelee conducted personal interviews and 
physical examinations of each of the girls (Elliott through an interpreter).  Their reputed 
high status certainly had aided their survival as the elite class of Armenian had financial 
reserves and prior relationships with influential Turks that could make the difference 
between life and death during the genocide.  Previous enrollment in American schools 
gave some girls connections to seek refuge with American missionaries.  Despite these 
advantages, the vast majority gave patient histories that included sexual violence, forced 
marriage, and disease.  Some had escaped certain death or rape on multiple occasions.  
Those with Turkish husbands reported past pregnancies, some gave birth and others 
aborted or miscarried. Only one mother fled with her child.  Another two girls were 
currently pregnant.   Elliott and Parmelee attempted to screen the women for syphilis and 
gonorrhea “because the experiences of the exile journey through which these girls passed 
                                                
29Born outside London to a former British Army officer and his American wife, Elliott and her many 
siblings were raised in South Florida. Elliott graduated from University of Chicago and its Rush School of 
Medicine with her sister, Grace Elliott Papot. Dr. Papot attempted to sign with the AWH, but age 
regulations prevented anyone over 45 years to apply.  At least one brother and another sister likewise 
practiced medicine.  “Dr. Mabel Evelyn Elliott,” Encyclopedia of American Biography 40 (1970): 198-9. 
  147 
were such as to make one suspicious of venereal disease.”30  Scarce supplies meant that 
only 19 Wasserman tests could be located, 3 of which were positive for syphilis.  None of 
the vaginal smears for gonorrhea were positive.  Given the extent of the sexual abuse 
these women suffered, the physicians considered their rates of venereal disease 
particularly low.  
 Ruth Parmelee dedicated much of her time as an AWH physician to women who 
had escaped from Turkish homes.  As a medical missionary who was raised by Reverend 
Moses Parmelee, a fixture in the Armenian community of Harpoot, Parmelee was 
predisposed to see the moral strengths of the Armenians.  She had lived among the 
Armenians for the first ten years of her life and sporadically thereafter so that she spoke 
fluent Armenian, a skill which no other AWH physicians could claim.  As a result, 
Parmelee interacted with Armenians without an interpreter and built many meaningful 
relationships within the community.31  During her service in Harpoot, Turkey, Parmelee 
established a flourishing obstetrical and gynecological service, a girls’ orphanage, and a 
home for women recovering from venereal disease.  From June 1919 to July 1920, 
Parmelee’s Women’s Medical Department examined 722 women over the age of thirteen.  
680 of those women gave histories of marriage with Turks, service in Turkish homes, or 
were “exiled long distances under their protection.”  Based on laboratory and physical 
exams, Parmelee diagnosed 15.5% of the 680 women with some form of venereal 
disease.32  In a later report to Lovejoy, Parmelee commented on her findings: 
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Although in a generally weakened state, the women may not suffer at all and the 
pelvic examination may not show any signs of the disease except for the 
discharge.  It may be that these eastern races are more or less immune, although 
Armenians have always been noted for their morality.33 
 
Parmelee’s explanation perhaps reflected her upbringing among Armenians more than 
logical reasoning.  As interesting as she found venereal disease rates, Parmelee was 
emotionally devoted to “our babies [who] are our bane and our blessing!”  She quickly 
corrected herself by criticizing the Armenian mothers as “the bane, rather.”  Parmelee 
expressed frustration at their unwillingness to learn the basics of American baby care, 
though she blamed their time in Turkish homes for many of these deficiencies.34   
 Elliott filled her days with relief work in the area until she was called to run a 
mobile dispensary on a train line to Angora, now the Turkish capital Ankara.  While she 
was preparing her supplies, it became clear that her services were sorely needed in the 
Aleppo district. Elliott was sent some 150 miles north to Marash,35 a town of 40,000 
residents at the foot of the Taurus Mountains.36  Like Parmelee and the other women 
physicians, Elliott’s primary assignment was to run the maternity and gynecology clinics.  
Elliott, however, was less critical of the mothers than the dangerous care provided by 
native midwives.  She described the horrors of uterine, bladder, and rectal prolapse that 
affected nearly all their post-partum patients.  Given the serious nature of such 
                                                
33 Ruth Parmelee, Harpoot, Turkey to Lovejoy, NYC, 7 September 1920, Box 10, Folder 73, AWH Papers.  
34 ibid. 
35 Marash is now known as Kahramanmaraş, capital of the eponymous province in southeastern Turkey. 
36 Mabel Elliott, Marash, to Dr. Mary Crawford (Interim Chairman) and AWH Headquarters, New York 
City, 22 June 1919, Box 14, Folder 112, AWH Papers. 
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complications, Elliott recommended that “a large share of a women physician’s relief 
work in this district might be given over to instruction in midwifery.”37   
 Nearly two months after Elliott’s arrival in Marash, new AWH Chairman, Esther 
Pohl Lovejoy replied to Elliott’s earlier letters that had gone unanswered during the 
transfer of power to Lovejoy.  In addition to the monthly reports and bookkeeping 
expected by a well-run philanthropic organization, Lovejoy thanked Elliott for the 
pictures she had already sent and urged her to continue writing and sending pictures for 
publicity.  As further encouragement, Lovejoy suggested that such tidbits from the Near 
East would be welcomed by Americans at home who were “far more interested at this 
time in the Southeastern part of Europe than they seem to be in France and Belgium.”38 
Here, Lovejoy alluded to the shift of humanitarian focus from European war zones to the 
Near East.  From the German invasion of Belgium in 1914, American humanitarian 
philanthropies were largely concerned with the hungry Belgian and French civilians.  
Herbert Hoover’s Commission for Relief in Belgium—an agency with funding from the 
U.S. government—coordinated publicity campaigns that played on American sympathy 
for these Western European victims.  Armenian suffering took a backburner during 
wartime as they were citizens—albeit persecuted—of the Ottoman Empire.  In peacetime, 
the Near East Relief used these same tactics by emphasizing the “starving Armenians” 
and glorifying American relief workers as their saviors. Lovejoy recognized that the 
AWH stood to gain further funds by adopting sympathetic motifs in line with the NER 
approach to publicity.  
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 Though Lovejoy had pleaded for publicity materials from all AWH physicians in 
the Near East, Elliott would go unmatched as the eyes and ears of the organization 
through her evocative correspondence.39  Despite a massively successful fundraising 
campaign at home, the relief operations were still woefully unable to handle the never-
ending stream of refugees.  During the first months of her service in Marash, Dr. Elliott 
supervised wards overflowing with more patients than beds.  Some arrived gravely ill 
after traveling nine or twelve hours strapped to the backs of donkeys.  A surge in malaria 
and the toxicity of quinine treatment rendered the nursery nearly empty as the busy 
maternity ward delivered the dead and premature babies of sick women.  That winter, her 
staff of Armenian nurses-in-training—themselves refugees—shuttled between various 
clinics and refugee camps. Their gingham uniforms and sleeveless sweaters made poor 
stand-ins for coats.  When reflecting upon these daily struggles, Elliott was 
uncharacteristically candid: 
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Hospital space like every other kind of relief work in this matter has nothing to 
do with the word ‘finish’ or ‘enough.’  It’s like pouring sand in a rat hole—if you 
give our 5,000 blankets, you know that there are 15,000 people who still have 
nothing to wrap around them.40 
 
Of all the sorrowful stories Elliott recounted in her letters, none seem to have exposed 
this underlying frustration at the unyielding demands of humanitarian relief.  Her 
inability to help her patients and students was beyond her control, but deeply rankled the 
altruist within.  This anecdote illustrates the real problems facing relief workers as a 
counterpoint to the unrestrained optimism necessary for productive publicity material. 
 During the Kemalist Army siege of Marash in February 1920 Dr. Elliott was 
forced to evacuate the city.41  Her brush with danger seemingly imbued her with the 
confidence for a second stint with the NER.  While waiting for her assignment, Elliott 
petitioned the NER authorities in Constantinople for “real work” worthy of an 
experienced professional.42  Elliott cautioned the male officials that “I would be one mad 
woman if they hesitated to send me in [to the Interior] because I was a woman.”43   
 Elliott was sent to Greek-occupied Ismid,44 a city in flux between the Kemalist 
and Greek armies.  In the wake of battle, the city emptied and refilled with another cycle 
of refugees.  On her arrival, Elliott estimated that 14,000 Greek and 3,000 Armenians 
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refugees now lived in the area.  Their needs greatly exceeded the ill-equipped clinics, 
orphanages, and hospitals under her charge.  Elliott made an immediate appeal for ten 
thousand dollars by cable to the AWH.  By post, she explained her “big order” in concise, 
but diplomatic sentences that laid out her confusion over the financial situation: “I 
understood from things said in New York that there were plenty of funds for this year and 
out here all we hear is about cutting down the work on account of shortage of funds.”45   
 Despite the continuing success of fundraising drives, increased public scrutiny on 
spending by relief organizations led Lovejoy to remain cautious with AWH funds.  After 
the unrestrained giving of the war years, by 1921 the American public had become more 
circumspect of philanthropies.  With the revelations of extravagant spending by charities, 
relief organizations were regularly audited and made public.  In her capacity as 
fundraiser, Lovejoy had to reassure such groups that the AWH spent wisely and 
accomplished as much as possible.  With an empty treasury and the AWH expansions 
into the Caucasus, Lovejoy despaired at her colleagues who “seem to feel that there is 
some mysterious power able to turn on some sort of a financial faucet.”  That “mysterious 
power” suffered under the knowledge that it was “in large part, up to [Lovejoy] to get the 
money to carry it on.”46 
Publicity and Photography 
 Even with this pressure, Lovejoy considered sending publicity people abroad an 
unnecessary expense.  This resistance did not waver, even when the Serbian Child 
Welfare Association (SCWA), with whom the organization collaborated in Serbia, raised 
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  153 
funds by misrepresenting AWH work as their own.47 To Lovejoy, the AWH personnel in 
Serbia had an exemplary sense of what was “valuable material.” They understood that 
potential donors were not interested in photos of “good looking well-dressed American 
women,” but rather the sickly patients “who are being benefitted.”  The SCWA, however, 
sent publicity men who went “through the land taking pictures of the children that our 
American Women’s Hospitals physicians are caring for and bring them to the United 
States and cash in on them.”48  These professionals brought their superior equipment and 
journalists to write up anecdotes. As a result, they were able to publish their work in a 
fraction of the time it took the AWH to send a roll of film across the Atlantic.  In a 
competitive philanthropic market, the SCWA apparently had no qualms about taking 
credit for work done by the AWH in Serbia.   
 By the time similar materials reached Lovejoy in New York, the AWH had—in 
news terms—long since lost the race.  Still, she refused to send publicity people abroad: 
“In view of the difficulty in raising funds at the present time, I am sure the Board would 
not approve of sending any publicity people overseas.  As a matter of fact, we have had 
some exceedingly good publicity people request the Board at former times to be sent over 
and the attitude has always been against this plan.”49  She pleaded with Elliott to lessen 
her burden with explicit instructions on proper publicity photographs: 
The pictures that have money value are those of patients lined up at your 
dispensary, pictures of cripples, pictures of girls who have benefited, pictures of 
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little children and mothers with infants in their arms.  The pictures of markets 
and other photographs showing national costumes and such things is just so much 
postage wasted because they have absolutely no financial benefit whatever in a 
news pictorial.  Send only the kind that can be used and usually these have to be 
carefully posed.50 
 
Elliott, however, was in no position to submit photos that could compete with those taken 
by professionals.  Given the volume and intensity of her medical work, taking time for 
photography—let alone ‘carefully posing’ her subjects—seemed impossible. 
Furthermore, her amateur Kodak camera and lack of developing supplies limited Elliott’s 
ability to produce quality images.  Elliott’s personal camera had no flash and could not be 
used in cloudy or rainy weather. The NER likewise solicited photographs from its 
workers, but had difficulty arranging the logistics.  The Acorne announced their intention 
to provide the field workers with film.  They offered this service on the condition that the 
staff send “copies of all pictures which would be of general publicity value” to 
headquarters.  This was an effort to encourage cooperation with their publicity needs as 
the NER complained that “we are not receiving pictures of work in the field.”51 Though 
the office received orders, they had difficulty filling them when the film failed to arrive 
from the States as expected.  Again, they noted “we are not receiving pictures from the 
field.”52 When staff tried to buy film in town, they found that prices were three times in 
excess of those in the States.  Their price list offers a glimpse into the types of cameras 
the field personnel brought with them.  Among those cameras were regular or folding 
Brownies and other small models manufactured by the Eastman Kodak Company.53  
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Even when the lighting and camera cooperated, film for these cameras had to be sent as 
far as Constantinople, Aleppo, or Jerusalem to be developed.  In the process, the rolls 
were often ruined before they could be turned into negatives.   
Among the first batch of photos Elliott sent was a picture of “the most emaciated 
[patient she] had ever seen” alongside an AWH nurse and her interpreter.  Conscious that 
the image was unsuitable for publicity, she sent along the film so that it could be 
reprocessed in the States.  After finally producing a set of passable images, Elliott made a 
plea for professional help:  “Please remember, however, doctor that I am no photographer 
and the other organizations who get such wonderful pictures have publicity men and 
women who do nothing else, not to speak of the many Commissioners mentioned in your 
letter.”54   
 Elliott’s next attempt was even less successful when she entrusted the films to a 
Greek officer rather than the Constantinople laboratory.  Unfortunately, the officer 
bungled the process and ruined the films.55 Despite that setback, Elliott sent the publicity 
stories she had intended for this and earlier rolls of film.56  These descriptions first 
appeared in the April 1921 issue of The Medical Women’s Journal.  A cropped version of 
Elliott’s devastatingly thin patient appeared in the accompanying article (Figure 2). While 
the original photo made its way to AWH headquarters, Lovejoy issued a specific request 
for a picture of “some of those children who are in such sad need on account of 
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malnutrition.”57  No matter the decidedly grainy quality of the photo—Elliott had 
unwittingly provided an image that fit Lovejoy’s vision.   
 
Figure 18: Malnourished patient from Medical Woman’s Journal 28, no. 4 (April 1921) 
The skeletal patient illustrated the severity of such cases, “This picture was taking after 
six weeks of feeding.  When she was first brought in she was unable to raise her head or 
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feed herself; she has improved under proper feeding so that she can almost stand 
alone.  We can’t call her “fat” exactly, yet, but she is considerable filled out compared to 
what she was.”58  She went on to describe ‘contracted tendon,’ one of the many horrific 
conditions facing such children:   
Many of these children are brought into us with their knees drawn up to their 
chins, and they have lain such a long time in this position trying to keep or get 
warm that it takes days of oil rubbing to loosen up the tendon sufficiently to draw 
their legs down straight.  Many of them die within a few hours after their arrival, 
but usually if we can get them over the first strain of their first two or three 
meals, they gradually begin to take a little interest in life, and it is a wonderful 
satisfaction to see them slowly get a grip on life and learn to smile.59  
 
Alhough the original image of the frail patient fit Lovejoy’s need at the time, it was not 
nearly as appealing as the text that it inspired.  
 Elliott continued to work the publicity angle by enlisting visiting photographers 
and journalists to enhance the reputation of the AWH.  She could never be sure, however, 
that the AWH would get its due.  Given her difficulties with photography, she promised 
that when “the first ‘picture’ man comes along I will beg a few for us.  I don’t think the 
N.E.R. will mind.”60  In April 1921, she got her chance when an NER “publicity lady” 
visited the Ismid operations and “took a number of pictures of [her] work” of which 
Elliott intended to ask for permission to use two or three.61  Indeed, the photographer 
complied and a few photographs of the orphans and staff exist in the AWH archives. 
 Soon thereafter, all the Christian refugees fled as Turkish troops took over Ismid.  
After serving the few Turks in need of American medicine, the AWH discontinued their 
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work in the “abandoned city” and sent Elliott to the Caucasus region.  Large groups of 
Armenian refugees fled eastward from Anatolia and the moribund Armenian Republic 
into this mountainous terrain southwest of the Soviet Union.  As a result, the Caucasus 
was flooded with potential patients when Elliott established operations in Erivan.62  In 
late November 1921, Elliott was attempting to bring order to the chaos in Erivan.  She 
wrote in a letter for publicity use: 
All day long you can hear the groans and wails of the little children out side our 
office building in hopes we can and will pick them up.  If the sun shines for a 
little while it quiets down and then when it rains they begin again.  One day the 
rain turned to snow and it was awful to listen to them.  The note of terror that 
came into the general wail was distinctly perceptible although my office is 
upstairs and I have the window closed.  They well knew what a night out in the 
snow would mean to them.  We are picking them up as fast as possible.63 
 
Lovejoy later estimated that this paragraph alone earned “thousands of dollars” for the 
AWH and NER.64  One hundred of those dollars came from a Mrs. A.W. Hook of 
Phoneton, Ohio, a consistent donor to the Armenian cause for six years.  As she wrote to 
Charles Vickery of the NER, “this is the first request I have made as to where it is to be 
used, and I sincerely hope and pray that every dollar of it will be used to help feed those 
dear suffering children.”65  Such was the power of Elliott’s stories that she could “deeply 
stir hearts” and open pocketbooks without the gloss of a professional journalist.   
Over the next year, Elliott organized medical relief in and around Erivan.   
During the deadly winter of 1921, the AWH took approximately 2000 street 
children from the overflowing Erivan orphanages and hospitals.  Mrs. Dorothy H. Sutton, 
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the head nurse of the Erivan orphanages, described recruiting these desperate cases for 
treatment in the New Near East magazine: “I started out at night with three people to help 
me, to gather in the flock.  They were not hard to find.  The first forlorn bundle consisted 
of three mites, two girls and a boy rolled up in one filthy rag in a doorway.”66 These 
children were removed to nearby Etchmiadzin where the Armenian Orthodox Church had 
lent NER a building on their grounds.  Life on the streets rendered the Etchmiadzin 
children the worse for the wear.  In her response to Mrs. Hook, Elliott described them as 
“almost all dead from starvation” before funds were raised for their recovery.67  She 
further remarked to Lovejoy that "they didn't look like human beings,” a description that 
calls to mind the iconic photograph of Elliott examining an unidentified patient.68 
What little information is known about this picture is suggestive in its very 
absence.  The photograph was not one of a kind in its content and use, but part of a larger 
trend of creating poster children to represent the many needy children in the Near East. 
Noorilhida, for example, was one of 300 orphans living in a Red Cross orphanage in 
Damascus, Syria.  Red Cross Volunteer Anna L. Fisher brought the “tiny bit of a thing” 
to national attention in a letter published in The New York Times in June 1919.69 In that 
letter Fisher introduced Noorilhida as “by far our most interesting child [and] the only 
Arab I have.”  In another context, the fact that Noorilhida was an Arab and not an 
Armenian might show some glimmer of inclusiveness.  Here that fact was ignored in 
favor of treating her as just another orphan.  The girl entered the orphanage “in a frightful 
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condition, starving, alive with vermin, covered with scabies, filthy beyond belief.”  After 
numerous baths, and Fisher “began curing her physically and morally” so that Noorilhida 
revealed her “astonishing intelligence” and “lovely nature.”  Fisher marveled at her 
transformation, concluding that “at home if we ever saw such a child properly clothed we 
should undoubtedly associate her with generations of gentlefolk.”70  
These attempts to ply American donors with tales of lovable, yet tragic orphans 
were undone by presenting audiences with a full photograph of Noorilhida (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 19: Noorilhida in Australian Christian World, 15 September 1922, p.iv. 
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As the original story in The New York Times was not illustrated, it seems likely that there 
is no connection between the real Noorilhida and this photograph.  This picture of a 
starving child was likely taken by Glen R. Carrier, photographer and later Hollywood 
cinematographer who accompanied the Barton Commission on their survey of possible 
venues for NER stations.71  That photograph was displayed as part of slideshows 
prepared by the NER Publicity Committee to raise money in local communities.  It was in 
this context that audiences were officially introduced to “Noorilhida,” the starving orphan 
who needed Americans’ cast-off clothing.  Who better than a naked girl to advertise the 
need for used clothing items?  
Noorilhida’s obituary, “Only One of Thousands,” was an entirely separate article 
published in the April 1922 edition of The New Near East.  That article mourned “poor 
little Noorilhida, immortal little Noorilhida, dead at five yet having fulfilled a mission in 
life that would do honor to an active adult of a hundred and five.”72  What did Noorilhida 
do to deserve such elegy? Her photograph brought in donations—clothing and money—
for the NER. With “her emaciated little face made beautiful by her soul-filled eyes,” “no 
one could refuse the demands she mutely made.  Noorilhida’s photograph said to all who 
saw it, ‘I am only one of thousands, Give! Give! Give!’”  Plucked from a batch of photos 
of similarly starving children, the picture was chosen to represent all those dependent on 
NER for aid. What was different about her picture?  One thing is certain: it wasn’t her 
eyes.  Noorilhida’s nudity was unusual for this genre of photographs.  Most were pictured 
in rags or at least a piece of cloth to cover their genitals. On the other hand, Noorilhida—
                                                
71 Courtesy of Vicken Babkenian. 
72 “Orphans of Damascus,” The New York Times, 15 June 1919. 
  162 
like Elliot’s patient—is defined by her body in showing the ravages of hunger on a young 
child.  She is described as “naked, abandoned, her thin little legs with their enlarged 
joints supporting a torso distorted by a scavenged diet too awful to contemplate.”   
Noorilhida’s “obituary” more explicitly demonstrates that the Publicity 
Committee chose her body specifically to represent the humanitarian crisis in the Near 
East.73 Noorilhida and her successor, Dr. Elliott’s patient from Figure 1, have bloated 
abdomens and legs so thin that every muscle is revealed. Kwashiorkor secondary to 
severe malnutrition and various parasitic infections negate the cuteness that might endear 
to prospective donors. Nor do they resemble the 1919 poster children with deep-set eyes, 
prostrating themselves while fully clothed.  Unlike Douglas Volk’s They Shall Not 
Perish, Ethel Betts Bains’ Lest They Perish and other 1919 Campaign posters, Noorilhida 
and Dr. Elliott’s patient do not overtly plead for help.  Instead these Armenian subjects 
make their appeals through the frailty of their bodies. Noorilhida and Elliott’s patient are 
spectacles of tragedy in the same way as East African children were during the famines 
of the 1980s and 1990s.   
Barbie Zelizer critiques the standard photojournalism that captured images of the 
Ethiopian, Zimbawean, Somalian, and Sudanese Famines in About to Die: How News 
Images Move the Public.  Her analysis is useful in drawing conclusions about the 
photograph of Dr. Elliott and the Patient.  Zelizer distinguished images of presumed, 
possible, and certain death from each other to find differences in their presentation, 
framing, and content.  When focused on bodily frailty as in images of possible or likely 
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death, identity matters less than the overall message.74  Noorilhida’s full photograph was 
presented as an image of possible death, while her obituary photograph featured only her 
face.  In this way, Zelitzer would argue that she was turned from a symbol of many 
starving children into an individual at her death.  The accompanying photos and text 
reminds us that there are still many more “Noorilhidas” whose likely death may be 
prevented by humanitarian aid.  As Zelizer writes, “the function of bodily frailty, then, is 
to cue a larger story than the possible death of those depicted.”75 
What, then, is the larger story?  Why were these children starving? The Armenian 
genocide is not discussed in Noorilhida or the Patients’ stories, but the Turkish role in 
orphaning and scattering children far from home was well known in the U.S.  It was 
therefore not necessary to invoke the slaughter for the genocide to factor into NER 
photos. In contrast to earlier campaigns, those ads devised from the Armistice onwards 
were categorically less anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish than those from the 1919 Campaign 
and before.  This accords with literature on U.S. relations with Turkey showing that 
American diplomats began building a relationship with their Turkish counterparts in the 
postwar period.76  In view of this new era of cooperation, it would suffice to blame these 
deaths from starvation on famine rather than dredge up anti-Turkish rhetoric.  As Thomas 
Keenan, Alex DeWaal, and others have shown, famines are caused by political upheaval 
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and often accompanied by violence.77  At the time, however, a ‘famine’ such as that in 
the Caucasus and Near East would have been perceived as a natural disaster.  Wars, 
however, would have exacerbated any catastrophic event as they impeded humanitarian 
work.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that many Americans still blamed the Turks 
for deaths by starvation.   
As Elliott’s patient is pictured in the care of the NER, his possible death offers an 
additional message about humanitarian aid. Like Noorilhida, Elliott’s patient is a symbol 
for all the starving orphans sustained by NER work in the Near East and the Caucasus.  
He is arguably made less real because the patient lacks an identity to differentiate him 
from the crowd.  Bereft of name, date, place, even sex, there is nothing to stop the 
spectator from projecting their own idea of tragic upon Elliott’s patient.   The main focus, 
however, is on Dr. Elliott caring for the patient.  She gives him the possibility of life, 
rather than inevitable death.  Her ability to heal echoes the public’s ability to give.  They, 
too, hold thousands of lives in their hands, all dependent upon American donations to 
receive medical care, food, and shelter.  Thus the NER uses Dr. Elliott to represent itself 
as the courageous physician, caretaker, and guardian of Armenian lives.  At its core, the 
picture of Dr. Elliott is an image created and distributed by the NER and AWH to portray 
its organization in a favorable light.  All the hiring photographers, sending film, and 
encouraging workers to share their pictures was done to make this one photograph. 
This chapter has articulated some of the ways publicity work was integrated into 
relief work.  Journalists sent to report were escorted personally, relief workers were 
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encouraged to share their experiences through their writing and photography, and the 
NER hired professional photographers to frame perfect shots like the ones above.  These 
methods may have interfered with the workers’ daily schedules, but publicity was 
perceived as part of humanitarian aid.  Those same workers who escorted journalists 
through clinics, refugee camps, orphanages, and other NER institutions were kept 
constantly aware of the need for funds and had experienced campaigns prior to 
volunteering for the organization.  If anyone understood how vital those images were for 
the cause, it was those relief workers in the field.  To ensure that fundraising would be 
successful, these men and women took time from their days to cooperate with these calls 
for media. 
Yet for all this maneuvering, the publicity created in the field was simple in 
comparison to the media originating in the States.  The next chapter will look at the films, 
cooperative marketing plans, and product placement that the Publicity Committee created 
on their own turf.  While the themes of famine, pity, and duty remained similar, the 
modes of conveying them changed to appeal to an individual’s conscience as a consumer.  
These techniques heralded the modernization of humanitarian media from forms used by 
social movements such as Protestant revivalism and Suffrage into celebrity spokesmen 
and vertical integration that consumers recognize to this day.  In this final chapter, I will 
argue that this represents a transformation from selling ideas and politics to advertising 
humanitarian aid as consumer product.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Film, Celebrity Spokesmen, and Product Placement 
 
 Publicity generated in the U.S. benefitted from popular films as well as celebrities 
who offered their services in the name of Armenian relief. Names like Jackie Coogan, 
Norma Talmadge, Irene Rich, and Charles Ray found their way into NER literature and 
other publicity.  Jackie Coogan, in particular, lent his name and eight weeks of his life to 
a publicity junket that took him across the country and overseas to Europe and the Near 
East.  Each move was carefully produced to get the most mileage out of this young screen 
star’s numerous fans.  The polish exhibited in Jackie’s tour extended to advertising 
campaigns conducted in cooperation with food manufacturers.  A large percentage of the 
food sent overseas for use in the orphanages came directly from donations by 
manufacturers.  Food companies enjoyed publicity in trade and popular journals for their 
cooperation with the cause.  At a time when brand name foods were still new, this 
publicity was invaluable for such companies as Borden Milk and Karo Corn Syrup.  
Their collaboration with the NER allowed them to make claims about the nutritional 
value of their products in the popular press.  These particular publicity campaigns—all 
produced in the U.S.—demonstrated the commodification of humanitarian service.  Each 
event represented an exchange where the possibility of donations was traded for 
legitimization by this humanitarian agency.  We talk today about “brand aid” and 
“celebrity sponsorship,” but here we find the roots of those marketing plans. 
Films represented the commodification of humanitarian sentiment in a slightly 
different manner.  Apart from the publicity blitzes organized yearly, films served as the 
main means of advertising Armenian relief to much of the American public. The NER 
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contributed to several films, including Auction of Souls, Alice in Hungerland, Uncle 
American Sees It Through, Or Seeing Is Believing, and Miracles in Ruins, but only a 
section of one film survives today.  The NER films began in 1919 with Auction of Souls, 
a film version of a young Armenian woman’s memoirs.  That film was given wide and 
overbearing publicity that distressed the young star.  Another film, entitled Alice in 
Hungerland, featured an even younger star who was originally found in a Constantinople 
orphanage.  Upon reaching the United States, this girl lost her birth name and was called 
Alice after her character in the film.  Comprehensive publicity surrounding these films 
and their stars exhibited a true “exploitation campaign,” as publicity campaigns then 
known.  The films themselves benefitted humanitarian relief by opening up new portions 
of the public to Armenian Relief.  As Mrs. Oliver Harriman, head of the National Motion 
Picture Committee put it, “the screen was selected as the medium because it reaches the 
millions, where the printed word reaches the thousands.”1  The screen version of the 
Armenian Genocide and its aftereffects was highly sensationalized through graphic 
violence and sexuality in Auction of Souls, and the innocence of childhood in Alice in 
Hungerland.  Despite the fact that neither was an objective reporting of the events, both 
presented a pitiful picture of Armenian refugees for the benefit of the audience.  In this 
way, both films were designed to elicit sympathetic response to Armenian Relief and 
thereby turn a complex event into a simplistic affair.   
To understand how this was accomplished, we must first know the source 
material for Auction of Souls and the circumstances surrounding its release.  Ravished 
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Armenia, the original book written by Harvey L. Gates from which Auction of Souls was 
adapted, opens on Easter Sunday 1915 in Tchemesh-Gedzak, a village in the Armenian 
vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz between the Euphrates and Murat Rivers.2 Aurora 
Mardiganian lived with her father, a prosperous banker, mother, and six siblings until that 
fateful Spring day when the Turks began arresting the Armenian men.  Her father and 
eldest brother were taken from home that night and died in a prison fire within days. With 
the men disposed of, the Armenian women were given three days to pack before they 
were deported from the village.  The remaining family members, including Aurora’s two 
aunts, set out on a journey that only Aurora would survive.3   
Along the way, Aurora and her family contended with thirst, hunger, illness, and 
exhaustion.  The hardships of the road, however, did not compare with those foisted upon 
them by their guards.  At fourteen, Aurora was considered of marriageable age, and she 
was without protection from the Turkish guards who preyed upon the young Armenian 
girls.  For a time she and Lusanne, her seventeen year-old sister, were able to keep the 
soldiers at bay by spreading mud on their faces to hide their beauty.4  After Lusanne’s 
death at the hands of a guard, Aurora and a group of girls and women were kidnapped by 
Kurds who carried them away on horseback.  Once they had escaped into the desert, the 
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women were stripped, beaten, and presumably raped.  Still naked, they were tied up and 
bound to a horse so that neither animal nor woman could escape.5   
The Kurds escorted Aurora’s party to Egin in the province of Erzincan where they 
were held in a government building with hundreds of other young Armenian women. 
Twenty at a time they were paraded in front of two Turkish officials who offered them 
protection if they converted to Islam.  When Aurora refused, she was beaten with “long, 
cruel whips.” She was then left in a courtyard for four days before continuing to march 
on to Malatia. 6  As her party approached Malatia, they encountered a gruesome sight: 
At the side of the road, in ridicule of the Crucifixion and as a warning to 
such Christian girls who lived to reach Malatia, the Turks had crucified on 
rough wooden crosses sixteen girls.  I do not know how long the bodies 
had been there, but vultures already had gathered.  Each girl had been 
nailed alive upon her cross, great cruel spikes through her feet and hands.  
Only their hair, blown by the wind, covered their bodies.7 
 
This image was to play an important part in the film version.  Armenians converged in 
Malatia “from Sivas, Tokat, Egin, Erzindjan, Kerasun, Samsoun, and countless smaller 
cities in the north, where the Armenians had had their homes for centuries.”8 
 After the men were gathered and killed in Malatia, the women were told to 
prepare for the journey to Diyarbekir, a hundred miles away on the banks of the Tigris 
river.  “Fifteen thousand women, young and old,” were assembled to begin the long 
march.  Aurora and her group of 200 “apostates” traveled at the front of the pack, 
guarded closely by specially assigned soldiers.9  Again, Kurds came to rape the helpless 
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women whose “screams and cries for mercy and the groans of mothers and sisters filled 
the night.”  Aurora later reflected, “I saw terrible things that night which I cannot tell.  
When I see them in my dreams now I scream, so even through I am safe in America, my 
nights are not peaceful.” Despite her abiding trauma, Aurora and her party were kept safe 
by their guards.10 
Upon reaching Shiro, a departure point for caravans to Damascus, Aurora’s luck 
ran out.  She was claimed by Hadji Ghafour, a devout and wealthy Muslim who had 
made the pilgrimage to Mecca.11  In Hadji Ghafour’s harem Aurora outwardly lived as a 
Muslim, while dreading the night of her “betrothal.” On that fateful night, her master 
would call her to his bed and she would be forced to submit to his will or die.  Aurora 
reveals little of that night except that her desire for a “happier future depended upon her 
submission.”  It was with this hope that she “went and sat upon the cushion at Hadji 
Ghafour’s feet!”  Her next statement betrays a sense of shame, “It is needless to say more 
of that terrible night!”  Aurora thereby signals her victimization without using words to 
describe her ordeal.  According to Katherine Derderian, such phrasing is commonly used 
in narratives of the Armenian Genocide to implicitly indicate rape and sexual violence.12   
Aurora escaped to a monastery soon after her encounter with Hadji Ghafour.  She 
rested there for two weeks until a group of Chechens abducted her to Diyarbakir.  Aurora 
was then given to a group of German officers who kept her as a captive in a house given 
to them for that purpose.  This aspect of Aurora’s story indicted the Germans for 
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participating in crimes against humanity.  When the Germans were ordered to Harput, 
near Aurora’s hometown, they abandoned the remaining Armenian girls and took off.  
After three days Turkish gendarmes discovered the girls, but Aurora fought her way out 
and found safety with a kind Turkish woman.  The Turkish woman helped her to rejoin a 
group of refugees who were headed to Ourfa.13  At Ourfa, Aurora was reunited with her 
mother and three surviving siblings. When set upon by a group of Kurds, Aurora’s 
mother was unable to convince them that Aurora belonged with her.  As a result, she was 
taken to Moush as a captive of Bekran Agha, “the notorious slave dealer.”  Aurora was 
sold for one medijidieh—eighty-five cents—to a wealthy man who demanded that she 
convert to Islam.  Many of the film’s advertisements featured the slave market and 
Aurora’s price of 85 cents as titillating details for marketing.  This identified Auction of 
Souls with other white slavery films like Traffic in Souls (1913) that were popular in the 
1910s. 
When she refused to convert, Aurora was given to Ahmed Bey whose “interest 
seemed not to be so much in the young women themselves, as in the children he wanted 
them to bear to his sons—children in whom the blood of the noble Armenian race might 
be blended with that of the savage Turk, and who might live to perpetuate and improve 
the blood of his family.”14  Such a depiction of Ahmed Bey’s purposes in seeking out an 
Armenian woman to improve his family’s bloodline reinforces stereotypes that 
Armenians were Caucasians and, therefore, superior to the Asiatic Turks.  These racial 
stereotypes were common in Near East Relief publicity so that Armenians seemed less 
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foreign than the Turks.  Aurora was then given to Ahmed’s son Nazim, who “had the 
same gentleness of his father” that “hurts more than blows.”15  Nazim attempted to sweet 
talk her into accepting Islam, but she again refused.  As punishment, he brought her 
family to the house and though she promised to “belong to Allah,” the gendarmes killed 
the other Mardiganians in front of her eyes.   
In the days that followed, Aurora recanted her profession of faith in Allah and 
mourned her family with frightening intensity.  Though Nazim and his father spoke to her 
“with the same cruel gentleness,” she rebuffed their efforts at conversion.  A shepherd 
from her hometown eventually freed Aurora from Ahmed Bey’s dungeon and sent her to 
the Dersim Kurds, a tribe of Kurds whose purview spanned into Russian territory.  The 
Dersim were unlike the Kurds she had previously met in that “they do not have the lust of 
killing human beings common with the tribes of the south.”16  She wandered through 
their territory for a year before reaching Erzurum, where the Turks were retreating from 
the Russian Army.  In Erzurum, Aurora met the missionary physician Dr. F. W. 
Macullum who arranged for her voyage to New York through Oslo, Norway.   
Upon reaching Ellis Island on November 5, 1917, Aurora was taken in by an 
Armenian family living in New York.  This family helped her adjust to life in the U.S. 
and aided her attempts to trace a surviving brother by placing advertisements in various 
newspapers.17  She did not find her brother but reporters for the New York Sun and the 
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New York Tribune located her via these advertisements and published her story in their 
pages.  The press attention alerted screenwriter Harvey Gates and his wife Lucille Gates 
to the potential commercial interest of a firsthand account of the events in Armenia.18  
When the Gateses approached Aurora, she was already in the charge of Nora Waln, the 
publicity secretary for the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.  Though 
she planned on working in a dressmaking factory, the Gateses promised her that “You 
don’t need to work, we’re going to take care of everything—for you, for your nation, for 
your people.”19  Mr. and Mrs. Gates became her legal guardians, changing her first name 
from the Armenian, Arshaluys, to the English, Aurora, and her last name from Mardikian 
to Mardiganian to preserve her anonymity.20  They set up headquarters in New York’s 
Latham Hotel where Aurora recounted her experience in Armenian with her original 
foster family acting as translators.  The non-English speaking Aurora was then sent to 
                                                                                                                                            
audience’s sympathy.  A heroine who lost her entire family is marginally more pitiful than one who lost all 
save one. 
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camp in Connecticut for three weeks so that she could pick up some basic understanding 
of her new language.21 
When she returned from camp, Mrs. Gates asked Aurora to sign some papers so 
that she could go to Los Angeles and “have her picture taken.”  As Aurora told film 
historian Anthony Slide late in her life, she was unaware that Mrs. Gates meant that she 
would be filmed and thought that she was just having a still-picture made.  Besides, her 
uncle Steven Long (an Anglicized name) lived in Fresno so that Aurora assumed that she 
would be reunited with her living relative.  Instead, she was to star in the film version of 
her life for $15 a day. In her later years Aurora recalled her confusion at the papers and 
the explanation given by Mrs. Gates, “I said I don’t understand my language much.  I 
don’t understand your English.  And they said $15 was a lot of money.  I was naïve.  I 
didn’t know nothing.”22  As Slide commented, “she was to become the victim of another 
form of exploitation—capitalism and a society looking for a cause worthy of its white, 
Christian wrath.”23 
Col. William N. Selig, a veteran producer who began his film career in the 1890s, 
had acquired the rights to Ravished Armenia.  This was to be his last production.  Though 
the film was ostensibly produced for the ACASR, Slide found that Selig claimed 
complete ownership of the film rights and only gave a percentage of profits to the 
organization. Frederick H. Chapin received credit for the screenplay in the publicity 
materials, but Slide states that Waln and Gates were also involved in writing the script.24  
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Confusion surrounding rights and credits point to a complicated relationship between the 
Hollywood team and the ACASR.  Unfortunately, there is no known documentary 
evidence that could further flesh out these potential conflicts.  Apart from the book and a 
twenty-four minute clip circulated within the Armenian community, little remains to 
piece together this fascinating episode in the American public reception of the Armenian 
Genocide.25 
Auction of Souls was accompanied by intense publicity campaigns that used 
traditional advertising techniques as well as more theatrical attempts to stir up audiences.  
Motion Picture News reported on the production of these campaigns in localities 
throughout the U.S.  An article on Indianapolis held that the “the new idea [that] appears 
to be probably the most important in exploitation is the creation of publicity items by the 
attractions and by incidents surrounding its presentation.”26 The film’s distributors, the 
First National Distributors’ Circuit, began marketing Auction of Souls by “taking star 
spots on all billboards and in all newspapers.”  This was not altogether new as the 
Indianapolis-based English Theater’s own promoter S. Barret McCormick, later art 
director for Citizen Kane (1941), commonly used such paid advertising in his 
“exploitation campaigns.”  McCormick and his partner Robert Liber were revolutionary 
in their use of unpaid publicity to run alongside the paid advertisements in the week 
before opening.  They created and planted news stories about Aurora and the Gateses to 
drive ticket sales by building fascination with the young woman.   
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By the time Aurora arrived in Indianapolis—escorted by the Gates—for a 
weeklong press junket, the city’s journalists were chomping at the bits to get a piece of 
her.  As the threesome moved into their hotel room “several score of newshounds [were] 
begging for the privilege of carrying their grips, hat boxes, portfolios and Aurora’s 
bathrobe, which she had forgotten to enclose in her grip.”27  It was this sort of attention 
that eventually took its toll on the reluctant movie star, leading the studio to hire “seven 
Aurora Mardiganian look-alikes to appear with the film” when the original model proved 
unsuited to the constant public attention.  An article from the New York American had 
captured Mardiganian’s discontent during a dinner at the St. Francis Hotel in San 
Francisco, “Miss Aurora seemed to be annoyed; she avoided answering the questions put 
to her; she evinced a desire to be, as she expressed it, ‘let alone.”  To those who pressed 
her for a word or two, that they might go away and say that they had ‘spoken to Aurora 
Mardiganian, the Joan of Arc of Armenia,’ she refused to reply.”28 The fact that it took 
seven girls to replace the one speaks to the enormous burden placed upon Mardiganian’s 
shoulders.  This complete loss of autonomy coupled with the isolation of her life on the 
road must have seemed a cruel rejoinder for someone who had ostensibly escaped 
captivity before.  Mardiganian made her last public appearance in Buffalo, NY in May 
1920, upon which Mrs. Gates sent her off to a convent school.   
In the summer of 1919, however, both Mardiganian and Indianapolis remained 
besieged by publicity for Auction of Souls.  Motion Picture News notes the publicity 
given Harvey Gates as “a native son” of Indianapolis.  Census data on Gates asserts that 
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he was born in Hawaii to missionaries of the Church of Latter-Day Saints, raised in Utah, 
and lived in California.  There is no evidence that Gates ever lived in Indianapolis either 
as a child or adult, let alone that he was a “local boy” as Motion Picture News asserts. 
Given the tenor of the publicity campaign, Gates’ loose or non-existent connection to 
Indianapolis was a gambit to attract local audiences.  This ploy apparently worked, as did 
others that kept Indianapolis newspaper editors busy. Motion Picture News commented, 
“It is enough to say that the combined newspapers of Indianapolis soon learned to spell 
Aurora’s last name in the twinkling of an eye.  (And that is some job.)”29 
James H. Shallcross, a businessman and NER representative in Omaha, Nebraska, 
had no experience as an exhibitor, but pulled together a comprehensive publicity plan for 
Auction of Souls.  Originally, the film was to be exhibited by the general manager of the 
A.H. Blank Enterprises, owners of the First National Distributors’ franchise for 
Nebraska, Iowa, and Kansas.  The promise of a heatwave and difficulties inherent in 
attracting audiences to sit close together in a hot, windowless room convinced the 
manager to sell exhibiting rights for the city.30  Shallcross took the initiative on behalf of 
the local NER chapter and purchased those rights.  Instead of sponsoring the film as part 
of a philanthropic campaign, Shallcross announced, “We want it as a straight, strictly 
amusement affair, without approvals, without a special society night, without anything 
but crowds.  We want to jam the theatre at regular prices, and we want the entire city to 
go.  Then—here’s the secret—we’re going to wage a city-wide campaign to raise funds 
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for Armenian relief.”31  By exhibiting the film prior to the NER publicity campaign, 
Shallcross hoped to interest audiences in Armenian relief before announcing the actual 
fundraiser.  The NER would then receive proceeds from the film at regular commercial 
rates that were set as high as $10 a seat in some cities.32 
Shallcross further created a theatrical atmosphere for showing the film.  Despite 
some early confusion about the exhibitor’s obligations, Shallcross learned that he needed 
to hire an orchestra, an operator for the projection machine, ushers, and a cashier to sell 
tickets.  He later discovered that “the lobby should be decorated; that a stage setting was 
a necessary adjunct.”33  Shallcross went beyond simple ‘decoration’ to “paint the canopy 
out in front to resemble a great Arab tent” and hired “ a quartet of fiendish looking Arabs, 
mounted on Arabian horses, and carrying Arabian spears with banners attached telling 
about the show.”  It seems that “the madly yelling Kurds of the Desert were given a 
dozen summonses each for speeding during the week they reached the streets of Omaha.”  
Instead of hiring the usual male ushers in plain garb to direct the audience to their seats, 
Shallcross engaged female ushers dressed as “ostensibly beautiful harem inmates” to lend 
further Oriental flavor.34  In doing so, Shallcross exhibited a production within a 
production, all tailored to create a spectacle of Orientalist imagery. 
Auction of Souls was similarly feted in Minneapolis, Minnesota where a “ little 
group of elderly spinsters” had attempted to block the showing of the film for propriety’s 
sake.  It seems ‘the spinsters’ had read the serialized version of Ravished Armenia 
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published in Twin Cities’ newspapers and felt that the sexual violence and slavery made 
for unsavory viewing.  Their objections were overruled by the Federation of Women’s 
Clubs, “a big, broad-minded organization” who “listened to the ‘reformers’ and then 
attended a private showing of the production.”  The committee that reviewed the picture 
proclaimed it “a splendid production and wonderful propaganda for the cause of 
Armenia” and dismissed ‘the spinsters’ complaints.35  A complete ‘exploitation 
campaign’ followed, culminating in yet another Orientalist spectacle.  Motion Picture 
News reported that: 
Special stage effects included an extremely realistic desert sandstorm.  A 
camel, borrowed from the local zoo, was chauffeured by a driver dressed 
in Armenian costume, who performed the ceremony of the Mohammedan 
prayers while the orchestra played Oriental music.  About the driver 
during this atmosphere stunt, were clustered a group of girls in Armenian 
garb.  Night tints were used in the lighting effects.  These faded to red and 
then to pink as the sand storm started.  Sand whipped furiously across the 
stage, and moving clouds gave greater realism to the presentation.  It was 
one of the most unique stage effects that Minneapolis theatre goers had 
ever seen.36 
 
These sorts of sideshows were a confused mangling of Christian and Muslim, Armenian, 
Kurdish, and Arabian stereotypes that played up the exoticism of Oriental life.  Though 
these promotional stunts were inaccurate, they succeeded in lending a sense of 
atmosphere to the proceedings.  
Auction of Souls presented graphic images of violence against Armenian 
Christians at the hands of Muslim Turks.  It recreated visual evidence of the Armenian 
genocide with the addition of sensationalized scenes for American (and British) 
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audiences. Judges and police commissioners across the U.S. attempted to ban the film for 
these reasons. Detroit, Atlanta, and the state of Pennsylvania initially banned the 
production, only to reverse their decision within weeks.  Cinema magazines covered the 
overturning of these bans as part of their coverage of publicity for Auction of Souls.  
Police Commissioner Dr. James W. Inches initially banned Auction of Souls during the 
film week of “pre-release” showings.  His decision to reopen the production was perhaps 
motivated by popular demands as Exhibitors Herald and Motography noted that this 
announcement “was cheered to the echo by 10,000 persons in Cadillac Square” in 
downtown Detroit.37  Auction of Souls then proved so popular that “the Police 
Commissioner further accommodated the management of the Washington Theatre by 
posting extra patrolmen to prevent throngs of Detroit people from blocking traffic.  
Several times it was necessary to order ticket sales stopped for short periods.”38 
In Atlanta, the ban placed on Auction of Souls by the local Board of Review and 
Board of Trustees of Carnegie Library was overruled in an opinion by Judge George L. 
Bell of the Fulton Country Superior Court.  Bell’s ruling “provided the most phenomenal 
advertising matter in the history of the state” when news outlets picked up the story and a 
newspapers published the full opinion “headed by a seven-column streamer—‘Superior 
Court Lifts Ban.’” with multiple exclamation points.39  Other newspapers also announced 
the decision in double columned articles so that “in all it was a development that gave 
‘Auction of Souls’ the greatest amount of gratis publicity in the annals of Atlanta motion 
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picture theatres.”40  The Pennsylvania State Board of Censors also banned the film, only 
to be overruled by Judge Patterson of Common Pleas Court in Philadelphia.  A trial 
ensued between the producers and distributors versus the Board of Censors, but Judge 
Patterson decided to review the film himself.  He found that “there is nothing in the 
scenes which make them sacrilegious, obscene, indecent or immoral, or of such nature as 
to tend to debase or corrupt morals.  Viewing the picture as a whole, the court finds as a 
fact that it is educational in character. It is not only a vivid portrayal of the story entitled 
‘Ravished Armenia,’ but it is also a picture of conditions as they existed in Armenia a 
few months ago.”41  
Judge Patterson’s opinion that Auction of Souls was an educational film accords 
with the findings of the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures, an unofficial 
censorship agency that reviewed films before release.  In the report issued to the National 
Motion Picture Committee of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, 
Auction of Souls was found “impressive” in its entertainment value and “unusual” in its 
educational value.  The Board’s general comments called Auction of Souls “[a] frank 
straight-forward exposition of sufferings of Armenians which makes a sincere and 
powerful appeal to every drop of red blood in America’s manhood and womanhood.”42  
A copy of this report appeared in an epic eight-page advertisement for Auction of Souls in 
The Moving Picture World.  That advertisement also featured a letter from Marcus Loew, 
owner of at least twenty-five Loew Theatres in New York City alone.  He wrote that the 
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box office reports from those theaters indicated “that this production, without a single 
exception, is the biggest business getter that has ever played our theatres.”43   
In addition to Loew’s letter extolling the business benefits of hosting Auction of 
Souls, that same advertisement contained a letter from the former president of Harvard 
University, Charles W. Eliot.  Eliot was involved with the NER’s fundraising efforts and 
wrote a letter that explained the meaning of the film for Armenian relief:  
The sight of this motion picture is capable of implanting in many millions 
of thinking and unthinking Americans three convictions which may 
reasonably determine the public conduct of the American people in the 
near further: First, that the Armenian people deserve to be rescued, 
comforted, and made free and secure for the future by the use of the full 
power of the democratic western peoples: secondly, that the Concert of 
Europe, which since the Crimean War, at least, has signally failed to 
protect the Christian populations of the Near East and to establish justice 
in that part of the work, should now be replaced by a more effective 
international organization; and thirdly, that if this enterprise of restoring 
Armenians be a crusade, that is, an enterprise undertaken in a good cause 
with unselfish enthusiasm, it is a crusade in which the American people 
should ardently desire to take part.44  
 
Eliot suggested that the film would move the American people to support Armenian relief 
as well as the League of Nations.  He criticized Europe for not halting the persecution of 
Christians under the Ottoman Empire, but did not consider the U.S. negligent in failing to 
intervene.  Eliot hoped that seeing this film would cause Americans to open their hearts 
to the Armenians on a grand scale so that the NER’s “crusade” would flourish.  The ad 
concluded by summarizing the production, “That $10 per seat picture ‘Auction of Souls’ 
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holds audiences spellbound.  8 reels, several thousand people, a vivid living presentment 
of the fact that makes the blood of American women boil.”45  
With only parts of one reel in circulation it is difficult to know exactly what was 
shown that made “the blood of American women boil.”  However a list of subtitles from 
the Selig Collection at the Margaret Herrick Library of the Academy of Motion Picture 
Arts and Sciences was reprinted in Anthony Slide’s Ravished Armenian and the Story of 
Aurora Mardiganian (1997).  This list allows us to reconstruct the narrative elements of 
the film and suggests likely content of certain scenes. In addition, photos from the film as 
well as the lone surviving clip offer glimpses into the tone and look of the film.   Reel 
five, for example, depicted a scene where “the Turkish gendarmes “marched 9,000 
women and children to the banks of the Tigris, killed them all and threw the bodies into 
the river.” This scene refers to a report Viscount James Bryce made to the House of 
Lords in which he stated, “According to my information there was, at Mush in particular, 
a very extensive massacre; at another place all the male population that could be seized 
were brought out and shot, and women and children to the number of 9,000 were taken to 
the banks of the Tigris and, thrown into the river and drowned.”46 In the film, the 
subtitles continue: “(15) The boat is overloaded.  Throw out the children.  (16) It will take 
at least three trips to carry them across. (17) Make them swim. (End of reel five).”47  On 
this occasion, the scene reenacted allegations put forth in the public realm and were 
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brought to life on screen.  In other instances, the scenes were largely manufactured from 
Mardiganian’s heavily edited text.   
 
Figure 20: Crucifixion of Armenian Women.  Still from Auction of Souls (1919). 
For instance, the haunting image of young women crucified in the desert was an invented 
scene from Mardiganian’s book.  According to Mardiganian in her later years, “The 
Turks didn’t make their crosses like that.  The Turks made little pointed crosses.  They 
took the clothes off the girls.  The made them bend down.  And after raping them, they 
made them sit on the pointed wood, through the vagina.”48  Besides being sexually 
explicit and unfilmable, Mardiganian’s version lacked the symbolic power of showing 
Armenian victims in the same position as Jesus Christ on the Cross.  This image invited a 
comparison between those Romans who crucified Jesus and the “Unspeakable Turk” who 
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made innocent Christians suffer for the love of Jesus and God.  It is a powerful 
indictment of Muslim hatred, even if patently false.  
Though Auction of Souls was by far the most well known film of the Armenian 
Relief Movement, NER released several other ‘photoplays’ including Alice in 
Hungerland.  Alice in Hungerland was shown in schools, churches, and theaters 
nationwide as part of the 1922 NER campaign.  This take off on Lewis Carroll’s Alice in 
Wonderland features another orphan in the titular role. Alice Duryea, née Esther Razon, 
starred in Alice in Hungerland, a NER film release in the Fall of 1921.  The NER cast the 
eight-year-old Razon from among the wards of the Jewish National Orphanage in 
Constantinople.  Like Mardiganian, a representative of the NER, Mrs. Florence Spencer 
Duryea, took her in and became her foster mother.49   It was not uncommon for women 
who visited NER orphanages to adopt a child and bring them to the U.S.  Such adoptions 
were later discouraged by the NER, presumably because the legalities were murky at best 
and the women generally single.  The fact that Esther Razon was Jewish—not 
Armenian—led Rabbi Stephen S. Weiss of the NER Executive Board to raise objections 
to her adoption by a non-Jewish woman.  According to the New York Times, the 
application for adoption was endorsed by the NER with the “stipulation that the adoption 
should be ‘under the consent and advice of such Jewish members of our committee as 
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Hon. Henry Morgenthau, Abram I. Elkus, Oscar M. Strauss, Rabbi Stephen S. Weiss, and 
Rabbi Tietelbaum [sic].’”50  
Rabbi Weiss held that Mrs. Duryea only sought advice from him but did not abide 
by his direction.  He stated his belief that Mrs. Duryea “has the intention of weening [sic] 
the child away from her religion and inducing her to embrace another religion.”51 As a 
result, the Jewish National Orphanage attempted to have Razon removed from Duryea’s 
custody and released into the care of Rabbi Weiss until an appropriate Jewish home could 
be found.  Mrs. Duryea surrendered Razon to Rabbi Weiss temporarily, but remained part 
of the child’s life.  Razon was removed from her school in Westchester County and spent 
her time divided between Rabbi Weiss’ home during the week and Mrs. Duryea on the 
weekends.  Once Rabbi Weiss located a Jewish foster family, Mrs. Duryea was to have 
her say in the matter of adoption.  The row assumedly died down as the next piece of 
news relates to Alice Duryea’s engagement to John I. Kinney.52  From the engagement 
announcement it seems that Mrs. Duryea eventually got her way; Esther the Jewish 
orphan became Alice the American girl. 
  In Alice in Hungerland, Alice played a young girl who follows her father 
overseas to his work with the NER. Alice stows away on a cargo ship filled with food, 
clothing, and supplies donated by the American people and bound for the Near East.  
After “certain vicissitudes” she reaches her father in Constantinople and continues with 
him “over the Black Sea to Batum and then into the interior, to Tiflis, Alexandrapol, 
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Erivan.”  The film intersperses unscripted footage from NER cinematographers who 
traveled through these areas with Alice’s scripted visits to various orphanages in the Near 
East.  She encounters the poor NER orphans “parentless, homeless, ragged, starving and 
ill.”  An article in The New Near East tells us that “sometimes she saw them lying still in 
the street, dead for want of actual food. Sometimes she saw them living in caves with 
dogs because there was no roof in all that desolate land.”53  These scenes did not drive the 
narrative, but offered an opportunity to show the desperate circumstances in which the 
Armenians lived.  Other scenes—those more likely to feature narrative action—pictured 
the work of the NER with children who had found sanctuary in their orphanages.  Inside 
NER institutions “she saw hundreds of healthy children at long tables eating.  She saw 
children in classrooms and workshops industrious and happy.”  This juxtaposition 
between the children under NER supervision and those “living in caves with dogs” 
testified to the substantial work the organization did in caring for such orphans.   
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Figure 11: Alice (in white) hands out bread to Armenian children in Alice in Hungerland (1921).  Courtesy of 
The New Near East. 
Yet there were still limitations to NER’s ability to aid the poor children in such 
need of food and homes.  When Alice sees the “great truckloads of flour roll into the 
orphanage compounds” she initially thinks that this enormous amount of food must feed 
those begging outside the gates as well.54  She then watches as that flour is baked into 
bread so that she understands the vast quantity of supplies necessary to keep those 
thousands of children simple nourished, not overfed.  This realization is meant to impress 
the audience with the insufficiency of current donations.  If the American people want to 
help all Armenian children, they must give more money, more food, more often.  It is 
also important to realize that this film focuses on children rather than all refugees.  At this 
point in the NER campaign, adult refugees were less attractive beggars than poor, 
innocent children.  Alice, in particular, emphasizes the interest in children as a child 
                                                
54 ibid, 4. 
  189 
herself.  As both Alice and Esther Razon, she is the new poster child for Armenian 
Relief.  Where once she might have appeared on an actual poster, now she is animated in 
film.  This helped bring her alive to American children like those in White Plains, New 
York who contributed 5,000 cans of milk at a screening of Alice in Hungerland 
sponsored by local Boy Scouts.55  Alice in Hungerland also spoke to the schoolchildren 
of Manchester, New Hampshire, where the NER State Director distributed tickets to a 
screening.  When the children returned to school they “ask[ed] their teachers if they may 
not be permitted to bring to the schools, as collecting places, money to buy food and 
clothes for the hungry children of Armenia.”56  Eleven-year-old Elizabeth Hayes of 
Wellesley, Massachusetts saw the film and was inspired to put on a play of her own to 
raise money for “the poor starving children over there.”  She and two other girls raised 
four dollars from the thirty people who attended the play.57 
Alice, the character, also appeared in her own play entitled “Shadows: A 
Children’s Play for the Near East Relief” by Elisabeth Edsland.  The content of the play, 
while not the same as the film, provides further insight into the moral of the film.  In 
Edsland’s version, Alice is an American girl who “falls through the looking-glass” to find 
herself among a group of Armenian orphans.  The play begins with Alice’s beloved 
mother telling her of Armenia: “And in that land, so far away, in that land of starving 
children, our Lord Jesus was born many years ago.”58 Of course, Jesus was born in 
Nazareth in the former Ottoman territory of Palestine, but connecting Armenia and the 
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Armenian to the Bible helped bridge the cognitive distance to that foreign land for 
Americans, especially children.  Calling Armenia “the Cradle of Christianity” also 
legitimated American Christian support of the Armenians, who were seen as successors 
to early Christians.  Alice wishes that she could see the little children of Armenia and 
soon finds herself among a group of “sparsely clad” children “huddled together” in a 
barren field.  Stage directions note that “They are tired, and we wonder why they are so 
old-looking and why they are dressed so poorly in such cold weather.”  Alice cuts a 
strange figure in comparison, well-dressed and well-fed.  She approaches the group and 
begins interacting with them.  Much of the conversation concerns the differences between 
the average American girl and the many Armenian orphans: 
Oldest Girl: You do not look like the girls of this land.  Did you get those 
clothes at the orphanage? 
Alice: The orphanage! No, my mother made me this dress. 
A Very Little Girl: Mother!  What is a mother? 
(The very little girl looks questioningly at the Oldest Girl.) 
Oldest Girl: She doesn’t.  I had one once. But it was so long ago I have 
forgotten.  None of these children have mothers.59 
Alice comes to realize that she has taken her blessings for granted.  When she awakes in 
her mother’s arms, she hugs her tight and promises never to waste food again.  American 
children were reminded of their many blessings through their less fortunate peers.   
 Armenian relief marketed itself to children to draw young Americans into the 
cause.  Children’s plays, stories, and contests were published in The New Near East to 
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provide entertainment for both generations.  The Boy Scouts of America and other groups 
for children repeatedly organized milk drives and bundle days to collect old clothes for 
the Armenian orphans.  Their accomplishments resulted in accolades by the NER as well 
as local officials.  Jackie Coogan, the child movie star, was part of this effort to reach 
children when he was commissioned to lead a “Children’s Crusade for the Near East” in 
1924.  He has been dubbed “the first celebrity humanitarian” by one scholar for his 
efforts on behalf of Armenian Relief.60  It is hardly possible to overstate the heights of 
Coogan’s celebrity in the 1920s.  From the time he appeared with Charlie Chaplin’s The 
Kid in 1921, Coogan was a consistent draw at the box office.  In that film he played an 
orphan taken in by Chaplin’s Tramp to become his sidekick.  It was Chaplin’s full-length 
feature debut as director and a huge success.  Coogan parlayed that role into other 
vehicles such as Peck’s Bad Boy (1921), Oliver Twist (1922), Circus Days (1923) so that 
he was making two to three films per year throughout his childhood.  He later made the 
transition from silent to talking film with Tom Sawyer in 1930.  At his peak, Coogan was 
featured on merchandise ranging from peanut butter jars to dolls so that his audience 
could literally take a piece of him home.   
As early as July 1921, Coogan was involved in advocating for Near East Relief, 
as reported in an article published in The New Near East.  This article states that the 
“Infant Phenom” woke up one morning, found that his bathrobe was snug, and read in the 
newspaper “that a million and a half people in the Caucasus have no clothes for next 
winter.” After his father “convey[ed] to Jackie’s mind the picture of a million and half 
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ragged, starving people facing the bitter winter in the high lands of Transcaucasia,” 
Jackie exclaimed “There are altogether too many clothes in this house.”  The child star 
proceeded to clean out the house “and a huge bundle of clothing was sent to the 
warehouse of Near East Relief in New York at the very beginning of the clothing 
campaign.”61  Other movie stars were also listed as contributing their old clothing, but 
they played second fiddle to the six-year-old.  Bundles of old clothing were also 
contributed by children attending a production of Coogan’s 1922 film Trouble at New 
York’s Strand Theater.  The cost of admission was one bundle each and the event raised 
thirty-five hundred bundles of clothing.  The New Near East reported that “A similar plan 
may be carried out in all the principal cities of the country” with the help of the Jackie 
Coogan Productions Exploitation Manager, Paul Gray.  The team at Jackie Coogan 
Productions went on to sponsor other events that combined Coogan’s films with 
philanthropic work for NER.   
As discussed in the introduction, United Artists studios combined the filming of 
Circus Days in December 1922 with an event to collect supplies for NER in response to 
the Burning of Smyrna.  In early December, United Artists studios turned one of their lots 
into a circus complete with “every kind of circus attraction from bearded lady and fat 
woman to skeleton-man and brave equestrienne.”62  The circus also featured “side shows, 
[a] band, bareback riders, acrobats, clowns, camels, lions, and—EVERYTHING.”63  This 
was a complete circus that happened to include a film crew following Coogan in his role 
as Toby Tyler, a foster child who runs away to join the circus.  While children gathered 
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by “high schools, grammar school, women’s clubs and civic organizations” appeared in 
droves, Coogan worked a full day collecting donations for admission and filming various 
scenes. The New Near East judged the event a success as it raised $3500 in food and 
clothing from the 7,500 attendees.64  This was only the beginning of Coogan’s activism 
on behalf of the children of the Near East. 
 
Figure 22: Jackie Coogan at Circus Benefit.  Clipping from The New Near East (April 1923). 
  During the summer of 1924, Coogan traveled across the country drawing crowds 
and collecting donations for a cargo ship he would escort to the Near East.  This 
campaign was dubbed “The Children’s Crusade for the Near East,” an unfortunate choice 
of appellation considering the original Crusades pitting Christian against Muslim during 
the Middle Ages.  Of course, the NER might have chosen this name specifically to evoke 
                                                
64 ibid, 8. 
  194 
those violent events and remind Americans of the “natural hatred” between the two 
religions that supposedly left the Armenian people in shambles.  In announcing the tour, 
Jack Coogan Sr. discussed his edifying intentions in exposing his son to the “hardships 
and suffering other children of his own age have had to endure” so that he might realize 
“the common duty of all mankind to one another.”65   The elder Coogan’s sentiments 
were echoed by educators like Cincinnati’s Superintendent of Schools who believed that 
“every contribution from an American child is an advance in the development of the 
spiritual life of American childhood.”66  Whether or not he had an uplifting effect, Jackie 
Coogan’s contribution to Armenian relief directly spurred the contributions of thousands 
of American children. 
In August 1924, Jackie Coogan embarked on his “Children’s Crusade” that took 
him through twenty-five American cities as well as European capitals.  He also stopped 
in Greece to deliver the bill of lading to the cargo ship full of supplies donated by 
American children.  Jackie Coogan’s involvement in Armenian Relief was expertly 
crafted and carefully executed to promote Coogan as well as promoting Near East Relief.  
His tour of the U.S. and voyage to the Near East came at a crucial time in his career.  At 
the ripe old age of 10, Coogan was aging out of the cuteness that made him so popular 
among movie goers.  Hollywood columnists such as Harry Carr lamented “no one who 
has observed his recent work can fail to come to the conclusion that the little boy we all 
loved is slipping away. . . which is another way of saying Jackie is growing-up.”67  
Advocating for Near East Relief allowed Coogan to age gracefully by harnessing his 
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fame into charitable work.  Despite the fact that he likely had little to do with the 
arrangements, this was a sign of maturation for a boy whose every haircut and lost dog 
made national news.  Thus Jackie Coogan’s fundraising efforts were part of a symbiotic 
relationship with NER wherein the organization got a tremendous boost in publicity, 
interests, and donations from their association with such a celebrity.  Meanwhile, the 
celebrity received publicity, but more importantly the campaign molded his image as an 
ambassador of goodwill.  
Like film studios, food corporations offered their assistance in the form of rice, 
corn syrup, condensed milk, and other foodstuffs and, in return, their contributions to a 
humanitarian cause were acknowledged.  Some of these companies used that exchange in 
their advertising to improve their brand’s image, much like Jackie Coogan did for his 
reputation.  As Armenian orphans provided lessons in humanity for Coogan, NER wards 
also confirmed nutritional value in advertisements for food products.  Food cooperatives 
such as the Retail Grocer’s Association, Dairyman’s League, Inc., and Association of 
Corn Products as well as certain brand name food companies are listed as generous 
contributors to the NER’s Golden Rule Campaign.  Those brands include Borden’s 
Condensed Milk, Sun Maid Raisins, Carnation Milk, and Tharinger Macaroni among 
others.68 
The Borden Milk Company ran one of the best known campaigns on behalf of 
Armenian relief.  It began when Borden agreed to match every purchased can of their 
Eagle brand condensed milk with another can donated by the company.69 The New Near 
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East had long referred to the Borden Milk Company in the magazine, “the camel trains 
are the milk carriers, crossing the interior of Asia Minor laden with boxes of Borden’s 
condensed milk and other brands.”70  Borden’s milk was also the default brand for 
donation to various film and events run by the NER, including Jackie Coogan’s circus.  
The company also received a boost from Dr. J.C. Curran, Associate Director of the NER 
and Surgeon-Commander, U.S.N., who was quoted in a 1924 Borden milk pamphlet of 
“Diet and Nutrition”: 
Our experience with 115,000 orphan children of the Near East shows that 
there is no more valuable food than condensed milk for restoring half 
starved children to health and strength. In the area where the Near East 
Relief is operated, milk producing animals are tubercular, and we cannot 
depend upon that source of milk supply.  In a recent evacuation of refugee 
canned milk was of great help because of its concentrated food value.  
Many of the refugees were compelled to travel for days at a time with no 
other food to depend upon than a can of American Condensed Milk.71 
While milk was certainly vital to the survival of thousands of Armenian refugees, 
Curran’s statement about “tubercular cows” seems peculiar.  For one, there is no other 
evidence that unhealthy cows were a particular problem in the Near East; rather, the lack 
of dairy cows and temperature control coupled with the large number of dependents made 
canned milk a vital alternative to fresh milk.  As we shall see, Curran was not judicious in 
his statements of praise for various foods and their manufacturers.  His stamp of 
approval, however, was useful to companies that wanted to sell their foods on the basis of 
their nutritional value.  Curran’s words gave them the proof so that such companies could 
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benefit by advertising the dietary value of their products.  In return, the Near East Relief 
received donations of millions of cans of milk and other products. 
Food cooperatives were in a unique position to provide help for the NER.  In 
1921, for instance, the Retail Grocer’s Association in Syracuse started a campaign called 
“Say It With Flour.”  Every groceryman agreed to put flour on sale to encourage people 
to buy flour and donate sacks to the Near East Relief.  In addition to grocery stores, the 
flour was put on sale in “banks, restaurants, hotels, moving picture houses, cigar stores, 
and other business places” as well as churches.72  The “Say It With Flour” campaign was 
so successful that the sales organization of the Globe Grain and Milling Company made it 
a nationwide campaign by distributing “Coin Posters” for display to grocery stores and 
bakeries as they proved the most effective places for collecting donations.  These coin 
posters were “made of heavy cardboard, size 28x22, with slots for the deposit of coins 
taking up the lower third of the poster.  A heavy celluloid face, covering the coin slots, 
makes it possible for the public to see all the coins deposited.”73  The Coin Poster itself 
gave an accounting of the lives that a barrel of flour could save, “Every 5 cents you 
contribute towards purchasing this barrel of flour means another day of life for a little 
child.”74 
The Near East Relief received many endorsements for the “Say It With Flour” 
Campaign.  Philip A. DePuyt, trustee of the National Retail Grocers Association, wrote 
“the relief of distress in the Near East is a matter that concerns every thoughtful 
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American citizen.  Your plan of placing a barrel of flour on exhibit in the grocery stores 
and attaching thereto a receptacle for the customer to contribute toward sending flour to 
these distressed people is to be commended.”75  Allen B. Cox, President of the Syracuse 
Retail Grocers Association, gave his endorsement to the NER directly, “The Syracuse 
Retail Grocers Association has carefully investigated the Near East Relief, and finds that 
it is conducting a big work in a big, efficient way.”  These votes of confidence inspired 
the Hecker-Jones-Jewell Milling Company in New York City and the Washburn-Crosby 
Co. in Wisconsin to join the campaign.  More significant was the participation of silent 
screen star Norma Talmadge, who filmed a moving picture trailer that “[gave] glimpses 
of the misery in the Near East, and show[ed] Miss Talmadge in the act of helping our 
work by dropping a silver dollar into a Coin Poster and pleading with the public to ‘SAY 
IT WITH FLOUR!’”76  At this point, Talmadge was nearing the peak of her popularity 
but also in the midst of a transition from New York to Hollywood.  This contribution to 
Armenian Relief raised the profile of the “Say It With Flour” Campaign and brought it 
into the moving picture houses for consumption by the American film-going public.   
Flour was of perennial importance to the NER and articles about its necessity for 
sustaining life appeared consistently in the pages of the organization’s periodical.  The 
New Near East was as much an effective mouthpiece for advertising the need for food as 
it was for recognizing those companies that supplied it.  When the NER in Transcaucasia 
communicated their need for 25,000 pounds of cocoa, the NER in New York began 
gathering bids from various cocoa companies.  Instead of submitting their bid, the 
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Hershey’s Chocolate Company donated the entire amount and received 
acknowledgement and thanks in The New Near East.  Dr. J.C. Curran made a plea to the 
National Macaroni Manufacturers convention: 
We physicians, who have been on the ground and seen the terrible hunger 
of the little children who sometimes wander through the hills for weeks 
feeding upon weeds, old bones or whatever they can get hold of, have 
observed the wonderful recuperative value of macaroni to these starving 
little bodies.  There is no other food so nutritious.  Macaroni is high in 
gluten, the body and health building elements required especially by 
children.  It is a splendid meat substitute and can be made very palatable.  
We would rather have macaroni than any other food for those hungry 
children. (emphasis mine)77 
This statement was valuable for macaroni manufacturers looking for scientific evidence 
that their product was healthy.  At the time, nutritional scientist believed that a high 
caloric intake was more important than protein to feed victims of famine and American 
children.  If the NER preferred macaroni over all other foods for feeding starving 
children, then mothers of America would assume that macaroni was a good choice for 
feeding their own children.  Two Chicago macaroni companies donated 30,000 pounds of 
macaroni—or as winningly described, “more than 2,000 miles of the stuff”—and 
received thanks in The New Near East.  Another 5,000 pounds was donated by the 
Charles F. Mueller Company, with more to come from other macaroni manufacturers.  
The article, however, did not mention Dr. J.C. Curran’s statement on behalf of 
macaroni.78  NER made similar pleas for raisins, canned fruits and vegetables, canned 
milk, corn products, and rice. 
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 Dr. J.C. Curran also sent letters that were incorporated into advertising for Karo 
Corn Syrup. An ad from The Chicago Daily Tribune republished Curran’s letter: “The 
Food Experts of the Near East Relief Organization know the necessity of giving children 
energy and health through nutritious foods only. . . These experts have found that because 
Karo contains a high percentage of the vitalizing food element ‘Dextrose’ it ranks with 
the very best food for the upbuilding of children.  In fact, Karo has helped to save the 
remnant of the oldest Christian nation in the world.”79  Once again, this attempt at 
nutritional science dubiously argued for the dietary value of sugar for the starving 
children of the Near East and for healthy American children.  The Karo ad elaborates on 
the benefits of its product, specifying corn syrup as one of these “inexpensive but highly 
nourishing foods” that have “transformed half starved orphans into happy, healthy 
children.”80  
Such imperishable food items formed the diet of hundreds of thousands of 
Armenian orphans in the Near East.  In recognition of that fact, the NER and President 
Coolidge asked Americans to observe International Golden Rule Sunday on December 2, 
1923 by eating at least one meal “approximating that which is used every day in the 
orphanages of the Near East.”81  This meant that Americans limited themselves to foods 
found in orphanages, those very same foods that had been donated in tens of thousands of 
pounds.  The NER also provided recipes from expert chefs such as “Oscar, the famous 
chef of the Waldorf-Astoria in New York” that included approved staples like milk, 
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beans, rice, macaroni, cocoa, and corn products.82 These guidelines confirm the 
commercial collaboration between food manufacturers and the NER.  An article in the 
The Milwaukee Sentinel further connected American excesses with Armenian starvation: 
“Let us think of these children who would starve if it were not for agencies like the Near 
East Relief and resolve that we will start tomorrow on our reducing regime again; go on a 
three day low calorie period, and send the money we save on those three days to help 
keep some children from starving.”83   Golden Rule Sunday was an effective way to make 
Americans feel guilty about the abundance they enjoyed, while—an ocean away—
Armenian refugees starved. 
Whether packaged in a ‘barrel of flour’ or a ‘bundle of used clothing’, the needs 
of Armenian refugees were consistently reported to Americans in the guise of marketing 
conventions.  These conventions extended to the products the NER needed to function in 
the U.S.  Such a cozy arrangement came about as a result of the commodification of 
humanitarian sentiment on Armenian refugees.  NER could direct the emotions of so 
many Americans towards events a world away and ask these same Americans to express 
their sympathy through their daily choices.  Those “daily choices” included the 
consumption of certain brands of food that reified their commitment to Armenian relief.  
This, in essence, was how Armenian relief—and by extension, humanitarian causes—
came to be consumed by the American public. 
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Conclusion 
 
Celebrities since Jackie Coogan have associated themselves with various 
charitable endeavors.  One well-trodden path for philanthropic celebrities is the United 
Nations’ Goodwill Ambassadorship programs.  Various agencies within the UN take on 
celebrities to publicize their projects.  Athletes, musicians, actors, and royalty such as 
Mia Farrow, David Beckham, Don Cheadle, Harry Belafonte, and Queen Rania of Jordan 
act as Goodwill Ambassadors for United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).  Angelina 
Jolie, actress and former Goodwill Ambassador for the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugee (UNHCR) now works as a Special Envoy to the UNHCR.  
Actress Sally Struthers and other celebrities have served as spokespeople for 
organizations such as ChildFund—formerly, Christian Children’s Fund—in long-form 
infomercials that depict adorable children living in squalor.  Other celebrities use their 
influence in times of disaster.  In the aftermath of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, actor 
Sean Penn founded a non-profit foundation to provide humanitarian assistance in the 
impoverished nation.  Actor George Clooney organized Tsunami Aid: A Concert of Hope 
to raise funds for the tsunami victims of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake.  Performers 
included Elton John, Madonna, and Eric Clapton as well as appearances by former 
Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, actor Brad Pitt, and Donald Trump.  Such 
benefit concerts originated with the 1985 Live Aid Concert organized by musician Bob 
Geldof for Ethiopian famine victims.   
Between celebrity spokesmen, late night informercials, and benefit concerts, 
international humanitarian aid has garnered much media attention in the last twenty 
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years.   Humanitarian media itself was not new.  Nineteenth century reformers made good 
use of illustrations and pamphlets to raise interest in others’ distress.  For example, 
historian Elizabeth B. Clark analyzed the image of slavery in literature distributed by 
abolitionists.  By examining slave narratives and anti-slavery tracts, she identifies a turn 
towards the sensational by the mid-19th century.1  Protestant missionaries brought 
attention to famines and disasters in faraway lands.  Their methods for doing so included 
visual media so that Americans could viscerally experience distant suffering.  World War 
I, however, changed the media techniques and the construction of humanitarian 
institutions to create more sophisticated methods of conveying distant suffering. These 
methods include not just photography and film, but the manner in which this media was 
created and distributed.  By showing the transformation from earlier forms of 
humanitarian media to the modern commodification of Armenian relief, this dissertation 
demonstrates that the modern humanitarian industry has antecedents in Armenian Relief.   
Humanitarianism became a business in which corporations share.  In 1923, 
Borden’s Milk matched can-for-can every donation to Armenian Relief.  Today, 
Americans collect yogurt lids to send back to General Mills Foods so the company will 
donate 10 cents to breast cancer research.  Every time someone purchases a pair of Toms 
Shoes, another pair will be sent to a person in the Third World.  In this way consumer 
spending is directly connected to the alleviation of suffering.  In the case of Armenian 
relief, the development of a philanthropic market lent Near East Relief moral authority 
that it could confer upon food companies and celebrities. This dissertation has followed 
the development of these forms of publicity to demonstrate the accrual of moral authority 
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through the organization’s actions.  Though the publicity begins in a manner similar to 
19th century forms of humanitarian media, by the final chapter the NER becomes the 
beneficiary of films, celebrity spokesmen, and an outlet for food corporations to 
demonstrate their goodwill. 
In addition, this dissertation contributes to the literature on American international 
humanitarianism by focusing on the Armenian Relief movement.  Although the 
circumstances behind the Armenian Genocide were common knowledge in the Ottoman 
Empire, the U.S., and Europe at the time, the Turkish government denies that genocide 
occurred.  As a result, debates over the legitimacy of the Armenian Genocide continue to 
rage in political and historical discourse. Great strides are being made between Turkish 
and Armenian scholars towards a mutual understanding of the 1915-17 violence.  At the 
same time, the Armenian Genocide is largely unknown within the American public.  The 
Armenian Relief Movement and its vast organs of publicity are a piece of national 
memory that has been forgotten.  By revisiting these fundraising campaigns, we 
remember a part of American history.   
Efforts to resuscitate that episode in American history are not important simply 
because they have been forgotten, but also to enhance our understanding of the history of 
international humanitarianism in this country.  The Armenian Genocide is one of the first 
genocides of the violent 20th century and one of the first international relief projects that 
Americans supported in droves.  Publicity on behalf of the Armenian Relief Movement 
helped define humanitarian campaigns to this day.  A media campaign of this magnitude 
requires a comprehensive study of its genesis, methods, and results.   While historians 
have mentioned the range of publicity given Armenian Relief, none have subjected this 
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campaign to intensive scrutiny as in this dissertation. 
Analyzing the Armenian relief publicity campaign leads to a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between mass media and humanitarianism.  
Americans—like other citizens of the First World—do not easily respond to people in 
humanitarian distress.  The American public could not recognize the persecution of 
Armenian and their lack of basic human necessities without concerted efforts by various 
individuals and organizations to inform them of these needs. Newspapers and magazines 
relayed the Armenian situation in stark detail, but had little effect without the 
accompanying public speakers, rallies, posters, photographs, and films engineered by the 
NER.  Simple knowledge of Armenian suffering did not readily lead to humanitarian 
intervention.  After all, numerous civilian groups lived in areas devastated by the battles 
of World War I and their representatives appealed to Americans to contribute to their 
cause.  Americans contributed piecemeal to various organizations collecting money on 
behalf of their personal ethnic or national group.  The Armenian case was distinct 
because most of the donors to the cause were not Armenian—though Armenian-
Americans contributed greatly to their fellow countrymen—but Americans of different 
religious, cultural, and economic backgrounds.   
Where the NER excelled was building an argument for a special connection 
between Americans and Armenians—that Americans were somehow responsible for 
sustaining the Armenian refugees and restoring them to their lands.  Prior to the 
Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, the main arguments for contributing to Armenian 
relief denigrated the Turks and Islam while celebrating the Armenians as the oldest 
Christian nation.  This logic hearkened back to 19th century missionary appeals stating 
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that the United States, as a Christian nation, had a vested interest in the preservation of 
Christianity in Bible Lands.  As Turkish nationalism successfully challenged the Allied 
occupation of their lands, the NER was able to continue making pleas to the American 
public without referring to the Genocide.  Instead, the NER circulated images of starving 
Armenians and detailed the squalor in which they lived.  This approach resonated with 
the American public, who were familiar enough with the Turkish atrocities to read 
between the lines.  From 1919 to 1923, the fact of Armenian suffering when portrayed in 
graphic photographs and sensationalized films was enough to justify continuing 
donations to the NER.  While it was once beneficial to draw upon a longstanding hatred 
of Turks in American society, the Turkish War of Independence began rendered such an 
approach counterproductive to their goals in aiding Armenian refugees. By periodizing 
the NER’s portrayal of the Armenian Genocide, this dissertation suggests that the 
organization’s biases were attributable to their need to appeal to the American public.  
Identifying these shifting attitudes towards Turkish guilt demonstrates the political 
expediencies inherent in humanitarian appeals.  
This dissertation began with the formation of the Near East Relief as the 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief in 1915.  The second chapter turns 
toward Europe to examine Belgian relief as a counterpoint to Armenian relief.  Belgian 
relief propaganda emphasized the misery of women and children in efforts to gain 
sympathy for their cause.  At the same time, Hoover’s Commission on Relief in Belgium 
eschewed such sentimental campaigns and preferred to use facts and figures in 
representing the organization.  From Belgium, we return to the Near East Relief’s 1919 
publicity campaign where they attempted to raise $30,000,000.  This astronomical sum 
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led the NER (at the time, the American Committee for Relief in the Near East) to pursue 
more professional publicity by commissioning the Division of Pictorial Publicity of the 
Creel Committee. Once the 1919 Campaign was over, the Near East Relief thereafter 
relied upon photography rather than posters.  Chapter four continued to discuss the 
transition to photography by examining the process by which such photographs were 
taken and distributed by the Near East Relief.  In the final chapter, humanitarian aid was 
commodified so that the approval of NER could be bought and sold in a burgeoning 
philanthropic market.  
Of course, this philanthropic market was not as developed as it is in the modern-
day, where corporate social responsibility is a necessary part of building and maintaining 
a brand.  At the same time, the commodification of the humanitarian impulse was in its 
early stages so that philanthropies were in direct competition with one another for ever 
larger corporate resources. All the publicity reproduced in the dissertation contributed to 
NER efforts to brand itself as the moral authority in Armenian relief.  The iconic posters, 
photographs, and popular films all participated in the branding of the humanitarian 
organization.  In many of these publicity images, the NER defines itself as a trustworthy, 
effective organization to establish its primacy over possible competitors for funds.  This 
in itself is not commodification. Rather the act of associating its brand of humanitarian 
aid with the likes of Jackie Coogan or Karo Corn Syrup indicates that there is an 
exchange of commodities.  For Karo Corn Syrup, those commodities were real cans of 
corn syrup that were exchanged for the use of the NER name in their advertising.  With 
Jackie Coogan, himself a brand, the exchange was less tangible.  Coogan’s participation 
in NER fundraising events associated Coogan with the innate good of humanitarian aid.  
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Meanwhile, the NER received the attention from his fans and a massive uptick in 
donations.  It is significant that these exchanges took place decades before corporate 
social responsibility and celebrity activism was firmly entrenched in the philanthropic 
marketplace. 
Moving forward, this project would continue to dig deeper and find more 
associations between corporations and humanitarian aid organizations.  There are plenty 
more archives where one might find additional information on Armenian relief.  For 
example, I was not able to consult the Near East Relief collection at the Rockefeller 
Center Archives or the American Committee on Armenian and Syrian Relief at Burke 
Theological Seminary in New York City.  Additionally, there are resources on Belgian 
Relief available at the Hoover Institute Archives that would augment this evolving 
process.  More clarity on the relationship between Armenian and Belgian relief might put 
this quest for funds into a fuller context of competition between international 
philanthropic projects.  The next area for research would be with the advertisers 
themselves.  Advertising agencies like J. Walter Thompson retain records from this era 
that may elucidate the specific negotiations over such collaboration.    
Whatever the path this project takes, it is certain to involve other humanitarian 
relief projects both in the early 20th century and beyond.  The Armenian genocide is 
simply a jumping off point to discuss a phenomenon that has earned increasing attention 
in recently years.  The involvement of private enterprise with humanitarian has led 
political scientists like Stephen Hopgood to make observations like: “internal 
reorganizations enabled newly ‘branded’ humanitarian NGOs to seek corporate funds 
more effectively, their ‘product’—a moral brand with feel-good associations—now 
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marketed alongside appeals for direct program funding.  Whatever moral authority 
humanitarian NGOs had accrued was now a lucrative resource—a vital source of 
income—in a world where the boundaries that had once closed off extreme suffering 
from commercial interests were fast eroding.”2  Market-based solutions for funding 
humanitarian aid and development create an identity crisis for organizations that used to 
operate solely on voluntarism.  The entrance of private enterprise forces international 
humanitarian organizations to restructure within and without.  The question remains how 
far corporations can push the limits of humanitarianism.  Since we have seen that 
corporations have long been involved with at least one international humanitarian 
organization, the question must be: how has private enterprise already shaped 
humanitarian aid?  That question will require further historical research in the early 20th 
century rather than the late 20th century. 
 
                                                
2 Stephen Hopgood, “Saying ‘No’ to Wal-Mart: Money and Morality in Professional Humanitarianism” in 
Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics, eds. Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University, 2007): 106. 
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Appendix A: Map of Turkey 
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Appendix B: Timeline of Significant Events 
August 3, 1914: Germany declares war on Belgium, invading the neutral country and 
beginning the Rape of Belgium. 
August 4, 1914: Britain declares war on Germany. 
October 1, 1914: The Young Turk government abrogates the Capitulations. 
October 30, 1914: The Ottomans join the war on the side of the Germans. 
November 2, 1914: Russia declares war against the Ottoman Empire. 
December 22, 1914: Battle of Sarıkamış begins as Ottoman and Russian troops face off 
in the Caucasus region.  
January 17, 1915: The battle ends with an Ottoman defeat and their loss marks an 
escalation of hostilities against the Armenian population.   
April 24, 1915: 250 Armenian intellectuals and leaders are arrested in Constantinople.  
Most were later slain.  This is the date commemorated as the official beginning of the 
genocide. 
May 6, 1915: The New York Times reports that the Young Turks have adopted a policy to 
exterminate the Armenians. 
September 3, 1915: American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Henry Morgenthau 
asks that Secretary of State Robert Lansing recruit a few well-known philanthropists and 
religious leaders “to form committee to raise funds and provide means to save some of 
the Armenians.” 
September 16, 1915: First meeting of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian 
Relief (ACASR). 
October 4, 1915: Report of Committee on Armenian Atrocities released in the press. 
January 25, 1916: “Latest News Concerning the Armenian and Syrian Sufferers” issued 
for prospective donors.  At this point, the ACASR had sent $250,000 and set out to raise 
half-a-million more. 
January 30, 1916:  The ACASR holds a meeting with Armenian-Americans in New York 
City. 
April 6, 1917: U.S. declares war against Germany. 
Fall 1917: ACASR changes its name to American Committee for Relief in the Near East 
(ACRNE). 
December 9, 1917: The Ottomans surrender Jerusalem to British troops led by General 
Allenby. 
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February 19-21, 1918: British forces capture Jericho, beginning their occupation of the 
Jordan River Valley. 
March 3, 1918: Russians sign Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and leave the war. 
May 28, 1918: Armenian National Council declares independence to form First Republic 
of Armenia. 
October 30, 1918: The Armistice of Mudros is signed to end hostilities between the 
Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers at noon the following day. 
November 11, 1918: The Armistice of Compiègne goes into effect at 11 AM, ending 
hostilities between Germany and the Allied Powers. 
January 1919: ACRNE 1919 Campaign. 
January 18, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference opens to negotiate peace between the 
Allied victors and the defeated Central Powers. 
February 1919: U.S.S. Leviathan transports the first group of ACRNE volunteers across 
the Atlantic. 
May 15, 1919: Greco-Turkish War begins with Greek occupation of Smyrna. 
June 28, 1919: The Treaty of Versailles is signed between the Allies and Germany. 
August 1919: ACRNE changes its name to Near East Relief (NER) as specified by the 
organization’s congressional charter. 
February 1920: Kemalist siege of Marash, Dr. Mabel Elliott writes memoir of the 
experience. 
August 10, 1920: Allied Powers and Ottoman Empire sign Treaty of Sèvres that gave 
Armenia access to the Black Sea and parts of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
September 24, 1920: Turkish-Armenian War begins. 
December 2, 1920:  Turkey and Armenia sign the Treaty of Alexandropol, nullifying the 
Treaty of Sèvres and turning over much of Armenia’s land to the new Turkish Republic.  
In 1921, it was replaced by the Treaty of Kars. 
October 11, 1922: Greco-Turkish War ends with Turkish victory. 
July 24, 1923: The Lausanne Treaty formally replaces the Treaty of Sèvres, mandating a 
population exchange to remove Christians from Turkey and Muslims from Greece.  
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